Abstract
Traditionally, philosophical inquiry into pedagogical issues has occurred far from the classrooms in which pedagogy materialises. However, an organised form of inquiry into issues of a normative nature (about what ought to be done pedagogically) and of an analytic nature (about the meaning of pedagogical concepts), making use of ideas obtained in an empirical way in classroom and classroom-related situations, is both feasible and desirable. About desirability, this form of inquiry depends on the particularities of the local situations, and that helps to take them into account when deciding on how to improve pedagogical practice. That is, it contextualises pedagogical decisions. About feasibility for normative issues, an analysis based on Donald Davidson’s philosophy of language shows that there is nothing that compels empirical observations to be descriptive and to not be normative. And normative occasional beliefs acquired empirically can serve as a general confrontation or testing field for ideas about the justification of pedagogical actions or strategies. About feasibility for analytic issues, as a consequence of giving up the analytic–synthetic distinction it is argued that they can also be explored by means of occasional beliefs acquired empirically, when confronted with the implications of the definition of any pedagogical concept.
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Notes
In the literature, the expression ‘what works?’ has sometimes been associated with experimental or quasi-experimental types of research (Slavin 2002; Olson 2004). Nevertheless, I think that this expression also describes appropriately what is important for other alternative research approaches whose methods do not resemble those of the natural sciences, and in which teachers’ and administrators’ learning about what works may be a main result sought after—even if that learning is not or cannot be translated into formal theories.
I will not, however, deal with the difficult issue of how causal conclusions can be derived from empirical observations. That is beyond the scope of this paper.
The idea of ‘testing’ should be taken here in a broad sense, and not necessarily as a process leading to a full confirmation (proof) or refutation of some hypothesis.
If the analytic–synthetic distinction could be drawn, then it might be possible to find a (limited) number of analytic sentences that define the meaning of any one sentence or word. To understand any sentence or a word would be to understand the set of sentences that define its meaning.
Given the above discussion about Quine’s rejection of the analytic–synthetic distinction, the expression ‘analytic questions’ may be unfortunate. Nevertheless, I use it here for convenience, but without trying to establish any clearcut distinction with other questions. The borders are fuzzy. Analytic questions would be those that, in Rorty’s terminology, would tend to be answered more by looking them up in a dictionary rather than in an encyclopaedia (Rorty 1991). Quine warns us against taking too seriously this distinction between dictionaries and encyclopaedias.
Interpretation requires that the charity principle be observed. According to it, any interpreter has to grant truth to a great many of any speaker’s beliefs, if she will be able to interpret any sentence that the speaker asserts, true or false. ‘Disagreement and agreement alike are intelligible only against a background of massive agreement’ (Davidson 1973, p. 137). This is not a practical suggestion to make interpretation easier; it is rather an essential principle for meaning and language to make sense at all (Ramberg 1989).
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Mejía D., A. My Self-as-Philosopher and My Self-as-Scientist Meet to do Research in the Classroom: Some Davidsonian Notes on the Philosophy of Educational Research. Stud Philos Educ 27, 161–171 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-007-9096-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-007-9096-5