Abstract
I present three versions of the argument from divine hiddenness that are grounded in moral considerations regarding how a just deity would act and auxiliary commitments that theists often have. First, I argue that the problem of hiddenness is made worse if one also holds that many will suffer in the afterlife due to not achieving a proper orientation towards God and the demands of morality in this life. Second, I argue that if any version of the moral argument for theism is successful, then God has a very good reason to not remain hidden. Third, I argue that a just God would not allow people to do evil in her name.
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Notes
I would like to thank an anonymous referee for unusually thorough and perceptive criticisms, comments, and suggestions on two earlier drafts. I would also like to thank Charity Anderson for her insightful comments and criticisms of on an earlier draft.
Briefly, I find the claim that there are no non-resistant non-believers wildly implausible given the wide diversity of human psychologies that have been instantiated throughout human history, the self-reports of many agnostics and atheists, and Stephen Maitzen’s argument that whether or not one is a theist depends largely on demographic features beyond one’s control. (2006).
Arguments from divine hiddenness that are grounded in the claim that God has a prima facie moral obligation to make herself known, are a special case of the argument from evil. Yet, the considerations I will raise based on our ignorance of the divine raises some novel issues that are not raised by other versions of the argument from evil.
In an important article on hiddenness Trent Dougherty and Ted Poston have noted that reflecting on this issue will likely cause a reflective theist to refine her set of commitments and reject various auxiliary hypotheses in order to protect core theism. (2007, pp. 195–196).
A number of thinkers, both historical and contemporary, have argued that our concept of right and wrong is essentially tied to what P.F. Strawson has labelled our “reactive attitudes” and that these attitudes are primarily geared towards detecting and sanctioning harmful actions. Examples of such attitudes (or emotions) include indignation, resentment, guilt and blame. (Darwall 2006; Strawson 1962) Jesse Prinz has noted a significant asymmetry in regards to our moral emotions. In regards to “emotions of blame” Prinz is able to list a robust set of distinct emotions which are aroused in a variety of circumstances. In contrast, Prinz identifies only three “emotions of praise” which are far less differentiated in their phenomenal content even though these emotions are triggered by a diverse set of circumstances. (2007, ch. 2) Prinz notes that this may be because society has a larger interest in preventing bad actions as opposed to encouraging especially good ones. Prinz also notes that spheres of ethics are defined by transgression types. (ibid., pp. 79–80).
Schellenberg has argued we should not expect the divine to remain hidden because having a relationship with God will provide us with a powerful source of motivation for forming our character in an ethical direction. (1993, p. 19) Hence, I will not focus on that specific consideration below. Having said that, moral motivation and the justification of moral thought are two issues that cannot be sharply distinguished. Hence, it is inevitable that we will cover some ground priorly covered by Schellenberg.
Gregory Dawes (2009) does an outstanding job delineating why theistic explanations of various phenomena lack epistemic virtues such as explanatory power. In regards to auxiliary hypotheses such as libertarian freedom and the afterlife, even Richard Swinburne acknowledges that adding an afterlife hypothesis to core theism reduces the simplicity of the total set of propositions theists are committed to and hence the probability of theism. (2004, ch. 11).
In an outstanding article in the divine hiddenness literature, Jason Marsh (2013) details how Darwinian mechanisms have fostered the development of aberrant religious belief forming tendencies (from a theistic point of view). His analysis includes discussion of morally abhorrent religious belief systems that are non-theistic. Marsh relies heavily on Pascal Boyer (2001) and other evolutionary psychologists of religion. My own analysis complements Marsh’s by highlighting how easy it is for people to justify evil attitudes, actions and institutions even in the name of the theistic God.
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Rizzieri, A. How to make the problem of divine hiddenness worse. Int J Philos Relig 90, 3–17 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-020-09784-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-020-09784-6