Abstract
This article examines the question of why the risks posed by collective petitioning in China deter some villagers from participating but not others. Based on the statistical analysis of an original dataset and an ethnographic study of one case, this article finds that higher household income is the only significant factor that increases a villager’s probability to participate in collective petitions. Economic security empowers a peasant’s political participation. Contrary to the existing literature, being a demobilized soldier does not significantly increase a villager’s probability to participate in collective petitions. The implication of this finding is that petitioning as a form of “managed participation” in Chinese politics may face more and more challenges if the average Chinese household income continues to grow.
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Notes
For example, in the fourth quarter of 2009, Ministry of Civil Affairs reported that 820,000 persons petitioned. http://files.mca.gov.cn/cws/201001/20100128092527729.htm (accessed on 4 April 2010).
Regulations on Letters and Visits (2005), article 18. http://www.gjxfj.gov.cn/xffg/2009-11/24/c_1395090.htm (accessed on 7 March 2010). Communist China is not the only country that has forbidden collective petitions. For instance, in prerevolutionary France, collective petitions were illegal. In 1648 in England, the Long Parliament “laid down that petitions could not be submitted by more than twenty individuals.” See [1].
Given Timur Kuran’s argument on preference falsification and information cascade, the Chinese government’s limits on the number of collective petitions seem to be understandable. See [2].
The higher that collective petitions reach, the harsher the negative evaluation becomes. Negative evaluations range from “one-item veto” (Yi piao fou jue, meaning that all other achievements are equal to nothing if collective petitions occur) to the dismissal of chief officials from their positions. For example, Anhui provincial regulations require a formal criticism for local officials who face mass petitions that remain for more than 48 h at government agencies with over 50 petitioners at the provincial level or over 20 at the national level. “Mass petition movements that bring over 100 people to the provincial capital (or over 30 to Beijing) result in the suspension of the responsible official.” See Anhui Provincial Party Office and Provincial Government Notice Regarding the Implementation Details of the Xinfang Responsibility System for Leaders [Zhonggong anhui sheng bangongting, anhui sheng renmin zhengfu bangongting guanyu yinfa Anhui sheng xinfang gongzuo lingdao zeren zhuijiu zhi shishi xize de tongzhi], issued September 2, 2003, article 4(3) and article 6(2).
The latest report on this aspect and how the local officials deal with this issue is seen in Minnie Chan, “Intercepting Petitioners is a Thriving Business,” in South China Morning Post, on 3 April 2010. http://www.scmp.com/portal/site/SCMP/menuitem.2af62ecb329d3d7733492d9253a0a0a0/?vgnextoid=7e9aa17db6fb7210VgnVCM100000360a0a0aRCRD&ss=china&s=news (accessed on 4 April 2010).
See Regulations on Letters and Visists (2005).
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/27/world/asia/27china.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print (accessed on 26 March 2010).
For instance, Xincheng District in Pingdingshan of Henan Province received 76 collective petitions involving 1583 persons between January and June 2009. http://www.pdsnc.gov.cn/onews.asp?id=335 (accessed on 3 April 2010).
O’Brien and Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China, 48.
Ibid.
According to China’s official statistics, the country’s rural population was 727,500,000 by the end of 2007. It was 55.06 % of the total population. http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2008/indexch.htm (accessed on 7 April 2010).
Popkin, The Rational Peasant.
Until we include all variables interested into our analysis, the number of cases is 79 due to missing data in some variables.
According to the data bank of the World Value Survey –China (2007), among 1959 respondents, only 6.1 % respondents have signed petitions before. Lianjiang Li randomly surveyed 800 rural citizens in Fujian and Zhejiang Provinces, and only 38 of these farmers petitioned. See [15].
In Chinese, it is “San nian liang tou yan ((三年两头淹).”
Olson, Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.
According to Article 14 in Chapter 2 of the Regulations on Discipline and Punishment of the Chinese Communist Party, one-year observation within the party is considered a punishment because the party member under observation loses his rights to vote or to be elected to any position for a one-year period of time. At the end of the one-year period of observation, there are two possible outcomes. In the first outcome, the person will resume his party membership if he has behaved well and has showed his regrets. However, if the official’s behavior has not met the desired standards, his punishment can be extended for one more year. After 2 years of observation, a person will be permanently dismissed from the party if his behavior fails to justify re-integration. http://www.zsmz.gov.cn/mzdj/news_show.asp?page=1&id=1434 (accessed on 2 April 2010).
For protection of the interviewees, I do not use their real names.
Karl Marx argues that only those who have nothing to lose rebel. See [17].
Olson, Logic of Collective Action, 3.
O’Brien and Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China, 4.
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Acknowledgments
The author is grateful to Professor He Xuefeng and students in the Center for Rural China Governance Studies at Huazhong University of Science & Technology. They helped administer the survey and collect data. The author also would like to thank Jesse Menefee and the anonymous reviewers for their advice in refining this article.
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Chen, J. Who Participates in Collective Petitions in Rural China?. J OF CHIN POLIT SCI 17, 251–268 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-012-9201-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-012-9201-7