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Advancing “Ethnic Unity” and “De-Extremization”: Ideational Governance in Xinjiang under “New Circumstances” (2012–2017)

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Abstract

The central role of ideology has been one of the key features of the political system of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since 1949. One of the places where the phenomenon can be observed is the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, a vast, important, and rich borderland area inhabited by some 10 million Turkic Muslim Uyghurs. Since 1949, the central government has managed to win only a limited degree of Uyghur support for its policies, leaving the region riven with protest and violence. The central government has therefore sought to devise and implement policies so as to simultaneously address multiple aspects of Xinjiang’s reality, including ideational affairs. This paper examines the party-state’s ideational governance, i.e. efforts to define and regulate Uyghur values, beliefs, and loyalties so that they are instrumental in maintaining the political stability of the PRC. Firstly, the novel approach to Xinjiang policy adopted by the Xi leadership during its first functional term (2012–2017) is examined, namely its concern with Xinjiang’s growing geopolitical significance and with the security dimension of the Xinjiang problem. Two main focuses of Xinjiang governance are introduced, particularly the advancement of centripetal inter-ethnic relations (officially called “ethnic unity”) and the eradication of religious or cultural practices deemed as potentially subversive (“de-extremization”). Secondly, the ideology relating to Xinjiang is examined within the framework of the CPC’s national-level ideology. Thirdly, new legislation, by which the authorities seek to legitimate Xinjiang policies, is considered. Fourthly, several grassroots “ethnic unity” and “de-extremization” activities are reviewed as examples of the party-state’s efforts to use the Uyghur religion and other intangible domains as ideational apparatuses to inculcate desirable political values. The conclusions reached in this article raise the broader question as to whether the party-state’s resolve to strengthening its ideational governance over the Uyghurs will bring about a change in the security situation in Xinjiang.

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Notes

  1. Tianshan News 2014a. Zhang Chunxian: Prioritizing propaganda and public opinion [guidance], uniting thinking, and joining forces [Zhang Chunxian: xuanchuan kaidao, yulun xianxing, tongyi sixiang, ningju liliang]. 13 February. Retrieved from http://news.ts.cn/content/2014-02/13/content_9307645.htm on 30 July 2017.

  2. CPC News. 2010. The CPC central committee and state council convene Xinjiang work forum; Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao make important speeches [Zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan zhaokai Xinjiang gongzuo zuotanhui, Hu Jintao Wen Jiabao fabiao zhongyao jianghua]. 20 May. Retrieved from http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/67507/11654261.html on 15 November 2017.

  3. Collins, G. 2015. Beijing’s Xinjiang policy: striking too hard? The Diplomat, 23 January. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2015/01/beijings-xinjiang-policy-striking-too-hard/ on 10 December 2017.

  4. This paper generally prefers the English term “ideational” (conveyed best by the Chinese term sixiang) to “ideological” (yishixingtai) to refer to the context of the post-Mao China, as its propaganda generally does not inculcate a “hard” abstract ideological system, but rather a set of “soft”, easily comprehensible concepts, such as “economic development”, “social stability” and “national rejuvenation”. In short, reform era propaganda tends to be “market-friendly, scientific, high-tech, and politics lite” ([6], 1).

  5. Xinjiang is often observed, together with Tibet, as a case study of China’s troubled borderland governance and inter-ethnic conflict that threatens the state’s power [2, 23, 24].

  6. Zhang had succeeded Xinjiang’s long-time hardliner secretary, Wang Lequan, in April 2010 in the wake of the July 2009 violence.

  7. Zhang, C. 2014. The struggle to build a concordant, harmonious, flourishing, affluent, civilized, advanced, peaceful, and joyful socialist Xinjiang [Fenli jianshe tuanjie hexie fanrong fuyu wenming jinbu anju leye de shehui zhuyi Xinjiang]. People’s Daily 26 May: 7. Retrieved from http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0526/c1001-25062091.html on 24 August 2017.

  8. Xinhua. 2014a. CPC central committee politburo meets, examines how to step up Xinjiang social stability and enduring order work [Zhonggong zhongyang zhengzhiju zhaokai huiyi, yanjiu jinyibu tuijin Xinjiang shehui wending he changzhi jiuan gongzuo]. 26 May. Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/video/2014-05/26/c_126550197.htm on 7 May 2017.

  9. Xinhua. 2014b. Xi Jinping: expanding the scale of the Xinjiang minority nationalities’ residence in the interior [Xi Jinping: kuoda Xinjiang shaoshu minzu dao neidi juzhu guimo]. 29 May. Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-05/29/c_1110926294.htm on 11 April 2017. Due to numerous references to the XJWFII, the article references its statement only on the first occasion.

  10. China News. 2014. Xi Jinping has raised clear demands in relation to accomplishing Xinjiang work under new circumstances [Xi Jinping dui zuohao xinxingshixia Xinjiang gongzuo tichu mingque yaoqiu]. Retrieved from http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2014/01-08/5709009.shtml on November 15 2017.

  11. People’s Daily Online. 2011. Advancing Xinjiang’s leapfrog development and permanent order [Tuijin Xinjiang kuayueshi fazhan he changzhi jiuan]. Retrieved from http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/14562/14646342.html on 15 November 2017.

  12. Xinhua. 2015a. One Belt One Road core region defined: Xinjiang becomes “forefront” [“Yidai yilu” hexinqu mingque: Xinjiang cheng “qianyan”]. 1 April. Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2015-04/01/c_1114842365.htm on 22 March 2017.

  13. Pantucci, R., and Young, A. S. 2016. Xinjiang trade raises doubts over China’s “Belt and Road” Plan. Financial Times Beyond BRICS, 10 August. Retrieved from http://chinaincentralasia.com/2016/09/05/xinjiang-trade-raises-doubts-over-chinas-belt-and-road-plan/ on 20 March 2017. For other instances of how the BRI features in political discourse in the early Xi era, refer to Lutgard Lams’ article in this special issue.

  14. “Social stability” advanced by a complex “stability maintenance” (weiwen) campaign has been a primary strategy used by the CPC to preserve the existing socio-political order of the PRC in the reform era since 1978, and particularly since the political crisis of 1989.

  15. Along with perfecting and developing the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, the modernization of the national governance system and governance capacity was defined as the general objective of the “comprehensive deepening of reform” (quanmian shenhua gaige), which was Xi’s landmark term detailed at the third plenum of the 18th Central Committee in November 2013 (China Internet Information Center. 2014. Communiqué of the third plenum of the CPC 18th central committee [Zhongguo gongchandang shibajie san zhongquanhui gongbao]. 16 January. Retrieved from http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2014-01/16/content_31213800.htm on December 16, 2017). For more on the on the role of ideology in the overall consolidation of national governance in the early Xi era, see the Introduction to this special issue.

  16. South China Morning Post. 2016. Passports taken, more police... new party boss Chen Quanguo acts to tame Xinjiang with methods used in Tibet. 12 December. Retrieved from http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2053739/party-high-flier-uses-his-tibet-model-bid-tame-xinjiang on 17 May 2017.

  17. Zenz, A., and Leibold, J. 2017a. Xinjiang’s rapidly evolving security state. China Brief 17(4): 21–27. Retrieved from https://jamestown.org/program/xinjiangs-rapidly-evolving-security-state/ on 17 May 2017;

    Zenz, A., and Leibold, J. 2017b. Chen Quanguo: the strongman behind Beijing’s securitization strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang. China Brief 17(12): 16–24. Retrieved from https://jamestown.org/program/chen-quanguo-the-strongman-behind-beijings-securitization-strategy-in-tibet-and-xinjiang/ on 15 November 2017.

  18. Phillips, T. 2017. China “anti-terror” rallies: thousands of troops on streets of Urumqi. The Guardian, 28 February. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/28/thousands-of-troops-anti-terror-rallies on 1 September 2017. Before Chen, Xinjiang authorities also held ostentatious displays of violence, such as mass public trials involving death sentences (Reuters. 2014. China sentences 55 in Xinjiang mass trial. 28 May. Retrieved from http://in.reuters.com/article/china-xinjiang-crackdown-idINKBN0E80GS20140528 on 1 September 2017).

  19. CPC Central Committee United Front Work Department. 2017a. Central committee united front work department establishes ninth bureau [Zhongyang tongzhanbu sheli jiuju]. 4 May. Retrieved from http://www.zytzb.gov.cn/tzb2010/tzyw/201705/6780be66a7a64d3abfc713ad998412ce.shtml on 28 August 2017.

  20. The creation of a Xinjiang bureau reflects the elevated importance of the UFWD in the CPC’s efforts to garner domestic and international support during the early Xi era (Angliviel de la Beaumelle, M. 2017. The united front work department: “magic weapon” at home and abroad. China Brief 17.9. Retrieved from https://jamestown.org/program/united-front-work-department-magic-weapon-home-abroad/ on 5 November 2017.). This step also signifies the growing prominence of the party-operated UFWD in relation to the State Council’s State Ethnic Affairs Commission in the tug of war over the making and implementation of Xinjiang policy.

  21. CPC Central Committee Propaganda Department. 2009. Popular reader in ethnic unity education [Minzu tuanjie jiaoyu tongsu duben]. Beijing: Study. Retrieved from http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/68294/182630/11030649.html on 15 November 2017.

  22. The CPC’s resolve to recast Xinjiang’s ethnic groups as a single political nation draws on the less successful, yet conceptually identical, attempts by the Kuomintang (1944–1949), Sheng Shicai (1933–1944), and even the two insurgent East Turkestan Republics (1933–1934 and 1944–1949; [26]).

  23. Leibold, J. 2014a. Xinjiang work forum marks new policy of “ethnic mingling”. China Brief 14(12): 3–6. Retrieved from https://jamestown.org/program/xinjiang-work-forum-marks-new-policy-of-ethnic-mingling/ on 11 April 2017.

  24. Xinhua. 2014c. The central ethnic work conference and the sixth state council national ethnic unity progress award ceremony held in Beijing [Zhongyang minzu gongzuo huiyi ji guowuyuan minzu tuanjie jinbu biaozhang dahui zaijing juxing]. 29 September. Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-09/29/c_1112683008.htm on 16 May 2017.

  25. Xinhua. 2014d. “Proposal for strengthening and improving ethnic work under new circumstances.” [“Guanyu jiaqiang he gaijin xin xingshixia minzu gongzuo de yijian” yinfa]. Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-12/22/c_1113736752.htm on 16 May 2017. The growing demand for an integrationist agenda is also obvious in the recent proposals made by some PRC experts and ethnic policy makers to introduce a “second-generation of ethnic policies” (dierdai minzu zhengce), which would abandon the existing classification of China’s population into “nationalities” (minzu) altogether and instead denote China’s de-ethnicized population as a single “Chinese nation” ([29, 33], Leibold 2014b, [16]). This second-generation ethnic policy would necessitate the discarding of the regional ethnic autonomy system (minzu quyu zizhi zhidu) as one of the pillars of political and legal order in the PRC. It was, moreover, argued that this step would not manage to solve Xinjiang inter-ethnic tensions and that Xi personally lacked the authority and political capital to push ethnic governance in the assimilationist direction he desired, which resulted in policy paralysis (Leibold 2015).

  26. Some scholars even find continuities in Beijing’s Xinjiang policy from the late Qing era (1884–1911) to the contemporary era [20, 36].

  27. Leibold, J. 2014a; Leibold, J. 2014b. A family divided: The CCP’s central ethnic work conference. China Brief 14(21): 12–15. Retrieved from https://jamestown.org/program/a-family-divided-the-ccps-central-ethnic-work-conference/ on 5 May 2017; Leibold, J. 2015. China’s Ethnic Policy under Xi Jinping. China Brief 15(20): 6–10. Retrieved from https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-ethnic-policy-under-xi-jinping/ on 7 May 2017.

  28. For instance in the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism signed by the PRC, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in June 2001. Retrieved from http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2001-12/12/content_281315.htm on 15 November 2017.

  29. China Cadre Learning Network. 2016. Xi Jinping’s views on cultural security [Xi Jinping de wenhua anquan guan]. Retrieved from http://www.ccln.gov.cn/hotnews/182276.shtml on 6 January 2017.

  30. Xinhua. 2016a. Xi Jinping: Comprehensively raise the level of religious work under new circumstances [Xi Jinping: quanmian tigao xin xingshixia zongjiao gongzuo]. 23 April. Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-04/23/c_1118716540.htm on 15 May 2017.

  31. A total of four white papers dealing with Xinjiang have been issued since 2012, one of which is concerned with another highly sensitive ideational matter – human rights. (The State Council of the PRC. 2017. Government white papers [Zhengfu baipi shu]. Retrieved from http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ on 10 November 2017).

  32. Wumuti, M. 2016. How to carry out propaganda, ideational, and cultural work in the new period [Ruhe zuohao xinshiqide xuanchuan sixiang wenhua gongzuo]. Altai News. Retrieved from http://www.altxw.com/wyyl/content/2016-11/14/content_9456970.htm on 16 May 2017.

  33. The “Socialist Core Values System” (shehui zhuyi hexin jiazhi tixi) was adopted by the CPC’s 17th congress in 2007 and comprises: 1) the guiding ideology of Marxism; 2) the common ideal of socialism with Chinese characteristics; 3) national spirit with patriotism at the core; 4) the spirit of the times with reform and innovation at the core; and 5) the socialist concept of honor and disgrace (Baidu Encyclopedia [Baidu baike]. 2017. Retrieved from https://baike.baidu.com/ on 15 November 2017).

  34. The “Socialist Core Values Outlook” (shehui zhuyi hexin jiazhi guan) is another component of the Socialist Core Values System. It was adopted by the CPC’s 18th congress in 2012 and comprises three clusters: 1) value objectives at the national level (wealth, democracy, civilization, harmony); 2) value orientation at the social level (freedom, equality, justice, the rule of law); and 3) value criteria at the personal level (patriotism, dedication, honesty, amiability; Baidu Encyclopedia [Baidu baike]. 2017. Retrieved from https://baike.baidu.com/ on 15 November 2017).

  35. The “‘Two Centenary’ Struggle Objective” (“liangge yibai nian” fendou mubiao) is a CPC policy goal stipulated at the CPC’s 18th congress aimed at doubling the 2010 GDP and the per capita income of urban and rural residents, and finishing the building of a “society of initial prosperity” (xiaokang shehui) by the CPC’s centenary in 1921, and at turning China into a modern socialist country that is “prosperous and strong, democratic, civilized, harmonious, and beautiful” by the PRC’s centenary in 2049 (Baidu Encyclopedia [Baidu baike]. 2017. Retrieved from https://baike.baidu.com/ on 15 November 2017).

  36. Xinhua 2016a.

  37. “Five-in-One” conveys the CPC’s view that China’s development should consist of “economic construction, political construction, cultural construction, social construction, and the construction of ecological civility” (jingji jianshe, zhengzhi jianshe, wenhua jianshe, shehui jianshe, shengtai wenming jianshe; Baidu Encyclopedia [Baidu baike]. 2017. Retrieved from https://baike.baidu.com/ on 15 November 2017).

  38. Xinhua. 2016b. Xinjiang resolves to launch “ethnic unity progress year” activities [Xinjiang jueding kaizhan “minzu tuanjie jinbu nian” huodong]. 30 March. Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-03/30/c_1118492556.htm on 1 September 2017. The “Four Comprehensives” concept expresses Zhongnanhai’s direction of governance in the Xi era, namely to “comprehensively build a moderately prosperous society, comprehensively deepen reform, comprehensively govern the nation according to law, and comprehensively strictly govern the party” (Baidu Encyclopedia [Baidu baike]. 2017. Retrieved from https://baike.baidu.com/ on 15 November 2017). For more on the Four Comprehensives, see also Kerry Brown and Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova’s, as well as Lutgard Lams’ article in this special issue.

  39. Wumuti 2016. Other documents also address “cultural confidence” (wenhua zixin), forming the “Four Confidences” (sige zixin), which conveys the Xi leadership’s preeminent concern with the regime’s security (State Council Information Office. 2016. Important statements of general secretary Xi Jinping on “cultural confidence” [Xi Jinping zongshuji guanyu “wenhua zixin” de zhongyao lunshu]. 30 August. Retrieved from http://www.scio.gov.cn/zxbd/tt/Document/1489005/1489005.htm on 1 September 2017.).

  40. These Four Consciousnesses are not to be confused with Xi’s concept of the “Four Consciousnesses” (sige yishi): the consciousnesses of politics, the general situation, the core [leadership], and the [political] line” (zhengzhi yishi, daju yishi, hexin yishi, kanqi yishi; Qiushi. 2017. Establishing “four consciousnesses” requires an unswerving safeguarding of the party central’s authority [Shuli “sige yishi” jiuyao jianding buyidi weihu dang zhongyang quanwei]. 23 February. Retrieved from http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/hqwg/2017-02/23/c_1120519494.htm on 25 August 2017.).

  41. Wumuti 2016.

  42. Leibold 2015.

  43. Guangming Daily. 2016. “Five Identifications” and ideological security in ethnic regions [“Wuge rentong” yu minzu quyu yishi xingtai anquan]. 11 June. Retrieved from http://epaper.gmw.cn/gmrb/html/2016-11/06/nw.D110000gmrb_20161106_3-06.htm on 30 May 2017.

  44. Guangming Daily. 2014. Essential avenues to preserving China’s ideological security [Weihu woguo yishi xingtai anquan de jiben lujing]. 7 April. Retrieved from http://epaper.gmw.cn/gmrb/html/2014-04/07/nw.D110000gmrb_20140407_1-05.htm?div=-1 on 7 May 2017.

  45. CPC News. 2009. “Three non-separations” thinking is the root of ethnic unity [“Sange libukai” sixiang shi minzu tuanjie zhi ben]. 24 July. Retrieved from http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/9717537.html on 15 November 2017.

  46. Apart from the Three Histories, all the above mentioned concepts relating to Xinjiang are also used in thought-work in the Tibetan context.

  47. CPC Central Committee United Front Work Department. 2017b. Xinjiang’s “three histories” cannot be distorted. August 7. Retrieved from http://www.zytzb.gov.cn/tzb2010/whjy/201708/db3b4aa834e34ada9ccb3cfba796ee35.shtml on 28 August 2017.

  48. Xinhua 2014c.

  49. Xinhua 2014d.

  50. Xinhua 2013. Xi Jinping: ideological work extremely important for the party [Xi Jinping: yishi xingtai gongzuo shi dangde yixiang jiduan zhongyao de gongzuo]. Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-08/20/c_117021464.htm on 25 August 2017.

  51. Xinhua. 2015b. Xi Jinping: Consolidate and develop the broadest patriotic united front [Gonggu fazhan zui guangfande aiguo tongyi zhanxian]. 20 May. Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-05/20/c_1115351358.htm on 10 May 2017.

  52. Xinhua 2016a.

  53. CPC News. 2007. Hu Jintao: Implementing the party’s religious work orientation, accomplishing religious work under new circumstances [Hu Jintao: guanche dangde zongjiao gongzuo fangzhen, zuohao xin xingshixia zongjiao gongzuo]. 19 December. Retrieved from http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64094/6675748.html on 15 May 2017.

  54. Meng, Y. 2013. On Xinjiang’s “twenty-six forms of illegal religious activity” [Ping Xinjiang “feifa zongjiao huodong ershiliuzhong biaoxian xingshi]. Uyghur Human Rights Project, 8 October. Retrieved from http://chinese.uhrp.org/article/1499606570 on 1 September 2017.

  55. Baidu Encyclopedia [Baidu baike]. 2017. Retrieved from https://baike.baidu.com/ on 15 November 2017.

  56. Ibid.

  57. Ibid.

  58. Boxun News. 2013. On Xinjiang’s “twenty-six forms of illegal religious behavior” [Ping Xinjiang “feifa zongjiao huodong ershiliuzhong biaoxian xingshi]. 10 August. Retrieved from http://www.boxun.com/news/gb/pubvp/2013/08/201308101151.shtml#.WS1sSzpBpdg on 30 May 2017.

  59. CPC News. 2014. Fourth plenum of the 18th CPC central committee puts forth the general objective and major task of comprehensively promoting the rule of law [Shibajie si zhongquanhui tichu quanmian tuijin yifa zhiguode zongmubiao he zhongda renwu]. 23 October. Retrieved from http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/1023/c64094-25896586.html on 1 September 2017.

  60. CPC News. 2015. Zhang Chunxian: comprehensively promote ruling Xinjiang by law [Zhang Chunxian: quanmian tuijin yifa zhijiang]. Retrieved from http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2015/0107/c40531-26339421.html on 15 November 2017.

  61. Xinhua 2014c.

  62. Xinhua 2016a.

  63. National People’s Congress. 2015. National security law of the PRC [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia anquanfa]. 1 July. Retrieved from http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2015-07/07/content_1941161.htm on 29 May 2017.

  64. Tianshan News 2014c. XUAR religious affairs regulations [Xinjiang Weiwuer zizhiqu zongjiao shiwu tiaoli]. 4 December. Retrieved from http://news.ts.cn/content/2014-12/04/content_10789678_all.htm on 27 May 2017.

  65. Famularo, J. 2015. Chinese religious regulations in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region: a veiled threat to Turkic Muslims? Futuregram 15–002, Project 2049 Institute. Retrieved from http://www.project2049.net/documents/Famularo_PRC_Religious_Regulations_Xinjiang.pdf on 28 May 2017.

  66. State Ethnic Affairs Commission. 2017. XUAR ethnic unity progress work regulations [Xinjiang weiwuer zizhiqu minzu tuanjie jinbu gongzuo tiaoli]. 2 April. Retrieved from http://www.seac.gov.cn/art/2017/4/2/art_7193_279989.html on 1 September 2017.

  67. Xinhua. 2015c. Counter-terrorism law of the PRC [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fankongbu zhuyi fa]. 27 December. Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-12/27/c_128571798.htm on 1 September 2017.

  68. Xinhua. 2016c. Xinjiang to apply “counter-terrorism law” implementing regulations from 1 August [Xinjiang shishi “fankongbu zhuyi fa” banfa bayue yiriqi shixing]. 1 August. Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2016-08/01/c_129195246.htm on 1 September 2017.

  69. Tianshan News 2014c. Eradicating the breeding ground for extremist religious thought [Chanchu zongjiao jiduan sixiang zisheng turang]. 30 September. Retrieved from http://news.ts.cn/content/2014-09/30/content_10575403.htm on 1 September 2017.

  70. Tianshan News 2017. Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region de-extremization regulations [Xinjiang weiwuer zizhiqu qujiduanhua tiaolie]. 29 March. Retrieved from http://news.ts.cn/content/2017-03/29/content_12577663.htm on 1 September 2017.

  71. Similarly, the official Xinjiang Daily has called the people’s war on terror a “battle between good and evil, lightness and dark, between progressive and reactionary forces” (Phillips 2017).

  72. “Advancing the main theme” and “transmitting positive energy” are Xi Jinping’s key concepts of media control and public opinion management broached in the August 2013 propaganda and ideational work speech (Xinhua 2013). More information on media consolidation under Xi is to be found in the Introduction section of this issue.

  73. More on the importance of civility, civilization, and civilization building for the early Xi leadership is covered by Maurizio Marinelli and also by Kerry Brown and Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova in this special issue.

  74. China Civility Online. 2012. Xinjiang’s Kashgar deepens minors’ ideational and ethical construction guided by modern culture [Xinjiang Kashishi yi xiandai wenhua wei yinling shenhua weichengnianren sixiang daode jianshe]. 12 December. Retrieved from http://xj.wenming.cn/wcnr/201212/t20121212_980196.shtml on 1 September 2017.

  75. Xinhua. 2013. For more on the August 2013 propaganda conference, see Lutgard Lams’ article in this special issue.

  76. Xinhua 2014a.

  77. CPC XUAR Committee’s Organization and Propaganda Department. 2013. Xinjiang propaganda, ideational, and cultural force long-term development plan (2011–2020) [Xinjiang xuanchuan, sixiang, wenhua rencaizhong changqi fazhan guihua (2011–2020)]. Xihaiyun dangjianwang, 24 January. Retrieved from http://bhx.xjkunlun.cn/rcgz1/llyd/2014/482167.htm on 1 September 2017.

  78. Famularo 2015.

  79. Bloomberg. 2017. China bans list of Islamic names, including “Muhammad”, in Xinjiang region. 27 April. Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-27/china-bans-list-of-islamic-names-including-muhammad-in-xinjiang-region on 1 September 2017.

  80. Reuters. 2015. Exiles angered as China holds beer festival in Muslim county. 22 June. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ramadan-china-idUSKBN0P20L620150622 on 1 September 2017.

  81. Mortimer, C. 2017. Ramadan 2017: China trying to stop Muslims observing holy month in restive Xinjiang region. Independent, 31 May. Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/ramadan-2017-china-xiniang-uyghur-muslim-holy-month-islam-fasting-a7765836.html on 1 September 2017.

  82. Payton, M. 2016. Ramadan 2016: China bans civil servants and student from fasting in mainly Muslim region. Independent, 7 June. Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/ramadan-2016-china-bans-civil-servants-and-students-from-fasting-in-mainly-muslim-region-a7068481.html on 1 September 2017.

  83. Radio Free Asia. 2015. Chinese authorities order Muslim Uyghur shop owners to stock alcohol, cigarettes. 4 May. Retrieved from http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/order-05042015133944.html on 1 September 2017.

  84. Boxun News. 2012. On rozi 2012, Xinjiang will hold a festival of dinosaur culture [2012 nian kaizhaijie dangtian, Xinjiang jian juban konglong wenhuajie]. 16 August. Retrieved from http://www.bnn.co/news/gb/china/2012/08/201208160601.shtml#.Wag1381Bo1J on 1 September 2017.

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    Ondřej Klimeš

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Klimeš, O. Advancing “Ethnic Unity” and “De-Extremization”: Ideational Governance in Xinjiang under “New Circumstances” (2012–2017). J OF CHIN POLIT SCI 23, 413–436 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-018-9537-8

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