Abstract
We consider and reject a variety of attempts to provide a ground for identifying and differentiating disembodied minds. Until such a ground is provided, we must withhold inclusion of disembodied minds from our picture of the world.
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Notes
A further (Cartesian) question would be, “Can I exist disembodied?”
Gillett (1986) briefly discusses a similar issue and, in effect, concludes that a disembodied mind should be identified with a person.
Flew (1955, 270).
Strawson (1959, 3).
Carruthers (2004, 82).
Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1991, 183).
It might be questioned whether it follows from the fact that something is not extended that it is not in space. Interestingly, Hume’s (1964, sec. 5, 516–553) response to such a query was that it would then be possible, by the addition of other non-extended things, to situate two, three or four desires, for example, in such a manner as to have a determinate length, breadth and thickness, which he pronounced as evidently absurd. Smart (1971) also considers whether disembodied persons can be said to be spatially located and concludes that they cannot. Also see Kim (1996, 48) for a list of objections to this view. We take the most powerful of these to be the following. Consider a principle like: Distinct objects exclude one another from spatial regions. It seems that we would require an analogous principle involving disembodied minds (e.g., distinct disembodied minds cannot occupy exactly the same point in space or have the same point of view) if we are to make sense of disembodied minds having a position in space. This is because it would be absurd to allow that multiple disembodied minds could occupy the same position in space at the same time. Kim rhetorically wonders, “Why cannot a single point be occupied by all the souls that exist, like the thousand angels dancing on the head of pin?” (2006, 51). In the end, Kim argues that we have no reason for accepting a principle to the effect that is impossible for multiple disembodied minds to occupy the same place. And he adds that, “we must be able to produce independently plausible evidence or give credible argument to show that the principle holds.” We agree with Kim that this is an extremely difficult undertaking.
It might be thought that the sorts of mental events being considered appear to be mental events that prima facie require embodiment. As such, they may be deemed excluded from experiences that could plausibly be attributed to disembodied minds, including for example, to angels or even to God. However, the same problems to be discussed in what follows occur if we substitute experiences that seem less dependent on embodiment, for example: insight into the nature of mathematical entities, anguish over the plight of mortal beings, or reverence for the beauty of creation.
It should be noted that, under usual circumstances, if we know that there is a state of being in pain at t1 and a state of not being in pain at t1, then we can conclude that these cannot be states of one and the same individual. But this is because to say that there are these states implies that there is something that has them. If x is in pain at t1 and y is not in pain at t1, x and y must be different individuals. So, two mental states can only be thought to be incompatible if they are both thought to be states of a single individual. So a single person could not both be in pain and not be in pain at the same time. But without postulating some thing of which they are both properties, talking of incompatibility is inappropriate. If then, being in pain and not being in pain are only incompatible in a situation where we can talk about individuals being in these states, the appeal to the incompatibility of these two states must already presuppose that we can make sense of the idea of there being different, distinguishable individuals. We cannot then rely on the contradictoriness of being in pain and not being in pain to ensure that there are distinguishable individuals, for that there are distinguishable individuals is just what is presupposed by claiming that they are contradictory.
It might be suggested that the behaviors associated with feeling serene and being in pain include not just bodily behavior, but a variety of associated mental phenomena. That is, experiencing pain is typically accompanied by a wish to avoid being in pain in the future and dread at the prospect of encountering future pain-inducing situations. On the other hand, feeling serene is typically accompanied by wanting to be in a serene state in the future, and pleasure at the prospect of encountering future serenity-inducing situations. With this in mind, one might suggest that if t1 includes a pain, dread at the prospect of encountering future pain-inducing situations, feeling serene, and pleasure at the prospect of encountering future serenity-inducing situations, then there is a ground for saying that there must be at least two disembodied minds. The suggestion is that the first pair of mental states is to be included in one mind, and the second pair of mental states in another mind. However, a moment’s reflection will reveal that these four mental states are compatible with there being four minds and also mutually compatible within the same mind.
Smythies (1996, 369)
Russell (1956, 277).
Ibid.
This point is used against Russell and others in Shoemaker (1963).
Sosa (1987, 163) considers such a suggestion. He says, “It might be suggested that no soul x could directly experience the mental states of another soul y and that this provides us with the desired relation to accompany with necessity every case of diversity among souls.” However, he rejects it for somewhat different reasons than are presented here.
Interestingly, on this interpretation it would be possible that a throbbing pain might occur without an awareness of throbbing pain and vice versa. This has been a highly debated issue that need not be further debated here, as coming down on either side of the debate will not yield a principle of identification or differentiation for disembodied minds.
Stace (1967, 51–52).
In this vein, Campbell (1984, 44–45) notes the following:
Atoms and material things generally, are individuated and counted by their positions. Non-spatial spirits cannot, of course, be individuated and counted in this way. But then, in what way can they be individuated and counted? If there really is no difference between one spirit and two spirits of exactly similar history and contents (our italics), then spirits are a very suspect sort of thing indeed.
Here Campbell is talking about two souls existing at the same time with the very same experiences and thoughts over time, and notes that they would be indistinguishable, lacking any criterion of individuation. See Shaffer (1968, 38–39) for a similar case. Of course, this is analogous to the case of “mystical consciousness” offered by Stace. However, as we have argued, the problem of identification and individuation of disembodied minds extends well beyond examples of minds in qualitatively indistinguishable states.
Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1991, 201–204).
Ibid, 189.
Strawson (1959, 26) writes, “For the reidentification of places is not something quite different from, and independent of, the reidentification of things. There is, rather, a complex and intricate interplay between the two. For on the one hand places are defined only by relations of things; and, on the other, one of the requirements for the identity of a material thing is that its existence, as well as being continuous in time, should be continuous in space. ... There is no mystery about this mutual dependence. To exhibit its detail is simply to describe the criteria by which we criticize, amend and extend our ascription of identity to things and places.” It is worth noting that Descartes insisted on the conceptual connection between spatial location and bodies. It could be said that he defined bodies as things that take up space (whereas minds, by contrast, only take up time).
We’d like to thank Max Hocutt for invaluable comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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Steinberg, J.R., Steinberg, A.M. Disembodied Minds and the Problem of Identification and Individuation. Philosophia 35, 75–93 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-007-9054-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-007-9054-z