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Argumentation and the problem of agreement

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Abstract

A broad assumption in argumentation theory is that argumentation primarily regards resolving, confronting, or managing disagreement. This assumption is so fundamental that even when there does not appear to be any real disagreement, the disagreement is suggested to be present at some other level. Some have questioned this assumption (most prominently, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, and Doury), but most are reluctant to give up on the key idea that persuasion, the core of argumentation theory, can only regard disagreements. We argue here that this assumption is false. Argument may be as much about strengthening or maintaining agreement as it is about disagreement. Once we see how argument is possible and manifestly enacted under conditions of agreement, then we have tools to explain otherwise curious fallacies and argumentative phenomena.

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Notes

  1. Michael Gilbert (1997) elaborates, adding “Ordinary Usage” to a list of canonical definitions of arguments (from informal logic, pragma-dialectics, rhetoric, and discourse analysis): An argument is “a conflictual experience charged with emotion where opposing beliefs, desires and/or attitudes are involved.” (32).

  2. To be clear, however, Moldovan seems to walk this back somewhat when he asserts that a felicity condition of an argument is that some subject S does not accept some proposition p in advance of the arguing. This is, by the way, what distinguishes arguments from implicatures, “I can felicitously assert O and implicate that P even if I know that you already believe that P” (307).

  3. An alternative to the disagreement-first view of argument, if this is a reasonable name, is what we might call the “argument everywhere” view: Argument1s are not produced in the face of disagreement or controversy only. They’re always there because of the rational structure of our beliefs. Beliefs, qua beliefs, are caused by other beliefs as reasons. Whether we share these beliefs, or investigate their relations is a separate question.

  4. Broader discussion of the function of argument as such can be found in Goodwin (2007) and especially Mohammed (2016). Goodwin argues that argument has no particular function. Mohammed offers a detailed analysis of the various functions of argument.

  5. The distinction between Argument1 and Argument2 often hinges on a distinction between reasoning and arguing, or exchanging reasoning products. Mercier and Sperber’s Argumentative Theory of Reason collapses this distinction by arguing that the purpose of reasoning is to convince others with arguments. See (2011).

  6. For commentary on this requirement, see Moldovan (2012).

  7. Hansen also worries that the focus on Argument1 tokens trivializes the subject matter (Hansen, 2002, p. 265). For discussion, see (see Goddu, 2009, 2014).

  8. Johnson and Blair shade the matter of primacy of persuasion a bit differently: “probably the most frequent use of arguments is to try to persuade another or others to accept or agree with the arguer’s opinion (2006, p. 9). They are quick to note that this is not the only purpose of argument: “they can be used to investigate a hypothesis (by seeing what reasons might be given to support a claim, or to understand what one is committed to in accepting some claim (by seeing what other claims it leads to or supports) or to reinforce people’s opinions (by giving them further reasons for believing what they are already disposed to believe and answering objections or criticisms).” (ibid; emphasis added).

  9. A telling illustration of the salience of disagreement in informal logic can be found in the distinction between arguments and explanations. Informal logic style texts (such as Hurley and Watson and Baronett) are famous, or perhaps infamous, for their product-centered picture of argumentation. But even here we find a picture of controversy lurking in the background. It is a regular phenomenon for the textbook writers to labor to distinguish argument and explanation. A strategy that makes sense of the distinction is a pragmatic one: arguments involve controversy, and therefore disagreement. You offer an explanation when you agree on the explanandum, but don’t know the explanans (but are prepared to accept it). Baronett, for instance, in commenting on what purports to be an example of an explanation, observes: “This speaker does not dispute the fact that the cell phone went off during the exam; he is attempting to explain why it happened (2013, p. 19). Hurley and Watson put the matter in two ways: (1) whether someone is trying to prove something; and (2) whether the explanandum (or conclusion) is an accepted matter of fact (2018, p. 17). At bottom, while the tendency among texts of this sort (and a surprising number of informal logicians) is to consider the distinction between argument and explanation a structural question (since argument is defined structurally), the justification relies on pragmatic criteria based on some notion of implied controversy or disagreement. See McKeon (2013) for the structural-pragmatic criteria for distinguishing (or not, as he argues) arguments from explanation.

  10. See Aikin (2021) and Aikin and Casey (2022) for reasons-contrastivist accounts of argument.

  11. See Plunkett (2015) and Plunkett and Sundell (2021) for an account of pragmatist norms for metalinguistic negotiation.

  12. As noted by Aikin and Talisse (2008) and Aikin and Casey (2011, 2022).

  13. Aikin and Casey (2022) call this the puzzle of effectiveness for straw man arguments. That audience commitments regarding the issue and participants in a dialogue influence audience-effectiveness for straw man arguments has been shown in Bizer et al. (2009) and Schumann et al. (2020).

  14. By contrast, a base strategy seeks to energize people who already agree. According to Bitecofer, in 2016 Democratic Presidential candidate Hilary Clinton pursued, to her great disappointment, a persuasion strategy while the Trump campaign followed a base strategy.

  15. Not to say they didn’t try: https://www.burr.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/RussRptInstlmt1-%20ElecSec%20Findings,Recs2.pdf.

  16. For detailed discussion of the tactics of the Internet Research Agency, a Russian-state supported agency, see https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/new-evidence-shows-how-russias-election-interference-has-gotten-more and the US Senate report: The Tactics & Tropes of the Internet Research Agency.

  17. For a (terrifying) discussion see Kosinksi et al. (2013): Individual traits and attributes can be predicted to a high degree of accuracy based on records of users’ Likes....For example, the best predictors of high intelligence include “Thunderstorms,” “The Colbert Report,” “Science,” and “Curly Fries,” whereas low intelligence was indicated by “Sephora,” “I Love Being A Mom,” “Harley Davidson,” and “Lady Antebellum.”.

  18. Mercier writes: “When we encounter a message that challenges our views—like being asked to vote for a candidate we don't already favo—our first reaction is usually to reject it. We change our minds only if we are provided with good arguments, ideally in the context of a discussion and from a source we perceive as competent and trustworthy. Gaining voters' trust or engaging them in proper discussion is very hard to do en masse, which is why large-scale persuasion nearly invariably fails to convince us.”

  19. The authors wish to thank the two anonymous reviewers for this journal for their justly critical and ultimately helpful comments. In addition, they wish to thank Lucy Alsip Vollbrecht, Michael Baumtrog, Matt Ferkany, David Godden, Robert Talisse, Armina Sharif, and the audiences at the Association for Philosophy of Education at the 2020 Central APA and the Ethics and Argumentation Workshop, hosted by Katharina Stevens and Andrew Aberdein.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Vanderbilt University, 018A Furman Hall, Nashville, TN, 37240-6319, USA

    Scott F. Aikin

  2. Northeastern Illinois University, 5500 N. St. Louis, Chicago, IL, 60625, USA

    John Casey

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Aikin, S.F., Casey, J. Argumentation and the problem of agreement. Synthese 200, 134 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03680-4

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