Abstract
The present paper aims to examine whether the impact of economic growth on political rights/civil liberties depends on the political environment. The paper introduces the concept of political disinterest, which defines social unawareness/unresponsiveness to the loss of political rights/civil liberties in cases of expansion of economic opportunities, and which is proxied by economic growth in the empirical part of the study. The paper argues that political disinterest causes a negative impact of economic growth on political rights/civil liberties. The study uses data for 142 countries from 1996 to 2017 to empirically evaluate whether the impact of economic growth on political rights depends on the political environment. System Generalized Method of Methods (GMM) is used to take account of reverse causality, country-based heterogeneities, and heteroscedasticity problems. The estimation result shows that the impact of economic growth on political rights/civil liberties is positive for democracies but negative for autocracies. The results also indicate the presence of political disinterest only in the context of autocratic countries, which is referred to in the hypothesis in the body of the paper. The results also suggest that the presence of political disinterest in autocratic countries is only valid for non-fiscal expansions in which economic growth is not financed by government funds.
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Appendices
Appendix 1 List of countries
Democratic countries | |||
|---|---|---|---|
Albania | El Salvador | Lithuania | Philippines |
Argentina | Estonia | Luxembourg | Poland |
Armenia | Finland | Madagascar | Portugal |
Australia | France | Malawi | Romania |
Austria | Georgia | Malaysia | Russian Federation |
Bangladesh | Germany | Mali | Senegal |
Belgium | Ghana | Mauritius | Sierra Leone |
Benin | Greece | Mexico | Slovak Republic |
Bolivia | Guatemala | Moldova | Slovenia |
Botswana | Guinea-Bissau | Mongolia | Solomon Islands |
Brazil | Guyana | Mozambique | South Africa |
Bulgaria | Haiti | Namibia | Spain |
Burundi | Honduras | Nepal | Sri Lanka |
Cabo Verde | Hungary | Netherlands | Suriname |
Canada | India | New Zealand | Sweden |
Chile | Indonesia | Nicaragua | Switzerland |
Colombia | Ireland | Niger | Thailand |
Comoros | Israel | Nigeria | Trinidad and Tobago |
Congo, Dem. Rep | Italy | North Macedonia | Turkey |
Costa Rica | Jamaica | Norway | Ukraine |
Cyprus | Japan | Pakistan | United Kingdom |
Czech Republic | Kenya | Panama | United States |
Denmark | Kyrgyz Republic | Papua New Guinea | Uruguay |
Dominican Republic | Latvia | Paraguay | Zambia |
Ecuador | Lesotho | Peru | |
Autocratic countries | |||
Algeria | Congo, Rep | Kazakhstan | Tajikistan |
Angola | Cote d'Ivoire | Kuwait | Tanzania |
Azerbaijan | Cuba | Lao PDR | Togo |
Bahrain | Egypt, Arab Rep | Mauritania | Tunisia |
Belarus | Equatorial Guinea | Morocco | Turkmenistan |
Bhutan | Ethiopia | Myanmar | Uganda |
Burkina Faso | Fiji | Oman | United Arab Emirates |
Cambodia | Gabon | Rwanda | Uzbekistan |
Cameroon | Guinea | Saudi Arabia | Vietnam |
Chad | Iran, Islamic Rep | Singapore | Yemen |
China | Jordan | Sudan | |
Appendix 2 Definition and source of the variables
Variable | Definition | Source |
|---|---|---|
Rights | 8-((political rights + civil rights)/2) | Freedom house (2022) |
Economic growth | GDP growth (annual %) | World development indicators (2022) |
Income per capita | GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) | World development indicators (2022) |
Variables for political disinterest | ||
Budget deficit | Government expenditure-government revenue | |
General government revenue | International monetary fund (2022) | |
General government total expenditure | International monetary fund (2022) | |
Primary balance | General government primary net lending/borrowing | International monetary fund (2022) |
Public Expenditure | General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) | World development Indicators (2022) |
Political variables | ||
Years in office | How many years has the chief executive been in office? | Database of political institutions (2017) |
Finite term | Is there a finite term in office? (1 if yes, O if no) | Database of political institutions (2017) |
Government seat | Seat share of government parties | |
govseat = (gov1seat + gov2seat + gov3seat + govothst)/totalseats | Database of political institutions (2017) | |
Opposition seat | Seat share of oppositionparties | |
oppseat = (opp1seat + opp2seat + opp3seat + oppothst)/totalseats | Database of political institutions (2017) | |
Institutional variables | ||
Control of corruption | Control of corruption: Estimate | Worldwide governance indicators (2022) |
Political stability | Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism: Estimate | Worldwide governance indicators (2022) |
Rule of law | Rule of law: Estimate | Worldwide governance indicators (2022) |
Economic freedom | Index of economic frredom: Overall score | Heritage foundation (2022) |
Economic variables | ||
Unemployment | Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate) | World development indicators (2022) |
Physical Capital | Gross capital formation (% of GDP) | World development indicators (2022) |
Natural Resources | Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) | World development indicators (2022) |
Trade | Trade (% of GDP) | World development indicators (2022) |
Socio-demographic variables | ||
Infrastructure | Individuals using the internet (% of population) | World development indicators (2022) |
Urbanization | Urban population (% of total population) | World development indicators (2022) |
Population growth | Population growth (annual %) | World development indicators (2022) |
Human capital | School enrollment, secondary (% gross) | World development indicators (2022) |
Women in parliament | Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%) | World development indicators (2022) |
Appendix 3 Descriptive statistics for democratic countries
Variable | Obs | Mean | Std Dev | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Rights | 2178 | 5.502 | 1.37 | 1 | 7 |
Economic growth | 2178 | 3.533 | 3.693 | − 28.099 | 26.417 |
Income per capita | 2178 | 14,834.87 | 20,163.57 | 214.139 | 111,968.4 |
Budget deficit | 1936 | 2.268 | 3.654 | − 31.045 | 32.125 |
Primary balance | 1936 | − 0.233 | 3.355 | − 29.901 | 31.243 |
Public expenditure | 1936 | 15.525 | 4.983 | 0.911 | 28.806 |
Years in office | 2134 | 4.284 | 3.59 | 1 | 32 |
Finite term | 2134 | 0.964 | 0.185 | 0 | 1 |
Government seat | 2134 | 0.562 | 0.175 | 0 | 1 |
Opposition seat | 2134 | 0.393 | 0.164 | 0 | 0.93 |
Control of corruption | 2134 | 0.162 | 1.052 | − 1.722 | 2.469 |
Political stability | 2134 | 0.021 | 0.933 | − 2.844 | 1.76 |
Rule of law | 2134 | 0.18 | 0.994 | − 2.129 | 2.1 |
Economic freedom | 2134 | 62.207 | 9.326 | 30.515 | 83.7 |
Unemployment | 2002 | 7.768 | 5.624 | 0.21 | 37.25 |
Physical capital | 2002 | 22.842 | 6.463 | − 2.424 | 58.15 |
Natural resources | 2002 | 3.632 | 5.561 | 0.001 | 42.257 |
Trade | 2002 | 78.388 | 43.983 | 15.635 | 408.362 |
Infrastructure | 2002 | 29.053 | 29.36 | 0 | 98.136 |
Urbanization | 2002 | 58.036 | 21.886 | 7.412 | 97.961 |
Population growth | 2002 | 1.085 | 1.12 | − 3.629 | 4.629 |
Human capital | 2002 | 81.392 | 31.1 | 5.291 | 163.934 |
Women in parliament | 2002 | 17.98 | 10.929 | 0 | 53.076 |
Appendix 4 Descriptive statistics for autocratic countries
Variable | Obs | Mean | Std dev | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Rights | 946 | 2.39 | 0.968 | 1 | 6 |
Economic growth | 946 | 5.581 | 7.274 | − 27.994 | 149.973 |
Income per capita | 946 | 6801.997 | 11,703.55 | 187.616 | 64,864.72 |
Budget deficit | 748 | 0.528 | 7.191 | − 43.304 | 22.509 |
Primary balance | 748 | 0.359 | 6.264 | − 22.962 | 31.314 |
Public expenditure | 748 | 14.268 | 5.319 | 3.46 | 34.565 |
Years in office | 902 | 13.482 | 10.603 | 1 | 47 |
Finite term | 902 | 0.749 | 0.433 | 0 | 1 |
Government seat | 902 | 0.722 | 0.298 | 0 | 1.125 |
Opposition seat | 902 | 0.141 | 0.177 | 0 | 0.926 |
Control of corruption | 902 | − 0.548 | 0.748 | − 1.826 | 2.325 |
Political stability | 902 | − 0.43 | 0.786 | − 2.941 | 1.615 |
Rule of law | 902 | − 0.624 | 0.702 | − 1.753 | 1.825 |
Economic freedom | 902 | 54.074 | 11.208 | 23.7 | 89.4 |
Unemployment | 836 | 6.791 | 5.48 | 0.14 | 29.77 |
Physical capital | 836 | 26.675 | 10.457 | 4.703 | 82.112 |
Natural resources | 836 | 15.095 | 14.882 | 0.0003 | 87.459 |
Trade | 836 | 90.164 | 57.455 | 17.858 | 437.326 |
Infrastructure | 660 | 13.769 | 19.665 | 0 | 97.999 |
Urbanization | 660 | 46.75 | 22.244 | 11.374 | 100 |
Population growth | 660 | 2.19 | 1.664 | − 1.728 | 15.177 |
Human capital | 660 | 58.965 | 30.515 | 5.283 | 127.323 |
Women in parliament | 660 | 15.329 | 12.357 | 0 | 63.75 |
Appendix 5 Correlation table for democratic countries
Rights | GDP growth | GDP per capita | Budget deficit | Primary balance | Public expenditure | Years in office | Finite term | Government seat | Opposition seat | Control of corruption | Political stability | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Rights | 1.000 | |||||||||||
Economic growth | − 0.089 | 1.000 | ||||||||||
Income per capita | 0.605 | − 0.176 | 1.000 | |||||||||
Budget deficit | − 0.079 | − 0.156 | 1.000 | |||||||||
Primary balance | 0.085 | 0.100 | − 0.835 | 1.000 | ||||||||
Public expenditure | 0.476 | − 0.235 | 0.037 | − 0.048 | 1.000 | |||||||
Years in office | − 0.180 | 0.017 | 1.000 | |||||||||
Finite term | 0.296 | 0.015 | 0.003 | 1.000 | ||||||||
Government seat | 0.046 | 0.010 | 0.108 | 0.239 | 1.000 | |||||||
Opposition seat | 0.301 | − 0.044 | − 0.132 | 0.223 | − 0.580 | 1.000 | ||||||
Control of corruption | 0.780 | − 0.141 | 1.000 | |||||||||
Political stability | 0.782 | − 0.077 | 0.762 | 1.000 | ||||||||
Rule of law | 0.804 | − 0.136 | 0.964 | 0.788 | ||||||||
Economic freedom | 0.635 | − 0.106 | 0.751 | 0.602 | ||||||||
Unemployment | 0.158 | − 0.106 | − 0.068 | |||||||||
Physical capital | 0.139 | 0.294 | 0.010 | |||||||||
Natural resources | − 0.460 | 0.105 | − 0.275 | |||||||||
Trade | 0.284 | 0.047 | 0.350 | |||||||||
Infrastructure | 0.532 | − 0.217 | ||||||||||
Urbanization | 0.598 | − 0.150 | ||||||||||
Population growth | − 0.334 | 0.125 | ||||||||||
Human capital | 0.602 | − 0.161 | ||||||||||
Women in parliament | 0.400 | − 0.118 | ||||||||||
Rule of Law | Economic freedom | Unemployment | Physical capital | Natural resources | Trade | Infrastructure | Urbanization | Population growth | Human capital | Women in parliament | ||
Rule of law | 1.000 | |||||||||||
Economic freedom | 0.765 | 1.000 | ||||||||||
Unemployment | 1.000 | |||||||||||
Physical capital | − 0.010 | 1.000 | ||||||||||
Natural resources | − 0.245 | − 0.128 | 1.000 | |||||||||
Trade | 0.043 | 0.228 | − 0.175 | 1.000 | ||||||||
Infrastructure | 1.000 | |||||||||||
Urbanization | 0.595 | 1.000 | ||||||||||
Population growth | − 0.352 | − 0.424 | 1.000 | |||||||||
Human capital | 0.664 | 0.776 | − 0.627 | 1.000 | ||||||||
Women in parliament | 0.571 | 0.418 | − 0.169 | 0.4621 | 1.000 |
The reason for the empty cells is that different datasets are used for each model in order to maximize the number of countries analyzed. Hence, the correlations should be questioned only between the variables that are used in each model.
Appendix 6 Correlation table for autocratic countries
Rights | GDP growth | GDP per capita | Budget deficit | Primary balance | Public expenditure | Years in office | Finite term | Government seat | Opposition seat | Control of corruption | Political stability | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Rights | 1.000 | |||||||||||
Economic growth | − 0.053 | 1.000 | ||||||||||
Income per capita | 0.151 | − 0.061 | 1.000 | |||||||||
Budget deficit | − 0.079 | − 0.035 | 1.000 | |||||||||
Primary balance | 0.095 | 0.017 | − 0.917 | 1.000 | ||||||||
Public expenditure | 0.097 | − 0.174 | − 0.025 | − 0.014 | 1.000 | |||||||
Years in office | − 0.134 | − 0.032 | 1.000 | |||||||||
Finite term | 0.012 | 0.058 | − 0.173 | 1.000 | ||||||||
Government seat | − 0.140 | 0.031 | 0.057 | 0.198 | 1.000 | |||||||
Opposition seat | 0.389 | − 0.047 | 0.005 | − 0.006 | − 0.280 | 1.000 | ||||||
Control of corruption | 0.317 | − 0.114 | 1.000 | |||||||||
Political stability | 0.109 | 0.008 | 0.585 | 1.000 | ||||||||
Rule of law | 0.392 | − 0.119 | 0.881 | 0.592 | ||||||||
Economic freedom | 0.417 | − 0.075 | 0.636 | 0.347 | ||||||||
Unemployment | − 0.013 | − 0.172 | − 0.201 | |||||||||
Physical capital | − 0.104 | 0.127 | − 0.080 | |||||||||
Natural resources | − 0.161 | 0.027 | 0.240 | |||||||||
Trade | 0.168 | 0.003 | 0.509 | |||||||||
Infrastructure | 0.046 | − 0.190 | ||||||||||
Urbanization | 0.016 | − 0.220 | ||||||||||
Population growth | 0.113 | − 0.013 | ||||||||||
Human capital | − 0.080 | − 0.131 | ||||||||||
Women in parliament | − 0.141 | 0.118 | ||||||||||
Rule of law | Economic freedom | Unemployment | Physical capital | Natural resources | Trade | Infrastructure | Urbanization | Population growth | Human capital | Women in parliament | ||
Rule of law | 1.000 | |||||||||||
Economic freedom | 0.790 | 1.000 | ||||||||||
Unemployment | 1.000 | |||||||||||
Physical capital | 0.030 | 1.000 | ||||||||||
Natural resources | 0.088 | 0.075 | 1.000 | |||||||||
Trade | − 0.087 | 0.082 | − 0.064 | 1.000 | ||||||||
Infrastructure | 1.000 | |||||||||||
Urbanization | 0.539 | 1.000 | ||||||||||
Population growth | 0.054 | 0.001 | 1.000 | |||||||||
Human capital | 0.561 | 0.715 | − 0.299 | 1.000 | ||||||||
Women in parliament | 0.175 | − 0.087 | − 0.152 | 0.011 | 1.000 |
The reason for the empty cells is that different datasets are used for each model in order to maximize the number of countries analyzed. Hence, the correlations should be questioned only between the variables that are used in each model.
Appendix 7 Cross section dependency test
Democratic countries | Autocratic countries | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
Variables | CD-test | p value | CD-Test | p value |
Rights | 21.749 | 0.000 | 4.565 | 0.000 |
Economic growth | 63.647 | 0.000 | 14.295 | 0.000 |
Income per capita | 244.510 | 0.000 | 68.363 | 0.000 |
Budget deficit | 45.768 | 0.000 | 20.438 | 0.000 |
Primary balance | 51.591 | 0.000 | 17.323 | 0.000 |
Public expenditure | 29.876 | 0.000 | 9.073 | 0.000 |
Years in office | − 2.254 | 0.024 | 8.282 | 0.000 |
Government seat | 1.836 | 0.066 | − 0.535 | 0.593 |
Opposition seat | − 1.388 | 0.165 | 2.321 | 0.020 |
Control of corruption | 1.283 | 0.199 | 7.647 | 0.000 |
Political stability | 14.505 | 0.000 | − 1.112 | 0.266 |
Rule of law | 10.354 | 0.000 | 9.741 | 0.000 |
Economic freedom | 32.506 | 0.000 | 11.155 | 0.000 |
Unemployment | 17.740 | 0.000 | 0.385 | 0.700 |
Physical capital | 25.864 | 0.000 | 23.060 | 0.000 |
Natural resources | 53.789 | 0.000 | 39.490 | 0.000 |
Trade | 51.714 | 0.000 | 25.308 | 0.000 |
Infrastructure | 262.799 | 0.000 | 89.565 | 0.000 |
Urbanization | 123.404 | 0.000 | 78.458 | 0.000 |
Population growth | 9.051 | 0.000 | 3.294 | 0.001 |
Human capital | 148.990 | 0.000 | 61.935 | 0.000 |
Women in parliament | 165.798 | 0.000 | 55.152 | 0.000 |
Finite term is not included in the table, since it is a dummy variable
Appendix 8 Unit root tests for democratic countries
Variable | Level | First difference | Second difference | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Constant | Constant & trend | Constant | Constant & trend | Constant & trend | Constant | Constant & trend | |
Im et al. (2003) | |||||||
Opposition seat | − 9.450* | − 6.305* | |||||
Control of corruption | − 3.870* | − 4.646* | |||||
Pesaran (2007) | |||||||
Rights | − 1.402 | − 2.079 | − 3.313* | − 3.525* | |||
Economic Growth | − 3.134* | − 3.404* | |||||
Income per capita | − 1.437 | − 1.705 | − 2.873* | − 3.275* | |||
Budget Deficit | − 2.258* | − 2.677* | |||||
Primary Balance | − 2.307* | − 2.719* | |||||
Public Expenditure | − 1.890 | − 1.908 | − 3.875* | − 4.050* | |||
Years in Office | − 2.664* | − 2.815* | |||||
Government Seat | − 2.179* | − 2.612* | |||||
Political Stability | − 1.920 | − 2.391 | − 4.183* | − 4.245* | |||
Rule of Law | − 1.717 | − 2.116 | − 3.790* | − 3.987* | |||
Economic Freedom | − 2.034 | − 2.298 | − 4.197* | − 4.385* | |||
Unemployment | − 1.215 | − 1.890 | − 3.150* | − 3.231* | |||
Physical Capital | − 1.885 | − 2.250 | − 3.932* | − 3.988* | |||
Natural Resources | − 2.504* | − 2.782* | |||||
Trade | − 1.681 | − 2.032 | − 3.861* | − 3.955* | |||
Infrastructure | − 1.117 | − 1.167 | − 2.805* | − 3.676* | |||
Urbanization | − 0.708 | − 0.715 | − 1.298 | − 2.503 | − 3.641* | − 3.775* | |
Population Growth | − 2.006 | − 1.747 | − 2.617* | − 2.821* | |||
Human Capital | − 1.547 | − 2.035 | − 3.498* | − 3.738* | |||
Women in Parliament | − 1.876 | − 2.077 | − 4.140* | − 4.256* | |||
Null hypothesis for both tests is the presence of unit root. The W-stat values are reported for Im, Pesaran and Shin, and CIPS values are reported for Pesaran (2007). Finite Term is not included in the table, since it is a dummy variable
*Denotes significance level at % 5
Appendix 9 Unit root tests for autocratic countries
Variable | Level | First difference | Second difference | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Constant | Constant & trend | Constant | Constant & trend | Constant | Constant & trend | |
Im et al. (2003) | ||||||
Government Seat | − 8.452* | − 7.235* | ||||
Political Stability | − 0.063 | − 2.805* | − 20.530* | − 15.531* | ||
Unemployment | − 1.314 | − 0.164 | − 11.312* | − 8.891* | ||
Pesaran (2007) | ||||||
Rights | − 1.499 | − 2.127 | − 3.981* | − 4.188* | ||
Economic growth | − 3.617* | − 3.777* | ||||
Income per capita | − 0.785 | − 1.253 | − 2.845* | − 3.451* | ||
Budget Deficit | − 2.700* | − 3.022* | ||||
Primary Balance | − 2.629* | − 2.851* | ||||
Public Expenditure | − 2.114* | − 2.692* | ||||
Years in Office | − 0.347 | − 1.064 | − 2.252* | − 2.559 | ||
Opposition Seat | − 1.152 | − 1.843 | − 3.322* | − 3.428* | ||
Control of Corruption | − 1.638 | − 2.071 | − 4.429* | − 4.574* | ||
Rule of Law | − 1.754 | − 2.191 | − 3.819* | − 3.882* | ||
Economic Freedom | − 2.346* | − 2.657* | ||||
Physical Capital | − 2.213* | − 2.207 | − 4.433* | − 4.478* | ||
Natural Resources | − 2.179* | − 2.339 | ||||
Trade | − 1.482 | − 2.230 | − 4.097* | − 4.174* | ||
Infrastructure | − 1.405 | − 1.634 | − 3.134* | − 3.032* | ||
Urbanization | − 1.195 | − 1.283 | − 0.907 | − 1.678 | − 3.016* | − 3.351* |
Population Growth | − 1.798 | − 1.809 | − 2.272* | − 3.138* | ||
Human Capital | − 1.391 | − 1.492 | − 3.055* | − 3.498* | ||
Women in Parliament | − 2.222* | − 2.439 | − 4.312* | − 4.364* | ||
Null hypothesis for both tests is the presence of unit root. The W-stat values are reported for Im, Pesaran and Shin, and CIPS values are reported for Pesaran (2007). The variables of yrsoffc and natres do not have trend, the variables of phycap and women have trend. Finite Term is not included in the table, since it is a dummy variable
*Denotes significance level at % 5
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Güvercin, D., Gök, A. Does Economic Growth Bound Political Rights in Non-democracies? An Empirical Evaluation. Soc Indic Res 168, 265–295 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-023-03116-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-023-03116-7