Abstract
I present in this article a new theory of structural properties or, more precisely, of structural kinds, such as being methane. According to this theory, structural kinds are kinds that are both emergent and sustained in their existence. In the first section, I introduce structural properties and four problems that affect the most widely held conception of them, namely, the pictorial conception. In the second section, I introduce some theses about emergence, powers, emergent powers, relations and structures that I have defended in other works and that constitute the basis on which my theory of structural kinds is built up. In the third section, I eventually develop my theory in full detail and show how it can solve the problems mentioned in the second section. Finally, in the fourth section, I face five objections and briefly compare my account with some other accounts of structural properties.
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Notes
See Fisher (2018).
In this case, of course, such a necessity is based on the nature of structural properties.
The involved-properties are the properties of proper parts (e.g., of hydrogen and carbon atoms) whose instantiation is involved by the instantiation of structural properties by complex objects (e.g., methane molecules).
I shall not provide here a characterization of natural kinds, as an intuitive and pre-theoretical understanding of the latter is enough for the sake of this article. On natural kinds, see for example Bird and Tobin (2017). In Bird and Tobin (2017)’s terms, such an intuitive understanding could be expressed as follows: a natural kind is “a grouping that reflects the structure of the natural world rather than the interests and actions of human beings”. I take the entities that are grouped to be substances.
This principle states that, given a certain collection of parts, there is only one whole that they compose.
See Kalhat (2008).
Examples of the first strategy are given by Pagès (2002), Kalhat (2008), Bigelow and Pargetter (1989, 1990). Examples of the second strategy are given by Armstrong (1986), Forrest (1986, 2006, 2016), Hawley (2010) and Bennett (2013). Campbell (1990) tries to solve the first two problems by appealing to tropes, whereas Armstrong (1997) tries to solve them by stating that universals are types of states of affairs.
See Paolini Paoletti (2018a), where I develop the contrast between weak and strong ontological emergence. I take weak ontological emergence to be nothing but some sort of sui generis and special dependence relation between the weakly emergent entities and their emergence bases. On this distinction, see also Wilson (2015). For some recent overviews of emergence, see Paolini Paoletti (2017), Gibb et al. (2018), Sartenaer (2018) and Tabaczek (2019).
In this article, by talking of “primary substances” and of “substances” in general, I shall refer to entities that bear further entities without being borne by any other entity. In sum, I shall adopt the characterization of substances provided by Aristotle in his Categories. Such a characterization does not rule out that substances can also have further features (e.g., enduring, being ontologically independent, etc.).
In Paolini Paoletti (2018b), I have defended further theses about powers, that I shall not recall here. For example, I have held that the activation conditions of non-basic powers are essential to the latter.
Of course, in this case, the idea that the components of e1 (i.e., certain substances) are more fundamental than the properties/powers/relations contributing to the emergence of p1 is at risk.
Such configurational relations may be in turn the effects of the activation of further lower-level powers (with respect to those included in the emergence bases). Yet, this possibility does not affect the independence of emergent powers. For emergent powers—though depending on their bases for their possession—are still independent for their activation. Moreover, call “relation-engendering powers” the lower-level powers that produce the configurational relations. Relation-engendering powers cannot replace configurational relations in emergence bases. For the mere presence of such powers does not account for emergence. Emergence is accounted for (also) by the effects of such powers, i.e., configurational relations. Finally, at least in the case of sustenance, we cannot rule out that some relation-engendering powers may also be borne by sustained entities themselves. Some of such entities can be taken to act on themselves so as to preserve their own existence.
Yet, I am not committed here to the idea that every relational predicate has a distinct relation as its ontological counterpart. Namely, I am not committed to an “abundant” conception of relations.
At least insofar as spatial relations—such as being near—do not entirely depend on intrinsic properties of entities in space. Additionally, this view also rejects the idea that relations can be replaced with relational properties, such as that of being near Desdemona.
On the ontology of relations, see MacBride (2016).
Some contemporary hylomorphists claim that structures play the role of Aristotelian forms. For a discussion, see Paolini Paoletti (2018c).
Yet, my characterizations of emergence-engendering and sustenance-engendering structures in Sect. 3 will assume that the latter conjoin all the structures an entity has at different times.
“In virtue of” should be attached to non-basic powers, whereas “only if” should be attached to basic ones.
In this respect, SE somehow resembles the conjunctive properties accepted by Armstrong (1978). However, unlike paradigmatic conjunctive properties (e.g., being an animal and being rational), SE has further relations as its relata. Moreover, unlike being an animal and being rational, it is not borne by one and only one entity (e.g., a human being). At best, SE is borne by different bearers (i.e., all the relata of the relations involved in SE) or by no specific entity at all. If one is suspicious of conjunctive properties as such—as I am—one should not worry about SE. For the role of SE in this context only consists in taking together all the emergence-engendering sub-structures contributing to the emergence of p1. SE has no specific explanatory work to do. I also assume that relations such as SE may have more than two “conjuncts”, i.e., that more than two relations may be related in relations such as SE.
I assume here that emergence is a not a process extended in time, so that the relations conjoined in SE hold between their relata at one and the same time (i.e., the time of emergence). However, one could also take emergence as a process extended in time and claim that the relations in SE hold at distinct times. SE must nevertheless conjoin all such relations.
Again, I assume here that emergence is a not a process extended in time, so that the components of the emergence base are placed at one and the same time (i.e., the time of emergence). However, one could also take emergence as a process extended in time and claim that the components of the emergence base are placed at distinct times. It goes without saying that the emergence base must nevertheless include all such components.
Mutatis mutandis, what has been claimed in note 21 with respect to SE may be also claimed with respect to emergence-engendering structural bases.
I have added the conjunct “it is a kind” in order to let the equivalence hold. Otherwise, I should have just claimed: “only if it has at one emergence-engendering structural base”. For even emergent powers—to be distinguished from emergent kinds—have emergence-engendering structural bases.
In principle, a sustained power may also sustain itself, i.e., it may also produce or contribute to producing its own continued possession by its bearer through its own activation (even if this would imply a reformulation of (SP)). In this case, it would be a self-sustained power. However, self-sustained powers will not be relevant for our discussion.
It is not necessary—though it is possible—that sustenance-engendering structures coincide with emergence-engendering ones.
Since sustenance seems to be a process extended in time, one should respectively include in SS and in the sustenance base all the relations and all the entities that participate in this process over time. See also notes 22 and 23.
Moreover, it is not necessary—though it is possible—that sustenance-engendering structural bases coincide with emergence-engendering ones.
This does not rule out that there can also be an explanation as to why certain relations (e.g., those between the atoms of a methane molecule) are emergence-engendering and sustenance-engendering structures. Yet, being these relations external, such an explanation cannot make the obtaining of these relations entirely dependent on the essence/existence/intrinsic properties of the relata.
In addition, I point out that the activation of emergent powers can only be due to higher-level entities. Therefore, it must be either basic—if such powers are basic—or it must also or only involve higher-level entities (i.e., substances, powers and/or activation conditions). At least in the latter case, this seems to imply that there could also be corresponding higher-level laws of nature as concerns their activation. Nevertheless, such laws could also be absent, if there were no natural regularities to be accounted for in this respect.
For some arguments for strong emergence, see Paolini Paoletti (2017).
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Paolini Paoletti, M. Emergence and structural properties. Synthese 198, 8755–8778 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02599-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02599-y