Abstract
This paper reveals the underlying dynamics between the capital buffer and bank performance in EU-27 countries. A dynamic panel analysis shows that capital buffer is significantly affected by bank performance and risk exposure. Remarkably, a threshold analysis identifies regime changes for the underlying relationships during the financial crisis of 2008. We find a positive relationship between the capital buffer and performance for banks that fall in the low performance regime, while a negative relationship is reported for the banks that belong to the high regime. Threshold results also show that buffer exerts a positive impact on bank performance. Although regulation reforms that aim to raise the capital requirements could improve bank performance and stability, these improvements are not homogeneous across banks.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Altunbas et al. (2007) measure bank capital as the ratio of equity over total assets.
Consistent with this theory, Jacques and Nigro (1997) document a negative association between changes in capital and risk during the first year of the risk-based standards. The authors note that such a result might be due to the methodological issues in the risk-based guidelines where the weights assigned to assets classes might not reflect the true risk.
In line with this theory, Baumann and Nier (2003) employing a sample of listed banks across 32 countries for the period between 1993 and 2000, find that banks located in countries with greater government support and deposit insurance hold lower capital buffer.
In our sample, we include both saving and commercial banks following the study of Casu and Girardone (2010). The authors suggest that mainly commercial and saving banks in European Union form depositary institutions and they have a sufficient degree of cross-country homogeneity and comparability. Previous studies that include both saving and commercial banks in their analysis are Gropp and Heider (2010) and Kalyvas and Mamatzakis (2014). In order to account for any differences in the business model between saving and commercial banks, most of these studies employ a dummy variable. In line with these studies, we also include a dummy variable for commercial banks (COM).
There are some concerns regarding the Z-Score. First, it depends on the quality of accounting framework and second, firms may smooth their accounting data and this, in turn, could lead to overassessment of the bank stability. Data availability issues dictate the choice of our proxies of bank risk exposure. Future research shall opt additional data sets such as Fitch or Capital IQ to estimate alternatives to Z-score.
In this paper with use the xtbond2 stata command that implements the two-step system GMM estimator with the Windmeijer (2005) correction to the reported standard errors. In the one-step system GMM robust standard errors are reported which are robust to heteroscedasticity. In two-step GMM error terms are already robust and Windmeijer (2005) correction is implemented to standard errors. Two-step uses the consistent variance co-variance matrix from first step GMM to reconstruct the weight matrix. Without this correction, the standard errors tend to be downward biased.
Franchise or charter value of a bank is defined as the value that would be foregone due to a bankruptcy. According to this theory there is ambiguous relationship between bank capital and risk taking. The higher risk can increase the probability of default and therefore encourage banks to raise their capital. This has been broadly discussed by Boot and Schmeits (2000).
Banks that violate the minimum capital requirements lose part of their charter value (Flannery and Rangan 2008; Stolz and Wedow 2011). Thus, larger banks will take advantage of the economies of scale, diversification effects and the easier access to capital markets to maintain a higher capital buffer.
Alfon et al. (2004), Ayuso et al. (2004) and Jokipii and Milne (2008) document a negative association between capital and past values of the return on equity. In this strand of literature the return on equity is used as an indicator of bank’s cost of raising equity capital. However, in this study and consistent with Berger (1995), Nier and Baumann (2006) and Flannery and Rangan (2008) the return on equity is used as an indicator of firm profitability.
This finding is supported by Stiroh and Rumble (2006) who show that size is negatively correlated with efficiency for both domestic and foreign banks. The authors explain this relation through the agency costs, bureaucratic processes and other costs of managing extremely large institutions.
Results are available upon request. Note that the ordering of variables could also be of importance. We test for the reverse ordering and results remain similar. Results are available under request.
Note that without loss of generality we could estimate a panel VAR 4 × 4, and so on.
Following Love and Zicchino (2006) we apply the Helmert procedure in the data set. That is the data we are forward mean differenced.
As the ordering of variables in the panel VAR is not without significance we also estimate the system of equations, opting for the reverse ordering of variables. Results remain are available under request and confirm the present findings.
References
Alali F, Jaggi B (2011) Earnings versus capital ratios management: role of bank types and SFAS 114. Rev Quant Financ Acc 36:105–132
Alfon I, Argimon I, Bascuñana-Ambrós P (2004) What determines how much capital is held by UK banks and building societies?. Financial Services Authority, London
Altman EI (1968) Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate bankruptcy. J Financ 23:589–609
Altunbas Y, Carbo S, Gardener EPM, Molyneux P (2007) Examining the relationships between capital, risk and efficiency in European banking. Eur Financ Manag 13:49–70
Arellano M, Bover O (1995) Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models. J Econom 68:29–51
Athanasoglou PP, Brissimis SN, Delis MD (2008) Bank-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic determinants of bank profitability. J Int Financ Market Inst Money 18:121–136
Avramidis P, Pasiouras F (2015) Calculating systemic risk capital: a factor model approach. J Financ Stab 16:138–150
Ayuso J, Pérez D, Saurina J (2004) Are capital buffers pro-cyclical?: evidence from Spanish panel data. J Financ Intermed 13:249–264
Barry TA, Lepetit L, Tarazi A (2011) Ownership structure and risk in publicly held and privately owned banks. J Bank Financ 35:1327–1340
Baule R (2014) Allocation of risk capital on an internal market. Eur J Oper Res 234:186–196
Baumann U, Nier E (2003) Market discipline and financial stability: some empirical evidence. Financ Stab Rev 14:134–141
Beccalli E, Casu B, Girardone C (2006) Efficiency and stock performance in European banking. J Bus Financ Acc 33:245–262
Berger AN (1995) The relationship between capital and earnings in banking. J Money Credit Bank 27:432–456
Berger AN, Bonaccorsi di Patti E (2006) Capital structure and firm performance: a new approach to testing agency theory and an application to the banking industry. J Bank Financ 30:1065–1102
Berger AN, Humphrey DB (1997) Efficiency of financial institutions: international survey and directions for future research. Eur J Oper Res 98:175–212
Berger AN, Leusner JH, Mingo JJ (1997) The efficiency of bank branches. J Monet Econ 40:141–162
Bick A (2010) Threshold effects of inflation on economic growth in developing countries. Econ Lett 108:126–129
Boot AWA, Schmeits A (2000) Market discipline and incentive problems in conglomerate firms with applications to banking. J Financ Intermed 9:240–273
Bouvatier V, Lepetit L, Strobel F (2014) Bank income smoothing, ownership concentration and the regulatory environment. J Bank Financ 41:253–270
Boyd JH, Graham SL (1986) Risk, regulation, and bank holding company expansion into nonbanking. Q Rev (Spr) 2–17
Brou FB, Krueger TM (2016) Continental and national differences in the financial ratios of investment banking companies: an application of the Altman Z Model. J Acc Finance 16:37
Buser SA, Chen AH, Kane EJ (1981) Federal deposit insurance, regulatory policy, and optimal bank capital. J Financ 36:51–60
Calormiris CW, Wilson B (1998) Bank Capital and portfolio management: The 1930′s capital crunch and scramble to shed risk (No. w6649). National Bureau of Economic Research
Campbell TS (1979) Optimal investment financing decisions and the value of confidentiality. J Financ Quant Anal 14:913–924
Caner M, Hansen BE (2004) Instrumental variable estimation of a threshold model. Econom Theory 20:813–843
Casu B, Girardone C (2010) Integration and efficiency convergence in EU banking markets. Omega 38:260–267
Chiaramonte L, Poli F, Zhou M (2016) How Accurately Can Z-score Predict Bank Failure? Financ Market Inst Instrum 25:333–360
Chu L, Mathieu R, Robb S, Zhang P (2007) Bank capitalization and lending behavior after the introduction of the Basle Accord. Rev Quant Financ Acc 28:147–162
Demirgüç-Kunt A, Kane E (2002) Deposit insurance around the world: where does it work? J Econ Perspect 16:175–195
Dong Y, Firth M, Hou W, Yang W (2016) Evaluating the performance of Chinese commercial banks: a comparative analysis of different types of banks. Eur J Oper Res 252:280–295
Fiordelisi F, Marques-Ibanez D, Molyneux P (2011) Efficiency and risk in European banking. J Bank Financ 35:315–1326
Flannery M, Rangan K (2008) What caused the bank capital build-up of the 1990s? Rev Financ 12:391–429
Francis WB, Osborne M (2012) Capital requirements and bank behavior in the UK: Are there lessons for international capital standards? J Bank Financ 36:803–816
Furfine C (2001) Bank portfolio allocation: the impact of capital requirements, regulatory monitoring, and economic conditions. J Financ Serv Res 20:33–56
Goddard J, Liu H, Molyneux P, Wilson JO (2013) Do bank profits converge? Eur Financ Manag 19:345–365
Gropp R, Heider F (2010) The determinants of bank capital structure. Rev Financ 14:587–622
Guidara A, Lai VS, Soumaré I, Tchana FT (2013) Banks’ capital buffer, risk and performance in the Canadian banking system: impact of business cycles and regulatory changes. J Bank Financ 37:3373–3387
Guo L, Jalal A, Khaksari S (2015) Bank executive compensation structure, risk taking and the financial crisis. Rev Quant Financ Acc 45:609–639
Hadad MD, Hall MJ, Kenjegalieva KA, Santoso W, Simper R (2011) Banking efficiency and stock market performance: an analysis of listed Indonesian banks. Rev Quant Financ Acc 37:1–20
Hansen BE (1999) Threshold effects in non-dynamic panels: estimation, testing, and inference. J Econometrics 93:345–368
Jacques K, Nigro P (1997) Risk-based capital, portfolio risk and bank capital: a simultaneous equations approach. J Econ Bus 49:533–547
Jan A, Marimuthu M (2015) Altman model and bankruptcy profile of Islamic banking industry: a comparative analysis on financial performance. Int J Bus Manag 10:110
Jokipii T, Milne A (2008) The cyclical behaviour of European bank capital buffers. J Bank Financ 32:1440–1451
Jokipii T, Milne A (2011) Bank capital buffer and risk adjustment decisions. J Financ Stab 7:165–178
Kalyvas AN, Mamatzakis E (2014) Does business regulation matter for banks in the European Union? J Int Financ Market Inst Money 32:278–324
Kremer S, Bick A, Nautz D (2013) Inflation and growth: new evidence from a dynamic panel threshold analysis. Empir Econ 44:861–878
Krug S, Lengnick M, Wohltmann HW (2015) The impact of Basel III on financial (in) stability: an agent-based credit network approach. Quant Financ 15:1917–1932
Kwan S, Eisenbeis RA (1997) Bank risk, capitalization, and operating efficiency. J Financ Serv Res 12:117–131
Lepetit L, Strobel F (2015) Bank insolvency risk and Z-score measures: a refinement. Financ Res Lett 13:214–224
Liu YC, Yang W, Mai SY, Mai CC (2012) Explaining bank efficiency differences between China and Taiwan by meta-frontier cost function. Rev Pac Basin Financ Mark 15:1250024
Love I, Zicchino L (2006) Financial development and dynamic investment behavior: evidence from panel VAR. Quant Rev Econ Financ 46:190–210
Lütkepohl H (2006) 6 Structural vector autoregressive analysis for cointegrated variables. Econ Anal 73
Mamatzakis E (2015) Risk and efficiency in the Central and Eastern European banking industry under quantile analysis. Quant Financ 15:553–567
Mamatzakis E, Bermpei T (2014) What drives investment bank performance? The role of risk, liquidity and fees prior to and during the crisis. Int Rev Financ Anal 35:102–117
Mare DS, Moreira F, Rossi R (2017) Nonstationary Z-Score measures. Eur J Oper Res 260:348–358
Myers SC, Majluf NS (1984) Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. J Financ Econ 13:187–221
Nicoló GD, Bartholomew P, Zaman J, Zephirin M (2004) Bank consolidation, internationalization, and conglomeration: trends and implications for financial risk. Financ Market Inst Instrum 13:173–217
Nier E, Baumann U (2006) Market discipline, disclosure and moral hazard in banking. J Financ Intermed 15:332–361
Oral M, Yolalan R (1990) An empirical study on measuring operating efficiency and profitability of bank branches. Eur J Oper Res 46:282–294
Pasiouras F (2008) International evidence on the impact of regulations and supervision on banks’ technical efficiency: an application of two-stage data envelopment analysis. Rev Quant Financ Acc 30:187–223
Pasiouras F, Gaganis C, Zopounidis C (2006) The impact of bank regulations, supervision, market structure, and bank characteristics on individual bank ratings: a cross-country analysis. Rev Quant Financ Acc 27:403–438
Radić N, Fiordelisi F, Girardone C (2012) Efficiency and risk-taking in pre-crisis investment banks. J Financ Serv Res 41:81–101
Repullo R, Suarez J (2012) The procyclical effects of bank capital regulation. Rev Financ Stud 26:452–490
Rime B (2001) Capital requirements and bank behaviour: empirical evidence for Switzerland. J Bank Financ 25:789–805
Sealey CW, Lindley JT (1977) Inputs, outputs, and a theory of production and cost at depository financial institutions. J Financ 32:1251–1266
Sharma N (2013) Altman model and financial soundness of Indian banks. Int J Acc Financ Manag Res 3:60
Sharma P, Gounder N, Xiang D (2015) Level and determinants of foreign bank efficiency in a pacific island country. Rev Pac Basin Financ Mark 18:1550005
Shim J (2013) Bank capital buffer and portfolio risk: the influence of business cycle and revenue diversification. J Bank Financ 37:761–772
Shrieves RE, Dahl D (1992) The relationship between risk and capital in commercial banks. J Bank Financ 16:439–457
Soedarmono W, Machrouh F, Tarazi A (2013) Bank competition, crisis and risk taking: evidence from emerging markets in Asia. J Int Financ Market Instut Money 23:196–221
Stiroh KJ, Rumble A (2006) The dark side of diversification: the case of US financial holding companies. J Bank Financ 30:2131–2161
Stolz S, Wedow M (2011) Banks’ regulatory capital buffer and the business cycle: evidence for Germany. J Financ Stab 7:98–110
Tzeremes NG (2015) Efficiency dynamics in Indian banking: a conditional directional distance approach. Eur J Oper Res 240:807–818
Windmeijer F (2005) A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-step GMM estimators. J Econom 126:25–51
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Appendix
Appendix
See Table 17.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Bagntasarian, A., Mamatzakis, E. Testing for the underlying dynamics of bank capital buffer and performance nexus. Rev Quant Finan Acc 52, 347–380 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-018-0712-y
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-018-0712-y