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Brentano’s Concept of Mind: Underlying Nature, Reference-Fixing, and the Mark of the Mental

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Innovations in the History of Analytical Philosophy

Part of the book series: Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy ((PIIP))

Abstract

Perhaps the philosophical thesis most commonly associated with Brentano is that intentionality is the mark of the mental. But in fact Brentano often and centrally uses also what he calls ‘inner perception ’ to demarcate the mental. In this chapter, I offer a new interpretation of Brentano’s conception of the interrelations among mentality, intentionality, and inner perception. According to this interpretation, Brentano took the concept of mind to be a natural-kind concept, with intentionality constituting the underlying nature of the mental and inner-perceivability serving as the concept’s reference-fixer.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Jean Nicod Institute, UMR 8129, Pavillon Jardin, Ecole Normale Supérieure, 29, Rue D’Ulm, 75005, Paris, France

    Uriah Kriegel

Authors
  1. Uriah Kriegel
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Correspondence to Uriah Kriegel .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada

    Sandra Lapointe

  2. Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, USA

    Christopher Pincock

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Kriegel, U. (2017). Brentano’s Concept of Mind: Underlying Nature, Reference-Fixing, and the Mark of the Mental. In: Lapointe, S., Pincock, C. (eds) Innovations in the History of Analytical Philosophy. Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-40808-2_7

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