Collection

Scepticism, Value and Action

Humans strive for knowledge because it is valuable. However, scepticism contends that knowledge is impossible because at least one of the necessary conditions of knowledge cannot be satisfied. Scepticism comes in many forms. We will focus on Cartesian Scepticism and Pyrrhonian Scepticism in this special issue because these are most widely discussed varieties in contemporary epistemology. In the meanwhile, discussions of other forms of scepticism are welcome.

Cartesian Scepticism is typically motivated by closure-based or underdetermination-based arguments while Pyrrhonian Scepticism is often supported by appealing to a version of Agrippa’s trilemma. Even though scepticism seems intuitively implausible, it remains an intellectual challenge that cannot easily be dismissed because the sceptical arguments appear to be sound. The premises appear plausible and ones which the non-sceptics would accept. Hence, in diagnosing scepticism, we are led to question theoretical assumptions and draw important distinctions between valuable commitments and apparent innocent platitudes. For this reason, the study of scepticism is a beneficial way of understanding the human epistemic condition.

This special issue is dedicated to the study of scepticism, value, and action. And the following two questions will be addressed specifically. First, whether and how the study of scepticism will affect our action? Traditionally, scepticism is deemed as little more than a theoretical puzzle, one that demands a solution but where the lack of a solution shouldn’t affect our life. However, if Cartesian Scepticism were true, how should we view and handle our epistemic risk? If Pyrrhonian Scepticism were true, what shall we do when disagreement is present? Second, in solving the sceptical challenge and defending the possibility of knowledge, what value, epistemic or otherwise, are we preserving? To evade the sceptical problem, one easy route is to lower the requirement of knowledge so that the sceptical argument does not work and knowledge is easier to attain. However, in doing so, the pursuit of knowledge is less appealing. Hence, can we find a sophisticated balance between preserving valuable knowledge and evading the sceptical attack?

Appropriate Topics for Submission include, among others:

(1) What are the positive values in reflections on scepticism?

(2) How to diagnose the Cartesian scepticism and the Pyrrhonian scepticism?

(3) Does scepticism affect our action? If so, in what ways?

(4) How the study of axiology informs the study of scepticism?

(5) Does the Agrippa’s trilemma reflect the true purpose of the Pyrrhonian scepticism?

(6) How to understand the Cartesian scepticism and the Pyrrhonian scepticism respectively?

(7) Other forms of scepticism.

For further information, please contact the guest editor(s):

Ju Wang

Peter Klein

The deadline for submissions is 19th November 2023

Submissions via: editorialmanager

Editors

  • Ju Wang

  • Peter Klein

    Peter David Klein (born September 17, 1940) is an American philosopher specializing in issues in epistemology who spent most of his career at Rutgers University. Klein is widely known for his work on skepticism. His most influential work, however, is on the nature of knowledge, where he has long defended the defeasibility theory. His recent work defends infinitism about justification.

Articles (5 in this collection)

  1. Hinge commitments and trust

    Authors

    • Duncan Pritchard
    • Content type: Original Research
    • Open Access
    • Published: 27 October 2023
    • Article: 149