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Accountability.org: Online Disclosures by U.S. Nonprofits

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Abstract

Why do some nonprofits signal their respect for accountability via unilateral website disclosures? We develop an Accountability Index to examine the websites of 200 U.S. nonprofits ranked in the Chronicle of Philanthropy’s 2010 “Philanthropy 400.” Our intuition is that nonprofits recognize that the “nondistributional constraint” by itself may not generate sufficient trust. We expect nonprofits’ incentives for website disclosures will be shaped by their organizational and sectoral characteristics. Our analyses suggest that nonprofits appearing frequently in newspapers disclose more accountability information while nonprofits larger in size disclose less. Religion-related nonprofits tend to disclose less information, suggesting that religious bonding enhances trust and reduces incentives for self-disclosure. Nonprofits in the health sector disclose less information, arguably because governmental regulations in which they are embedded reduce marginal benefits from voluntary disclosures. Education nonprofits, on the other hand, tend to disclose more accountability information perhaps because they supply credence goods.

Résumé

Pourquoi certaines organisations sans but lucratif manifestent-elles leur respect de la responsabilité par le biais de communications unilatérales sur leur site Web ? Nous développons un indice de responsabilité afin de procéder à l’étude des sites de 200 organisations sans but lucratif américaines classifiées dans la Chronique de la philanthropie 2010, « Philanthropie 400 » . Notre intuition est que ces organisations ont conscience que  « l’exclusion d’une distribution » n’est pas en elle-même susceptible de susciter une confiance suffisante. Nous estimons que les motivations des organisations sans but lucratif en faveur de communications via leur site Web seront élaborées en fonction de leurs caractéristiques organisationnelles et sectorielles. Nos analyses suggèrent que les organisations sans but lucratif qui sont fréquemment mentionnées dans la presse communiquent plus d’informations de responsabilité alors que certaines organisations de plus grande taille limitent ces divulgations. Les œuvres de bienfaisance de nature confessionnelle ont tendance à communiquer moins d’informations, ce qui semble indiquer que le lien religieux optimise la confiance et minimise les incitations en faveur d’une communication spontanée. Les organisations sans but lucratif dans le secteur de la santé divulguent moins d’informations, sans doute parce que les réglementations gouvernementales dont elles relèvent limitent les bénéfices marginaux des communications volontaires. Les organisations éducatives ont par contre tendance à divulguer plus d’informations de responsabilité, peut-être parce qu’elles assurent la fourniture de biens de confiance.

Zusammenfassung

Warum belegen einige Nonprofit-Organisationen ihre Anerkennung der Rechenschaftspflicht durch einseitige Bekanntgaben auf ihren Websites? Wir entwickeln einen Rechenschaftsindex, um die Websites von 200 Nonprofit-Organisationen in den USA zu untersuchen, die 2010 in der Rangliste „Philanthropy 400“des Chronicle of Philanthropy aufgeführt waren. Unsere unmittelbare Erkenntnis ist, dass sich Nonprofit-Organisationen darüber bewusst sind, dass das so genannte „Non-Distributional Constraint“- das Verbot der Gewinnausschüttung an Personen, die die Organisation kontrollieren - allein unter Umständen nicht ausreicht, um Vertrauen zu gewinnen. Wir gehen davon aus, dass die Anreize für Informationsoffenlegungen auf den Websites der Nonprofit-Organisationen von ihren Organisations- und Sektormerkmalen abhängig sind. Unsere Analysen deuten darauf hin, dass Nonprofit-Organisationen, die häufig in Zeitungen thematisiert werden, ausgiebigere Rechenschaftsberichte ablegen, während größere Nonprofit-Organisationen weniger Informationen preisgeben. Nonprofit-Organisationen im religiösen Bereich neigen dazu, weniger Informationen offenzulegen, was darauf schließen lässt, dass eine religiöse Bindung das Vertrauen fördert und die Anreize für eine Selbstauskunft mindert. Nonprofit-Organisationen im Gesundheitswesen geben weniger Informationen bekannt, wohl weil die für sie geltenden Regierungsvorschriften marginale Vorteile einer freiwilligen Offenlegung reduzieren. Nonprofit-Organisationen im Bildungsbereich hingegen neigen dazu, mehr Informationen offenzulegen, vielleicht weil sie Vertrauensgüter anbieten.

Resumen

¿Por qué algunas organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro señalan su respeto a la rendición de cuentas mediante divulgaciones unilaterales en páginas Web? Desarrollamos un Índice de Rendición de Cuentas para examinar las páginas Web de 200 organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro estadounidenses clasificadas en el “Philanthropy 400” de 2010 del Chronicle of Philanthropy. Intuimos que las organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro reconocen que la “restricción de no distribuir beneficios” por sí misma puede no generar suficiente confianza. Suponemos que los incentivos de las organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro para realizar divulgaciones en páginas Web se basarán en sus características organizativas y sectoriales. Nuestro análisis sugieren que las organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro que aparecen frecuentemente en periódicos divulgan más información sobre rendición de cuentas, aunque las organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro de tamaño más grande divulgan menos. Las organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro relacionadas con la religión divulgan menos información, lo que sugiere que la vinculación religiosa aumenta la confianza y reduce los incentivos de auto-divulgación. Las organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro en el sector sanitario divulgan menos información. Podría decirse que esto se debe a que las reglamentaciones gubernamentales en las que están integradas reducen los beneficios marginales de las divulgaciones voluntarias. Las organizaciones educativas sin ánimo de lucro, por otro lado, tienden a divulgar más información sobre rendición de cuentas quizás debido a que suministran bienes de confianza.

Chinese

为什么一些非营利组织要通过网页单方面披露的方式表示他们对责任的尊重?我们设计了“责任指数”,从2010年《慈善纪事》(Chronicle of Philanthropy)排名前400位的慈善组织中,选取200家美国非营利组织,对其网页进行检测。 凭直觉,我们认为,非营利组织认识到其自身的“禁止分配原则”(non-distributional constraint)并无法产生足够的信任。我们预测,网络披露的成因,将由非营利组织的组织与部门特性决定。通过分析,我们发现,经常出现在报纸上的非营利组织,披露更多责任信息,而规模较大的非营利组织则披露得较少。与宗教相关的非营利组织通常披露较少的信息,意味着宗教关系加强了信任,从而降低了自我披露的动力。医疗卫生领域的非营利组织也披露较少的信息,或许这是因为政府对其规管降低了其自愿披露的边际效益。相反,教育领域的非营利组织则通常披露更多责任信息,或许这是由于其提供的服务属于信任品(credence goods)。

Arabic

لماذا بعض المنظمات الغير ربحية تشير إلى إحترامها للمساءلة عن طريق الكشف عن الموقع من جانب واحد ؟ نحن نضع فهرس المساءلة لفحص مواقع 200من المنظمات الأمريكية غير الربحية تم تصنيفها في وقائع العمل الخيري عام 2010 “العمل الخيري 400”. توقعنا أن المنظمات الغير ربحية تدرك أن “ القيود الغير توزيعية “ في حد ذاتها قد لا تولد الثقة الكافية. نتوقع أن الحوافز الغير ربحية لإفصاحات الموقع سوف يتم تشكيلها من قبل الخصائص التنظيمية والقطاعية. تحليلاتنا تشير إلى أن المنظمات الغير ربحية التي تظهر بشكل متكرر في الصحف تكشف عن مزيد من معلومات المساءلة بينما المنظمات الغير ربحية التي في حجم أكبر تكشف عن أقل. المنظمات الغير ربحية ذات الصلة بالدين تميل إلى الكشف عن معلومات أقل ، مما يوحي بأن الترابط الديني يعزز الثقة و يقلل الحوافز للكشف عن الذات. المنظمات الغير ربحية في القطاع الصحي تكشف عن معلومات أقل ، يمكن القول بسبب اللوائح الحكومية التي هي جزء لا يتجزأ تقلل من الفوائد الهامشية من الإفصاحات التطوعية. منظمات التعليم الغير ربحية ، من ناحية أخرى ، تميل إلى الكشف عن مزيد من معلومات المساءلة ربما لأنها تقوم بتوريد سلع المصداقية .

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Notes

  1. We would also like to point out that in addition to some differences in our statistical approaches, Gálvez Rodríguez et al. (2012) study a sample of 130 Spanish NGOs that have voluntarily subscribed to the Lealtad Foundation’s Standards of Transparency and Best Practices (http://www.fundacionlealtad.org/web/jsp/english/transparency.jsp). These NGOs voluntarily submit information to the foundation for assessment, thus “intentionally subject[ing] themselves to an accountability mechanism” (p. 69). In contrast, our nonprofit sample is taken from the Chronicle of Philanthropy’s list of largest nonprofits. These nonprofits may or may not have subscribed to a voluntary program on transparency which would shape their website disclosures. Hence, we believe we have a more representative sample and there is less chance of a selection bias in our approach. We believe our findings are generalizable across the sample of large nonprofits in the United States.

  2. The IRS defines religious organizations not required to file Form 990 in the following way:

    “1. A church, an interchurch organization of local units of a church, a convention or association of churches, or an integrated auxiliary of a church as described in Regulations section 1.6033-2(h) (such as a men’s or women’s organization, religious school, mission society, or youth group). 2. A church-affiliated organization that is exclusively engaged in managing funds or maintaining retirement programs and is described in Rev. Proc. 96-10, 1996-1 C.B. 577. 3. A school below college level affiliated with a church or operated by a religious order described in Regulations section 1.6033-2(g)(1)(vii). 4. A mission society sponsored by, or affiliated with, one or more churches or church denominations, if more than half of the society’s activities are conducted in, or directed at, persons in foreign countries. 5. An exclusively religious activity of any religious order described in Rev. Proc. 91-20, 1991-1 C.B. 524.”

  3. From http://www.oneworldtrust.org/csoproject/cso/initiatives/352/gri_ngo_sector_supplement (Accessed 14 Feb 2013).

  4. Each indicator does not by itself constitute an analytic dimension. Several indicators might reflect the same dimension. If we give the same weight to each indicator, then we may be overstating the importance of dimensions which are reflected in multiple indicators (see Appendix 1). Therefore, we re-estimated our models using a different Index score (out of 100), which weights each dimension equally regardless of the number of indicators it comprises. Results were similar to the original results (available from the authors).

  5. Similar data had been collected from a smaller sample at the beginning of the project (summer 2010), and a great majority of nonprofits’ accountability disclosures did not change during the period.

  6. LexisNexis Academic is a database available to students and faculty from subscribing colleges. It provides access to full-text articles from more than 2,500 local, national, and international newspapers and to wire services (as well as magazines and journals).

  7. Since some cases do not appear in newspapers at all, we add a dummy variable which equals 1 when a logged value is available and 0 when it is not (see LogBound() in [R]).

  8. We want to reiterate that nonprofits classified as “religion-related” by NTEE codes are not the same as the “religious organizations” which are not required to file Form 990 with the IRS. The nonprofits included here perform religious activities, but are not churches (or affiliated with churches), and thus have to file Form 990 each year.

  9. We also estimated a simpler binomial model for comparison. The coefficients were extremely similar, but the standard errors were underestimated as expected (available from the authors).

  10. Traditional regression tables are available from the authors.

  11. 90 % confidence interval between 0.59 and 1.40.

  12. 90 % confidence interval between 0.04 and 0.09.

  13. 90 % confidence interval between −0.72 and −0.09.

  14. 90 % confidence interval between −0.16 and −0.02.

  15. Results are available from the authors. We conducted a variety of robustness checks to determine if the results we presented above are robust to alternative specifications of our key variables. We replaced logged total revenue with two alternative measures for nonprofit size: average number of employees (2007–2009) and number of volunteers (2009). We also re-estimated all of our models using the median of our independent and control variables rather than their mean for 2007–2009. Finally, we estimated the models for each year separately. None of these alternative specifications of the models produced meaningful changes in the results.

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Acknowledgments

Financial support for this research was provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). We would like to thank Chris Adolph for his helpful comments. We also want to thank Emily Fondaw and Phi Cong Hoang for their excellent research assistance.

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Correspondence to Joannie Tremblay-Boire.

Appendices

Appendix 1

See Table 1.

Table 1 Accountability indicators used to construct the index

Appendix 2

See Table 2.

Table 2 Descriptive statistics

Appendix 3

See Table 3.

Table 3 NTEE-CC classification

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Tremblay-Boire, J., Prakash, A. Accountability.org: Online Disclosures by U.S. Nonprofits. Voluntas 26, 693–719 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-014-9452-3

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