Abstract
We study the issue of optimality of policies devoted to environmental goals, building upon the recent and interesting work by Alesina and Passarelli (2010) and extending their analysis to the more general framework set up by Weitzman (The Review of Economic Studies 41: 477-491, 1974). We illustrate instruments that governments have at their disposal to reduce polluting emissions, and we point out the economic implications that may arise from the overlapping regulation through both instruments in the European context. We review the literature on political determination of environmental regulation. On the basis of existing literature, we show that political factors are more important than economic ones in explaining why particular instruments are implemented for certain problems (Hepburn et al. Climate Policy 6: 137–160, 2006). We recognize Alesina’s contribution which states that environmental policy, and the decision to adopt one tool instead of another, is subject to a complex political process. Governments are subject to pressure from politicians, households, and firms because their decisions imply winners and losers. Then, we focus in detail on the work by Alesina and Passarelli (2010) who consider which policy tool and at what level would be chosen by majority voting to reduce polluting emissions; they find out that even if a tax is in general superior to quantity based mechanisms (quotas and tradable permits), the majority may strategically choose a quantity mode in order to charge the minority a larger share of the cost for polluting emissions reduction.
We extend Alesina’s analysis, focusing on the optimality of price-based mechanisms, since it is not always the case that price instruments are more efficient than quantity instruments. To this aim, we explicitly make use of Weitzman results (The Review of Economic Studies 41: 477–491, 1974), which suggest that if costs are highly nonlinear compared to benefits, then price-type regulation is more efficient, while if costs are close to linear, then quantity-type regulation is more efficient. We cast Alesina’s analysis in the European context, analyzing potential voting outcomes, assuming that EU countries can be arranged according to different criteria. We find that depending on the empirical distribution of voting countries, Alesina’s voting procedure leads to interesting different outcomes.
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Bollino, C.A., Micheli, S. On the Relative Optimality of Environmental Policy Instruments: An Application of the Work of Alberto Alesina. Atl Econ J 40, 385–399 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11293-012-9338-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11293-012-9338-y