1 Introduction

This paper offers a new psychological reading of the Pyrrhonian Skeptic and their way of life (the so-called Skeptic Way), which aims to do two things.Footnote 1 The first is to provide a better understanding of who the Pyrrhonist is (i.e., what is her psychology?), what she does (i.e., how should we understand her suspension of judgment and its connection to certain positive psychological effects?), and why she does it (i.e., what value, if any, does the Skeptic Way have?). Thus, I aim to propose a new psychological lens and interpretive tool through which we can better understand the Pyrrhonist. The second is to ameliorate a tension regarding the Pyrrhonist’s apparent jeopardized status as an inquirer, which contemporary philosophers have noted arises from three claims Sextus Empiricus makes about the character and practices of the Pyrrhonist: (1) the Pyrrhonist is zetetic, i.e., an inquirer after the truth; (2) the Pyrrhonist aims to achieve tranquility (ataraxia) and does so by a suspension of judgment (epochē); (3) it seems to the Pyrrhonist that holding beliefs of any kind, but particularly evaluative beliefs about what things are good or bad and should or should not be pursued (i.e., morally, prudentially, pragmatically, epistemically), causes psychological disturbance (tarachē).Footnote 2 Thus, my second aim is to solve a problem that scholars take the Pyrrhonist to be facing by appealing to this new interpretative resource, namely, what I argue are some notable hallmarks of the Pyrrhonist’s atypical psychology.

In brief, I will suggest that the Pyrrhonist has three peculiar psychological hallmarks. The first hallmark is that she is, in a very strong sense, psychologically compelled to inquire after the truth. This isn’t simply an incidental aspect of her philosophical practice, but one deeply rooted in her psychology, in that her practice of inquiring after the truth isn’t reasons-responsive—she’s unable to stop herself from continuously investigating the truth concerning some anomaly in the facts, even if it seems to her that her sought-after psychological tranquility can be achieved without any such inquiry. The second hallmark is that she is persistently and repeatedly disturbed by anomaly in the facts. I will argue that while this isn’t the only source of psychological disturbance for the Pyrrhonist, it is one which distinguishes her from both philosophical dogmatists and everyday people. The third hallmark is that she is able to achieve tranquility as a result of suspension of judgment. Many people wouldn’t find anything remotely comforting about being at such a complete loss concerning what to believe that it resulted in a kind of doxastic failure where they couldn’t form any belief at all on the matter; however, for the Pyrrhonist, this same doxastic failure yields not psychological distress but relief.

This new psychological interpretation of Pyrrhonism, I believe, has two payoffs. First, it can resolve the supposed incompatibility between Pyrrhonism and genuine inquiry into the truth.Footnote 3 Second, it can help us appreciate a new kind of value of the Skeptic Way and the Pyrrhonist herself, what I will term psychological value. More specifically, it can help us discern two distinct types of ataraxia, both a moderate type of ataraxia resulting from the simple, temporary cessation of inquiry and a more significant, enduring type of ataraxia achieved by failing to hold any evaluative beliefs.

Before proceeding, I would like, as Sextus does in the PH, to add a caveat at the outset. Although this paper makes specific proposals regarding various aspects of the Pyrrhonist’s psychology, the larger thesis I remain most interested in and committed to advancing is that there is something peculiar about her psychology and that attending to this psychological peculiarity can shed philosophical light both on the problem of inquiry and on the value of the Skeptic Way. My hope for the paper is that it will offer others interested in the Pyrrhonists a new framework to use in considering their philosophy. As to the finite details of the hallmarks—I am much less committed, but rather, as Sextus says, “as regards none of the things that we are about to say do we firmly maintain that matters are absolutely as stated, but in each instance we are simply reporting, like a chronicler, what now appears to us to be the case” (PH 1.4).Footnote 4

2 Pyrrhonists are strange

Pyrrhonists are very strange individuals. Perhaps as a result of emphasizing features of Pyrrhonism which pose particular philosophical threat (e.g., the problem of the criterion, Agrippa’s trilemma, the skeptical Modes and their ramification for knowledge) or by focusing on the coherence of their philosophical outlook (e.g., whether they are able to engage in action at all—the so-called apraxia charge—or whether they really do live without belief [adoxastōs]), it often escapes notice just how peculiar Pyrrhonists are as persons. If we conceive of Pyrrhonism as we do the other ancient philosophical schools—as a philosophy that’s meant to be lived and that’s meant to be attractive as a way of addressing problems and living well—then someone for whom Pyrrhonism is suitable is psychologically peculiar along three dimensions: (1) the kind of psychological activity she compulsively engages in, (2) the kind of things that cause her psychological distress, and (3) the kind of psychological capacity she has for alleviating that distress. These, I submit, constitute three particular psychological hallmarks the Pyrrhonist has which distinguish her from other persons.

3 Hallmark 1: recurrent inquiry

In giving an account of the Pyrrhonist’s psychology, it’s helpful to begin where Sextus does in the PH, with a primary activity that characterizes the Pyrrhonist, namely, that she is an inquirer after the truth:

When people search for something, the likely outcome is that either they find it or, not finding it, they accept that it cannot be found, or they continue to search. So also in the case of what is sought in philosophy, I think, some people have claimed to have found the truth, others have asserted that it cannot be apprehended, and others are still searching. Those who think they have found it are the Dogmatists, properly so called—for example, the followers of Aristotle and Epicurus, the Stoics, and certain others. The followers of Cleitomachus and Carneades, as well as other Academics, have asserted that it cannot be apprehended. The Skeptics continue to search. (PH 1.1–3)

And again:

The Skeptic Way is called Zetetic [“questioning”] from its activity in questioning and inquiring, Ephectic [“suspensive”] from the pathos that arises concerning the subject of inquiry, Aporetic [“inclined to aporiai”] either, as some say, from its being puzzled and questioning about everything or from its being at a loss as to whether to assent or dissent. (PH 1.7)

Sextus characterizes inquiry not as a merely occasional activity, but as constitutive of the Skeptic Way. There are two important points to observe here. The first is that the Pyrrhonist’s inquiry is ongoing. The Skeptic, notably, continues to search, and this is reflected in the Greek; the verbs for searching at PH 1.1–3 are both present tense (zētousi) and the inclusion of the adverb “still” (eti) indicates that we should understand them in a present progressive sense rather than as reflecting completed actions. There’s no mention here that the Pyrrhonist stops searching at any point, even if they’re also characterized as suspensive. While the Pyrrhonist might provisionally suspend, representing a temporary interruption in the inquiring process (for one cannot suspend and inquire at exactly the same time), Sextus’ description unequivocally tells us that inquiring is a perpetually recurrent process for the Pyrrhonist. This is so important for Pyrrhonism that Sextus chooses recurrent inquiry as the main point of contrast between the Pyrrhonist and those belonging to the other philosophical schools. This is notable, for there are other features he could have chosen, e.g., that the Pyrrhonist lives entirely without belief (adoxastōs). The second is that Sextus chooses to give primary placement to this feature of the Pyrrhonist. The Pyrrhonist qua inquirer is placed (a) at the opening of the whole work and (b) prior to other important characteristics, such as being suspensive and aporetic. I take this to be a conscious and significant decision on Sextus’ part, for he just as easily could have begun the work with the Pyrrhonist’s goal (ataraxia and metriopatheia, PH 1.25–26) or the Skeptic’s characteristic ability (dunamis, PH 1.8–10), leaving this zetetic distinguishing feature for later (perhaps at the end of PH 1 where he addresses further distinctions between the Pyrrhonist and other philosophical schools). I take this to mean that, for Sextus, inquiring is a fundamental characteristic of the Pyrrhonist and the Skeptic Way.

Furthermore, it is crucial to attend to what the Skeptic is said to be searching for in these passages—the truth (to alēthes, PH 1.2). Some scholars such as Vogt (2012) have suggested that not all forms of inquiry necessarily have truth as their aim, and perhaps, like these, the Skeptic’s inquiry is not aimed at the truth directly, and instead merely demonstrates a certain degree of regard for the truth. While there are good reasons to find this reading attractive (reasons I will address more in depth later), I think we must reject such a conception of the Pyrrhonist’s inquiry, for Sextus’ description of the Skeptic Way here at PH 1.1–3 is unambiguous—the Skeptic is a perpetual inquirer after the truth.

One might think the zetetic quality is meant only to apply to the Skeptic Way, not the Pyrrhonist herself. If so, then engaging in inquiry might be a characteristic only of a particular practice and not of the individual. However, we have evidence that Sextus doesn’t restrict his characterization only to an activity, for at PH 1.11, he says, “The definition of the Pyrrhonean philosopher is implicitly contained in that of the Skeptic Way: he is a person who has the aforementioned disposition.” Some might argue that because this passage follows directly after Sextus describes the Pyrrhonist’s disposition to oppose phenomena and noumena at PH 1.8–10, and there is no explicit mention of inquiring here, we shouldn’t take inquiring to be an essential characteristic of the Pyrrhonist herself. However, I see no reason to think that Sextus’ characterization of the Pyrrhonist at PH 1.11 should only refer to opposing phenomena and noumena. This is because (a) Sextus has already informed us in PH 1.1–4 and PH 1.7 that the Skeptic Way is also partly constituted by the other psychological features of “inquiring” and “puzzlement” (aporia), and (b) once the Skeptic learns the practice of opposing phenomena and noumena, it becomes part and parcel of her inquiring. Consequently, when Sextus claims that the definition of the Pyrrhonean philosopher is implicitly contained in the Skeptic Way, it’s reasonable to interpret Sextus as claiming that inquiring is constitutive of the Pyrrhonist herself.

There are, however, multiple ways we might understand what it means for inquiring to be constitutive of the Pyrrhonist. On one interpretation, inquiring is simply a characteristic activity of the Pyrrhonist. Activities can have many motivations. One might engage in inquiry to prove an opponent wrong or to satisfy the needs of one’s profession (e.g., a detective, a scientist, a medical researcher), but in such cases the inquiring needn’t be a feature of one’s psychology. Such people might not be inquirers by nature, and their inquiring might not be a dispositional or constitutive feature of their psychology. Importantly, inquiry qua activity is a deliberate choice the individual makes and is something she can refrain from doing if she so chooses.

Alternatively, we can interpret inquiring as a persistent psychological disposition of the Pyrrhonist. On this interpretation, the Pyrrhonist inquires not because of some external motivation, but because she’s compelled by internal features of her psychology. The Pyrrhonist’s inquiry after the truth should be read as a kind of irresistible urge to search—it isn’t something that she can set aside or stop doing, precisely because the cause of her inquiring isn’t rational but psychological—she’s psychologically compelled to inquire after the truth. To get a clearer picture of this kind of psychological compulsion, consider the case of someone whose psychology compels them to repeatedly check that the front door is locked. Such persons don’t check the door because they think it rational to do so, but because they experience a deep psychological impulse to check. In cases such as these, the individual experiences a persistent urge to check the door that’s prompted by a kind of psychological disturbance, which can only be alleviated by compulsively checking. Notably, when one has a psychological compulsion of this kind, the individual may even recognize that she has good reason not to engage in the activity. For example, she may believe that the door is locked; she may admit that her impulse is arational and stems from her neurodivergent psychology; she may even acknowledge that the compulsive checking is harmful or conflicts with her other aims; nevertheless, she still may feel compelled to check. Thus, inquiring qua psychological characteristic isn’t a deliberate and rational choice made by the Pyrrhonist, but an arational, compulsive disposition to search for the truth. This isn’t to say that the Pyrrhonist cannot have rational reasons for inquiring, only that her inquiring needn’t have any such rational reasons. Even lacking good reason to inquire (and, as I will discuss later, even having good reason to refrain from inquiring), she will still inquire because she’s compelled to do so by her psychology. In this way the Pyrrhonist’s disposition to continue inquiring isn’t reasons-responsive (see Fischer & Ravissa, 1998), for her inquiry isn’t (entirely) sensitive to reasons for or against her engaging in inquiry. She doesn’t, in a thick sense, choose to inquire. She inquires because it’s in her nature and it’s constitutive of her atypical psychology.Footnote 5

4 Hallmark 2: anomaly as a source of disturbance

But why interpret the Pyrrhonist’s inquiring as a persistent psychological disposition rather than a characteristic activity? I maintain that Sextus gives us good reason to adopt the former interpretation because of one of the attested sources of the Pyrrhonist’s psychological disturbance:

We say that the inchoative principle of the Skeptic Way is the hope of attaining ataraxia. Certain talented people [megalophueis], disturbed [tarassomenoi] by anomaly in “the facts” and at a loss [aporountes] as to which of these “facts” deserve assent, endeavored to discover what is true in them and what is false, expecting that by settling this they would achieve ataraxia. But the main principle of Skepticism is the practice of opposing to each statement an equal statement; it seems to us that doing this brings an end to dogmatizing. (PH 1.12, trans. Mates, 1996, adapted)

We are told here that for this particular group of individuals there are two sources of psychological disturbance. The first is the feeling of distress (tarachē) resulting from an apparent incongruity in some states of affairs—the anomaly in the facts. The second is the feeling of confusion (aporia) that ensues from the Pyrrhonist’s considering which propositions to assent to (which are true, and which are false). Put differently, the first kind of disturbance results from the Pyrrhonist noticing the incongruity in the states of affairs themselves, while the second kind of disturbance results from the Pyrrhonist considering what is said about the states of affairs.Footnote 6 Machuca, however, has argued that it’s not the anomalies themselves that are the source of disturbance but rather the Pyrrhonist’s being unable to determine how to settle the unresolved conflicts in the appearances:

Judging by PH I.12, it seems that it is the very existence of an anomalia that was the cause of disturbance, since it is first said that the prospective sceptic was disturbed by the anomalia in things and it is then remarked that he was unable to determine which of the conflicting appearances exhibited by things he should assent to. However, at PH I.12 itself, and also at PH I.26 and 29, we are told that the prospective sceptic thought that he could become undisturbed by resolving the anomalia, or by deciding among the appearances, or by distinguishing what is true in things and what is false. This means that he took disturbance to be caused by existence of unresolved conflicts of appearances, that is, by the fact of being in a state of aporia as to how to settle them. Hence, it is not the existence of a conflict of appearances per se but the inability thus far to resolve it that brings about distress and anxiety. (2019a, pp. 197–198)

I think we have good reasons to question Machuca’s interpretation here. For one, Sextus clearly states that the Pyrrhonist is troubled by more than one thing, for he links the clauses with the conjunction “and” (kai) to mark a distinction between the disturbance at the anomaly in the facts and the confusion that ensues regarding which of the things said about the facts he should assent to. Sextus classifies the former as disturbance (tarachē) and the latter as confusion (aporia). While I agree with Machuca that the Pyrrhonist’s aporia is a kind of disturbance, it’s important to note that Sextus clearly regards the aporia as distinct from the tarachē, and it’s only the anomaly in the facts that Sextus cites as disturbance. Thus, Machuca’s claim that the disturbance Sextus attributes to the Pyrrhonist is only the aporia cannot be correct.

An additional reason for keeping these two concepts separate is that if we take the aporia to be the source of disturbance, it’s unclear what prompts the Pyrrhonist to begin considering what is true or false in the appearances at all. As Machuca himself states, the Pyrrhonist thought she could become undisturbed by resolving the anomaly, but this means that the disturbance is prior to any confusion she feels in considering which of the conflicting things said about the anomaly are true or false. Machuca’s interpretation would mean that the Pyrrhonist sees some anomaly in the facts and then, just because, begins the unsuccessful process of trying to resolve what is said about them, and it’s the lack of success in this process that constitutes both the Pyrrhonist’s confusion and her disturbance. But this cannot be correct, for it’s precisely because the Pyrrhonist is disturbed that she’s motivated to consider which appearances are true and which are false. Unfortunately, the propositions about those states of affairs are conflicting and, moreover, feel equipollent, such that she becomes confused as to which to assent to.

Some philosophers have noted that it’s difficult to see why anyone would be greatly disturbed by the anomaly in the facts, especially anomaly of the kind Sextus often points to—e.g., whether the honey is sweet, that the tower looks round from one position and square from another, whether the wine is sour, that snow that appears white sometimes appears dark in color, or that the good fare ill and the bad fare well. Mates, for example, writes:

I have known few—very few—philosophers to whom the problem of “our knowledge of the external world” was seriously upsetting…But as to the common man, on such questions as whether it really is the case that the honey is sweet or that the wine is sour, it is hard to see why he would be particularly upset by the conflicting evidence, or if he were, how Pyrrhonism could offer any more help than perhaps the advice to stop worrying about that and be content with appearances. (1996, p. 63)

I concur with Mates here; even if the ordinary person were to perceive any incongruity in states of affairs, the psychological response is more likely to be either that (a) they ignore the incongruity altogether or (b) they end up affirming one of the conflicting propositions about the states of affairs as true. That the Pyrrhonist is both disturbed by these anomalies and subsequently feels confusion about what to assent to is psychologically atypical. But that this is atypical shouldn’t be surprising to us, for Sextus tells us directly that this kind of disturbance is only applicable to those who already have a certain nature—the megalophueis (PH 1.12). The two components of the word, megalo- “great” and phueis “to be or to possess by nature,” suggest that the Pyrrhonist possesses by nature—that is, innately—some great capacity. Often the phrase is translated “men of talent,” which attempts to render into English the innateness of this Pyrrhonist feature (Annas & Barnes, 1994; Mates, 1996; Bett, 2012). The full phrase, hoi gar megalophueis tōn anthrōpon “the megalophueis of humankind,” uses a partitive genitive in Greek, indicating that the megalophueis are a subset of humankind; that is, not everyone is megalophueis. Sextus uses megalophueis elsewhere only once, where the term is contrasted with ordinary people: “even if we have to leave aside the notions of ordinary people and trust the clever men of the most talent” (M 9.63). Being megalophueis, therefore, is a natural and innate trait that only certain atypical people possess. Additionally, there seems to be an intellectual dimension to being megalophueis, since it’s paired with sunetos “clever, wise” (M 9.63).Footnote 7 Back in PH 1.12, it seems that the Pyrrhonists have a distinctive type of abnormal intellectual natural capacity—they are those who, being “upset by anomaly in ‘the facts’ and at a loss as to which of these ‘facts’ deserve assent, endeavored to discover what is true in them and what is false, expecting that by settling this they would achieve ataraxia.” We ought not, therefore, take the anomaly in the facts to be a source of mental disturbance for everyone, but only for those who have a certain innate and natural psychological disposition. I think Sextus’ description of the Pyrrhonist indicates one way that the Pyrrhonist is psychologically atypical as compared to other people. They are psychologically disturbed by things most people barely notice, and furthermore, they find themselves in a state of confusion about conflicting propositions which most people either simply disregard or between which they can easily decide.

Some philosophers have interpreted PH 1.12 as describing either (1) the Pyrrhonists of old—that is, the founding fathers of Pyrrhonism—or (2) a kind of proto-Pyrrhonist or the “Skeptic-to-be,” and claim that once one becomes a “full-blown Pyrrhonist” the anomaly in the facts no longer poses any disturbance.Footnote 8 I take there to be two issues with such an interpretation. The first is that Sextus himself never draws any such distinction between the Skeptic-to-be and the full-blown Skeptic, a point which Machuca (2013, p. 207) himself concedes. All Sextus informs us of at PH 1.12 is that the inceptive reasons for the inquiry of the megalophueis are that they’re troubled by anomaly in the facts. I see no grounds for attributing to Sextus the additional claim that the megalophueis are only the Skeptics of old and that the moniker isn’t also applicable to the present-day Skeptics.Footnote 9 Moreover, even if we were to take Sextus to be drawing a distinction between the amazing megalophueis Pyrrhonists of old and the Skeptics nowadays who aren’t megalophueis, this doesn’t in any way imply that both groups can’t share a common source of psychological disturbance. I am equally unconvinced that we should read into this passage any division between a Skeptic-to-be and a full-blown Skeptic. For if there were such a division, then employing such an interpretation would compel us to view Sextus as asserting that it’s the Skeptic-to-be who is megalophueis, while the full-blown Skeptic isn’t.Footnote 10 Given that megalophueis seems to connote something admirable, it would be odd if Sextus were applying such an approbatory title to those who have not yet become full-blown Skeptics, and who, presumably, would then cease to be megalophueis once they reach full-blown Skeptic status.

The second reason for rejecting such an interpretation is that those who advocate for it must explain why, if it’s only the Skeptic-to-be who’s troubled by anomaly in the facts, the full-blown Skeptic no longer endures this kind of disturbance. As Machuca notes, “Now, what is striking is that the conflicts of appearances remain unresolved once the prospective sceptic becomes a full-blown sceptic—such a lack of resolution is precisely what makes him suspend his judgment—but nowhere does Sextus explain why the unresolved conflicts do not cause disturbance anymore” (2019a, p. 198). This interpretation, then, generates an unnecessary philosophical problem. Instead, I suggest that the reason Sextus provides no explanation for why the anomaly no longer causes a disturbance is precisely because the anomaly still does cause a recurrent disturbance for the Pyrrhonist. Sextus is quite clear about another source of psychological disturbance that the Pyrrhonist avoids—namely the holding of evaluative beliefs about what is good or bad. For example, he maintains that “the Skeptic, by eliminating the additional belief that all these things are naturally bad, gets off more moderately here as well” (PH 1.30, see also PH 3.235–238, M 11.110–118, 11.141–167). Nowhere does Sextus similarly indicate that the anomaly has ceased to be a source of disturbance for the Pyrrhonist. In the absence of explicit assertions to the contrary, I maintain that we should assume that the anomaly represents a recurrent source of psychological disturbance for the Pyrrhonist.

Thus, given that Sextus never distinguishes between a Skeptic-to-be who’s troubled by anomaly and a full-blown Skeptic who’s no longer disturbed by this same anomaly, I think we ought to understand the psychological disturbance caused by the anomaly as something which persists for all Pyrrhonists. This interpretation posits only one kind of Skeptic rather than two, and a defining feature of the Pyrrhonist is her having another type of persistent atypical psychology—she is recurrently disturbed by anomaly in the facts. The advantage of reading Sextus in the way I suggest here is twofold: (1) it’s more in keeping with what Sextus says in the text, and thus we avoid attributing to Sextus a distinction he himself doesn’t make between a Skeptic-to-be and a full-blown Skeptic, and (2) it doesn’t give rise to the additional problem of explaining why the full-blown Skeptic is no longer disturbed although the anomaly persists. Given that being recurrently disturbed by anomaly in the facts is psychologically atypical, and that this kind of recurrent disturbance is applicable to all Pyrrhonists, I take “being disturbed by anomaly in the facts” to be another hallmark of the Pyrrhonist’s psychology.

This second psychological hallmark can elucidate why the Pyrrhonist continuously inquires into the truth of everything. Because the Pyrrhonist is recurrently disturbed by anomaly in the facts, she’s motivated to engage ongoingly in inquiry. The psychological disturbance she experiences qua anomaly will repeatedly arise for the Pyrrhonist given her atypical psychology, and in being disturbed she won’t be able to refrain from inquiring. Thus, the first psychological hallmark of the Pyrrhonist psychology is explained by the second. Because these are features of the Pyrrhonist’s psychology—her nature—this process of disturbance-then-inquiry will be both cyclical (it will occur again and again) and stable (it’s a feature that won’t and, in fact, can’t be eliminated), for these are the very features which, in part, make her a Pyrrhonist.

5 Hallmark 3: the ability to derive ataraxia from epochē

There’s one further way in which the Pyrrhonist’s psychology diverges from the norm, and that is the capacity by which she is able to resolve the disturbance she feels. Sextus tells us that the Pyrrhonist has a certain dunamis, variously translated as “disposition”, “power”, or “ability”:

The Skeptic Way is an ability (dunamis) to oppose phenomena and noumena to one another in any way whatever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence among the things and statements thus opposed, we are brought first to epochē and then to ataraxia. (PH 1.8–9)

While this ability is clearly one that defines the Pyrrhonist, there’s some debate about how far this ability extends. For example, Machuca, in criticizing Perin’s (2010) interpretation of the passage, argues that “the central aspect of this ability is the juxtaposing of conflicting appearances, which turn out to strike the person exercising the ability as equipollent” (2013, p. 211).Footnote 11 Similarly, Bett characterizes the Pyrrhonist’s ability as being able “to engage in philosophical argument on multiple sides of a question. As I said, Sextus says that the Skeptic is marked by having the ‘ability’ to assemble opposing arguments and impressions on any given topic in such a way that they have for the reader or listener, the characteristic of ‘equal strength’ (isostheneia)” (2019, p. 174; see also 2019, p. 110). The reason, I think, for such a reading hinges on whether one takes the result clause as wholly independent of the first clause or as an integral part of one large noun clause describing the ability.Footnote 12 Put differently, the question is whether the Skeptic Way is solely the ability “to oppose phenomena and noumena to one another in any way whatever,” or whether the ability that is the Skeptic Way extends to include the clause “with the result that, owing to the equipollence among the things and statements thus opposed, we are brought first to epochē and then to ataraxia.” Nothing about the Greek syntax leads us to favor one over the other; semantically, the content of the result clause could easily be contained within the ability of the Skeptic.

One reason to think it extends beyond simply opposing the phenomena and noumena is that this ability is supposed to be one that is specific to the Pyrrhonist and the Skeptic Way, rather than one also possessed by non-Pyrrhonists, that is, both ordinary people and dogmatic philosophers. But if we interpret that ability, as some scholars have, as only the ability to oppose phenomena and noumena, this is hardly an ability which is idiosyncratic to the Pyrrhonist. Indeed, being able to consider, for example, how things appear differently between this person and that person, or this person and that animal, is a capacity that appears in other non-Pyrrhonist philosophers as far back as the Presocratics, and even by those who aren’t philosophers at all such as the sophists and rhetoricians.Footnote 13 Sextus himself saw the need to clarify that it isn’t the ability to oppose phenomena and noumena that defines the Pyrrhonist, for he explicitly demarcates between the Pyrrhonist and the Heraclitean along these very lines: “But we reply to them that opposites’ appearing to be the case about the same thing is not a dogma of the Skeptics but a matter occurring not only to the Skeptics but also to the other philosophers, and, indeed, to all mankind” (PH 1.210). Shortly thereafter, when delineating how the Pyrrhonist differs from the Protagorean, he notes that insofar as Protagorean relativism involves opposing what appears to each person, “he [Protagoras] too seems to have something in common with the Pyrrhoneans” (PH 1.216).

What is specific to the Pyrrhonists is that, unlike other people, they’re able to achieve ataraxia as a result of being brought to epochē. For most ordinary people, this isn’t so; many would find the state of confusion and suspension of judgment frustrating and demoralizing rather than productive of tranquility. Sextus himself gives us additional reason to include the achievement of ataraxia as a result of epochē within the scope of the Pyrrhonist’s particular ability. Following the straightforward description of the ability, he unpacks its composite parts, namely, what he means by the terms “ability,” “to oppose phenomena and noumena,” “in any way whatever,” “opposed,” “equipollence,” “epochē,” and “ataraxia” (PH 1.9–10). If the Pyrrhonist’s ability were only the ability to oppose phenomena and noumena, it seems odd that Sextus would further define both epochē and ataraxia as technical terms. I take this as evidence in favor of interpreting the Pyrrhonist’s ability as encompassing the capacity not just to oppose phenomena and noumena but also to achieve ataraxia from epochē.

That we should view this ability as a feature of the Pyrrhonist’s atypical psychology seems clear from the fact that Sextus does not characterize the process by which the Pyrrhonist suspends nor the subsequent tranquility as arising from a deliberate and rational process but rather as something that passively happens to her. For Sextus states that the Pyrrhonist finds herself “held back” (epechesthai, PH 1.9–10) from assenting to any of the conflicting appearances under investigation, which then compels her to temporarily give up on trying to investigate. This giving up is necessitated not by any determination that she has reasons to suspend, but as a result of her feelings of being at a loss and puzzled (aporia) by the phenomenological fact that the conflicting appearances strike her as equally persuasive (isostheneia). There’s textual support for this psychological reading in that almost every single reference to the arrival of epochē in the PH describes it as arising unintentionally. Fourteen of those references are described in terms of compulsion or necessity,Footnote 14 eleven references make use of the passive voice,Footnote 15 and sixteen references describe the Pyrrhonist as inadvertently “being led to,” “being brought to,” “ending up with,” or “having recourse to” epochē (or alternately, that epochē “follows” or “is brought around” for the Pyrrhonist).Footnote 16 Occasionally, all three techniques are used at once, e.g. “we shall be forced also by this Mode to have recourse to suspension of judgment” (PH 1.121). In a way, the Pyrrhonist’s process represents a kind of doxastic failure: she cannot do what she set out to do, namely, discover the truth, and as a result she is forced to give up. This continuous doxastic failure is a product of her divergent Pyrrhonist psychology: she is disposed to investigate into the truth, but she is also disposed to become confused and suspend.Footnote 17 But this feature of the Pyrrhonist’s psychology isn’t merely the fact that she repeatedly encounters this doxastic failure, but that the failure engenders in her feelings of relief and tranquility rather than distress and despondence. In this way, we can actually construe the Pyrrhonist’s doxastic failure (qua inquiry into truth) as a kind of success (qua attainment of ataraxia).Footnote 18 Thus, I maintain that the ability to achieve ataraxia as a result of epochē represents the third hallmark of the Pyrrhonist’s psychology.

We can now see how all three hallmarks of the Pyrrhonist’s atypical psychology fit together. Constantly inquiring into the truth of everything isn’t something that people are typically compelled to do and represents one way in which the Pyrrhonist exhibits an atypical psychology. But what motivates this behavior? The fact that she is repeatedly disturbed by anomaly in the facts—itself a second kind of atypicality. Finally, the Pyrrhonist’s atypical psychology allows her to be able to achieve tranquility as a result of suspension (a type of doxastic failure) where non-Pyrrhonists in such a position would typically feel the opposite. The most significant aspect of these three psychological hallmarks is that they’re constitutive and arational features of the Pyrrhonist. Although they’re interconnected and mutually supportive, they’re not something the Pyrrhonist exercises control over or can refrain from doing. Thus, the Pyrrhonist inquires because she must, because she is unavoidably disturbed by anomaly in the facts. This unavoidable disturbance, which for most people never arises at all, isn’t insurmountable for the Pyrrhonist, because she possesses an atypical and innate ability to derive tranquility from suspending judgment.

6 Solving the inquiry problem

The three psychological hallmarks of the Pyrrhonist may serve as a useful interpretative resource in two ways. First, it can help us resolve the apparent incompatibility between the Pyrrhonist’s claim to be an inquirer and Sextus’ assertion that those who hold beliefs of any kind, but particularly evaluative beliefs, are perpetually disturbed and anxious:

The person who believes that something is by nature good or bad is constantly upset; when he does not possess the things that seem to be good, he thinks he is being tormented by things that are by nature bad, and he chases after the things he supposes to be good; then, when he gets these, he falls into still more torments because of irrational and immoderate exultation, and, fearing any change, he does absolutely everything in order not to lose the things that seem to him to be good. (PH 1.27)

Sextus repeats this same sentiment at PH 3.235–238 in describing how, for a person who undergoes surgery, the belief that something bad is happening to them is often worse than the surgery itself, which explains why onlookers will sometimes faint at the sight of surgery while the one actually having the surgery bears up better. Additionally, Sextus contrasts people who have evaluative beliefs with the Pyrrhonists who, “neither affirming nor denying anything casually but bringing everything under examination, teach that for those who suppose that there are good and bad by nature an unhappy life is in store, while for those who make no determinations and suspend judgment ‘Is the easiest human life’” (M 11.111; see also M 11.141–161).Footnote 19

Perin (2010, p. 13) terms this argument “the value argument” and notes that it looks “very much like a piece of dogmatism.” If it seems to the Pyrrhonist that the only way to avoid disturbance is to suspend judgment about all matters, then how can the Pyrrhonist genuinely engage in inquiry? For if we take genuine inquiry to involve (a) inquiring into the truth of some matter and being open to the possibility of forming a true belief as the outcome of the inquiring process and (b) viewing the attainment of a true belief as (at least in some sense) a positive thing, the Pyrrhonist seems to fall short. This is because (1) if ataraxia through epochē is the Pyrrhonist’s goal, then this suggests that they aren’t truly inquiring into the truth, for their true objective is to suspend so as to achieve tranquility, and (2) if it seems to them that holding beliefs of any kind, whether true or not, only leads to disturbance, then the Pyrrhonist will take great pains to avoid forming any beliefs at all, regardless of whether they’re true or not, as holding any belief seems to be bad.Footnote 20 Furthermore, if the Pyrrhonist has discovered that epochē rather than truth is the means to acquiring ataraxia, what reason could she possibly have for continuing to investigate? Once she has found the means to achieve the sought-after ataraxia, why does she not dispense with the whole enterprise of investigating into the truth, now that she has an alternative means to her end?

Some conclude that once the Pyrrhonist realizes that ataraxia is achievable through epochē, they will no longer pursue the truth. For example, Striker (2001, pp. 117–118) claims, “when he finds himself unable to discover the truth, but nevertheless relieved of his worries, once he has given up the project, the Sceptic also loses interest in the investigation of the philosophical problems.” Similarly, Burnyeat (1998, p. 41) states, “to the extent that he has achieved ataraxia he is no longer concerned to enquire which is right.”Footnote 21 Others maintain that, given the value argument, although the Pyrrhonist might be concerned with giving arguments pro and contra, the Pyrrhonist simply can’t be engaged in genuine inquiry.Footnote 22 For example, Bett writes:

But if “inquiry” is taken, as it naturally might be, to suggest an active and serious search for the truth, then it is misleading as applied to a skeptic of Sextus’ variety; the skeptic is someone who is looking to maintain ataraxia, and who has found a way of doing it in which inquiry, in that sense, has no place. To be sure, Sextus does describe the skeptic as someone who starts out an inquirer—who aims to discover the truth and to attain ataraxia that way; but the shift from this attitude to skepticism itself is precisely the abandonment of inquiry in that sense. (2019, p. 175)

Various attempts have been made to resolve this apparent incompatibility. I will consider three popular solutions here, though this in no way implies that these are the only solutions available.Footnote 23 One method advanced by Vogt is to argue that inquiry does not require that one aim at the truth, but instead that one’s investigation only be “guided by epistemic norms that respond to the value of the truth” (2012, p. 119). On the other hand, Perin (2010, pp. 15–18) argues that the fact that the Pyrrhonist set out to pursue the truth as a means to ataraxia does not entail the claim that this is the only reason why she must pursue the truth. Though the Pyrrhonist recognizes that the sought-after ataraxia is achievable through epochē, she nevertheless maintains an independent interest in the discovery of the truth for its own sake. It’s this independent interest that motivates her to pursue the truth through inquiry. Perin, using the distinction between the proto-Skeptic and the full-blown Skeptic, argues that the proto-Skeptic believes that ataraxia can only be achieved through acquiring the truth whereas the full-blown Skeptic values the truth independently while recognizing that ataraxia is achievable through epochē. Reaching a different conclusion than Perin, Machuca argues that the “the Skeptic-to-be wants to know the truth about the matters he inquires into because he believes that knowledge of the truth is something good or valuable in itself, and so becomes distressed when failing to acquire that knowledge, i.e., that good” (2013, p. 209) and that as for the full-blown Skeptic, “the likely reason why he has remained engaged in philosophical investigation is that he has an inquisitive and open-minded character shaped by his upbringing, education, socio-cultural milieu, and philosophical training” (2013, p. 209). Thus, for Machuca, the Skeptic-to-be has an independent valuing of the truth, while the full-blown Skeptic does not “believe that knowing the truth is something valuable by nature”; rather, Machuca proposes a “deflationary reading” of the full-blown Skeptic’s reason for inquiring “according to which these are mere preferences with which he is left after suspending judgment and to which he has no strong commitment” (2013, pp. 209–210).

I believe there are some significant issues with these solutions, and I shall take each in turn. Vogt’s solution has initial appeal because it locates the alleged problem of the Pyrrhonist being incapable of inquiring with us rather than the Pyrrhonist—it is we scholars, with our narrow conception of genuine inquiry as requiring direct pursuit of the truth, who generate the incompatibility. Vogt’s view allows us to preserve the idea that the Pyrrhonist is engaged in inquiry, not by reevaluating what the Pyrrhonist is doing, but by reevaluating the practice of inquiry. The Pyrrhonist is certainly engaging in activity that in some sense reflects a valuing or interest in the truth, even if they aren’t directly aimed at it, and this is really all that is required for genuine inquiry. Vogt’s view, however, strikes me as unsatisfactory because it requires us to disregard Sextus’ claim that he is in fact engaged in this narrower conception of inquiry. He straightforwardly claims at PH 1.1–3 that the Pyrrhonist is engaged (as are his philosophical opponents) in inquiry into the truth (to alēthes), and again at PH 1.12, he asserts that the Skeptic endeavored to discover what is true and what is false. Although Vogt might well be correct that genuine inquiry doesn’t require that one be aimed at the truth, it’s nevertheless the case that Sextus takes himself to be engaged in inquiry of this kind. I think it’s crucial to take seriously Sextus’ claim in this regard.

Perin’s proposed solution has the advantage of more robustly preserving the Pyrrhonist’s valuing of the truth, since he claims that even once they have determined that ataraxia can be attained without it, they still maintain an independent interest. However, I think Perin’s solution raises several concerns. First, it generates an additional puzzle—namely, whence this independent interest? If the Pyrrhonist set out wanting to discover the truth only as a means of achieving ataraxia, why are they now interested in the truth for its own sake? Second, if it seems to the Pyrrhonist that having beliefs of any kind (and particularly evaluative beliefs) will cause her to feel the very disturbance from which she was trying to escape, what could her motivation be for wanting to pursue the truth at all? If the Pyrrhonist desires ataraxia, it’s odd that she would thrust herself back into the independent pursuit of truth, when, if she actually achieves the end of this alethic pursuit (a true belief), she will only acquire something which seems to her to be harmful. Furthermore, to show how the Pyrrhonist comes to have this independent interest in the truth, Perin must posit the distinction between the Skeptic-to-be and the full-blown Skeptic, which, as I argued above, does not seem to have strong textual support.

Machuca’s solution has some of the same problems as Perin’s, for example, through the use of the distinction between the Skeptic-to-be and the full-blown Skeptic. However, he provides an explanation for the Pyrrhonist’s independent interest in inquiring into the truth, suggesting that the Pyrrhonist’s preference for inquiry is the result of his socio-cultural and educational circumstances. I am suspicious of the claim that we can attribute this preference to the socio-cultural milieu in which the Pyrrhonist is operating. For as Sextus says, the Pyrrhonist inquires into everything, and, as I argued earlier, this level of inquiry diverges from the norm in both degree and subject matter. In other words, I think it unlikely that the ancient society in which the Pyrrhonist lived (and no less so with our modern one) exhorted people, even tacitly, to inquire into absolutely anything and everything, and to do so repeatedly. Additionally, the same issue which arose for Perin’s solution of independent interest for the truth arises for Machuca’s preference for the truth. Why would the Pyrrhonist have a preference to pursue the truth, if it seems that, once she actually acquired it, this outcome would only lead to the very disturbance she is trying to avoid?

I believe the three psychological hallmarks presented above can yield a more satisfactory solution to the apparent incompatibility caused by the value argument. On my interpretation, the Pyrrhonist engages in inquiry into what is true because she is compelled to inquire by her psychology. Moreover, she will continually engage in inquiry into what is true because her divergent psychology also makes her cyclically disturbed by anomaly in the facts, including anomaly pertaining to what is by nature good or bad. Because both her inquiry and her disturbance by the anomaly are arational (that is, they aren’t reasons-responsive), regardless of whether she takes herself to have good reason to avoid inquiring into the truth—reasons such as (a) it seems to her that she can achieve ataraxia through epochē and so further inquiry is unnecessary to reach her goal, and (b) it seems to her that even if she were to acquire a true belief as the result of her inquiry this would only spell disturbance—she will nevertheless alethically inquire, because she cannot refrain from doing so.Footnote 24 The three psychological hallmarks provide us with what I think is a satisfactory account of (1) what motivates the Pyrrhonist to inquire, (2) how that inquiry can be genuine, and (3) why her inquiry is ongoing.

7 A new value of Pyrrhonism

In addition to solving the problem of inquiry, there’s a second benefit of using the three psychological hallmarks as an interpretative tool, since they allow us to better understand and appreciate the value of the Skeptic Way and the Skeptic herself. The type of value I suggest here shouldn’t be taken to be the only kind of value yielded by Pyrrhonism, but rather, from what I can tell, one that has not yet been suggested in the literature.Footnote 25 The value of the Skeptic Way I wish to suggest is quite narrow, and is in fact, only applicable to the Pyrrhonist. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, as Sextus does, that holding beliefs about anything (and particularly evaluative beliefs) is a main source of disturbance for many people. Let us further suppose that there’s some moderate level of disturbance one experiences when inquiring into the truth of some issue, simply by considering something that is yet unresolved; following Machuca we can refer to this as “unresolved conflict” (2019, p. 197). There may also be a corresponding moderate degree of relief that accompanies the resolution (or conclusion) of any inquiry; we might think of this as a kind of moderate ataraxia—this is simply the tranquility or relief that results from ceasing to inquire. If so, then one value of the Skeptic Way is simply that the Pyrrhonist has the psychology she does—a psychology which will (a) regularly allow her to resolve this conflict in such a way that she will achieve moderate ataraxia and (b) allow her to resolve the conflict without forming a belief. We can call this a psychological value. To illuminate the nature of this psychological value, consider one of the more mundane topics of inquiry that Sextus mentions—the question about whether the honey really is sweet. If we imagine two individuals, one a non-Pyrrhonist and one a Pyrrhonist, we can see that when inquiring into the truth about the honey, one of three possible sets of outcomes is likely to occur:

  1. (1)

    Both the non-Pyrrhonist and the Pyrrhonist consider the various arguments pro and contra → both feel confusion → both suspend judgment and achieve moderate ataraxia.

  2. (2)

    Both the non-Pyrrhonist and the Pyrrhonist consider the various arguments pro and contra → both feel confusion → both suspend judgment, but the ordinary non-Skeptic feels frustrated and demoralized as a result and does not achieve moderate ataraxia, while the Pyrrhonist achieves moderate ataraxia.

  3. (3)

    Both the non-Pyrrhonist and the Pyrrhonist consider the various argument pro and contra → both feel confusion → the ordinary non-Skeptic arrives at a true belief and achieves moderate ataraxia, while the Pyrrhonist suspends and achieves moderate ataraxia.

From this, on any given occasion the Pyrrhonist will always be at least as well off as the non-Pyrrhonist, and over the course of a lifetime, the Pyrrhonist will always be better off than the non-Pyrrhonist. This is because in all three outcomes the Pyrrhonist is likely to end up with moderate ataraxia, while in at least some cases the non-Pyrrhonist will feel frustrated and demoralized as a result of feeling that she has no choice but to suspend judgment. Furthermore, in outcome (3) where it looks as if the non-Pyrrhonist might reap rewards equal to the Pyrrhonist in that she feels moderate ataraxia from arriving at a true belief, she will, in fact, be worse off, for her moderate ataraxia comes at the cost of holding a belief, something which, if Sextus is right, will only end up causing disturbance. Thus, even when the non-Pyrrhonist succeeds in achieving ataraxia through acquisition of a true belief, it’s by this same token that she fares worse than the Pyrrhonist. Moreover, not only does the Pyrrhonist achieve more moderate ataraxia, but because she also avoids evaluative beliefs, she circumvents the much larger disturbance (such as the constant pursuit or avoidance of something, the feeling of being tormented by the Furies, irrational and immoderate exultation, on which see PH 1.25–30, PH 3.235–237, M 11.112–118, M 11.141–161) that such beliefs cause, and therefore achieves the more significant and enduring type of ataraxia. While the Pyrrhonist will encounter more low-level disturbance than the non-Pyrrhonist (for one of their psychological hallmarks is that they’re disturbed by anomaly in the facts more than the average person), they will always, it seems, have a way of resolving that disturbance that yields moderate ataraxia, and they will never fall prey to the much greater disturbance caused by holding beliefs about what is good or bad by nature. In this way, the Pyrrhonist’s psychology, which is an integral part of the Skeptic Way, offers a kind of value in that her life is semi-guaranteed to be, by and large, more tranquil than that of the non-Pyrrhonist.Footnote 26 The kind of value I am describing here is the value of being a certain sort of person with a certain way of life—the Skeptic Way. We can see the value in a certain way of life, and indeed in having a certain psychology, even if that way of life and psychology aren’t available to everyone and, very likely, only available to a limited set of megalophueis individuals.Footnote 27

That said, I think that Pyrrhonism might be of value for those who lack this atypical psychology. After all, Sextus himself claims that “because of his love of humanity (philanthropos) the Skeptic wishes to cure by argument, so far as he can, the conceit and precipitancy of the dogmatists” (PH 3.280), thus indicating that he takes Pyrrhonism to be of some value to those who are not like himself. I think, in light of what I have argued in this paper, that one potential reading of this passage is to view it as contending that although not everyone has the Pyrrhonist’s atypical cognition which fortuitously results in a more tranquil life, nevertheless, by getting the dogmatist to recognize the benefits of the adoxastōs Skeptic Way, the Pyrrhonist can improve the life of the dogmatist by getting him to eliminate at least some of the evaluative beliefs which are productive of psychological disturbance. In other words, the dogmatist can attempt to do deliberately what the Pyrrhonist can do naturally. Such reasoning is neither strange nor unfamiliar, for it is often the case that those who have some particular natural capacity that brings about a desired outcome can serve as an aspirational model for those who lack that natural capacity (e.g., the chess prodigy and grandmaster Magnus Carlsen is studied by the average player; the musical genius Mozart by the amateur musician; and the physically anomalous Michael Phelps by the ordinary swimmer at the local pool). Such a reading is supported by the fact that Sextus qualifies the degree to which the Pyrrhonist may aid the dogmatist using the phrase “so far as he can” (kata dunamin) and the fact that the vehicle for improvement is the acceptance of the Pyrrhonist’s arguments, the feature of their philosophy which (at least to some degree) can be appreciated and emulated, even without their atypical psychology. In this way the Skeptic Way can serve as a kind of model that can lead to a more valuable and tranquil life for a much wider audience.