Abstract
The Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) requires that firms wait 1 year before hiring an individual employed as a member of the external audit team. SOX’s intent is to reduce the perceived loss of auditor independence due to affiliated hiring. SOX also requires fully independent audit committees and disclosure of directors with financial expertise. Using a sample of financial executive hires during the pre-SOX period, we find that earnings response coefficients (ERCs) decline following hires of individuals recently employed by the firm’s external auditor, but ERCs do not decline following hires not recently employed by the external auditor. We also find smaller ERC declines following affiliated hires for firms with audit committee compositions consistent with subsequently imposed SOX requirements. Further investigation using measures of earnings quality suggests that differences in ERC changes are attributable to perceived, rather than real, changes in earnings quality following affiliated hires.
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Notes
The 1-year cooling off period applies to all members of the audit engagement team who provide more than 10 hours of audit, review, or attest service. Financial positions are director, chief executive officer, president, chief financial officer, chief operating officer, general counsel, chief accounting officer, controller, director of internal audit, director of financial reporting, treasurer, or an equivalent position (SEC 2003).
Former SEC chief accountant Lynn Turner underscores the importance of perceived independence: “The appearance of independence not only matters, it is the oxygen that keeps our profession alive… The staff believes that auditor independence is really about only one thing—investor confidence in the numbers and in the markets” (Turner 2000).
For example, Livent Inc. hired the engagement partner, Maria Messina from Deloitte, as its chief financial officer. The media (National Post 1999) criticized this practice: “Having a top officer who knew how Deloitte worked, and what its auditors were looking for, no doubt made it easier for the company to keep auditors from finding evidence of any fraud. She [the new CFO] also had the credibility with former colleagues when questions arose, which may have been used to reassure them if something suspicious was noticed” (from Beasley et al. 2000).
Geiger et al. (2008), who examine the security price reaction to appointments of affiliated versus unaffiliated hires, document a positive response to the appointment of affiliated auditors, although the “positive market reaction to revolving door appointments is driven mainly by smaller companies, and that these appointments are not associated with lower financial reporting quality when assessing subsequent discretionary accruals or the receipt of an Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER)”.
Recent studies use ERCs to examine whether perceived auditor independence is impaired by significant client-auditor bonding (e.g., Krishnan et al. 2005; Ghosh and Moon 2005; Francis and Ke 2006). Other studies use the ERC methodology to consider investor perceptions in related contexts (e.g., Ghosh et al. 2005; Lim and Tan 2008; Wilson 2008; Keung et al. 2010). For a more detailed discussion of the earnings quality literature, see Dechow and Schrand (2004) and Dechow et al. (2010).
Recent studies indicate differences in the impact of auditors’ provision of non-audit services on independence in fact and independence in appearance. More specifically, other than Frankel et al. (2002), prior studies consistently indicate that non-audit services do not impair independence in fact (e.g., Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Chung and Kallapur 2003; Larcker and Richardson 2004; Reynolds et al. 2004), whereas studies of independence in appearance indicate that auditor provision of non-audit services adversely influence perceived auditor independence (Krishnan et al. 2005; Francis and Ke 2006).
Differences among studies suggest cautious interpretation of comparisons between studies. For example, Menon and Williams (2004) primarily focus on the effect of hiring of former audit firm partners, whereas Dowdell and Krishnan (2004) and Geiger et al. (2005) focus on partners as well as other professionals. We follow Dowdell and Krishnan (2004) and Geiger et al. (2005) because the cooling off period defined by SOX applies to nonpartners as well. Moreover, Menon and Williams (2004) distinguish the 1-year cooling off period only in sensitivity tests, while our test sample (like Geiger et al. 2005) is restricted to only hires within 1 year of employment with the firm’s auditor. The Geiger and North (2006) sensitivity test is based on a sample of 18 affiliated and 42 non-affiliated hires.
The consequences of hiring an affiliated auditor are not always characterized negatively. Arguments that suggest positive consequences typically presume that the member of the firm’s audit team is likely to be familiar with accounting systems, firm management and personnel, and accounting issues that distinguish the company (Beasley et al. 2000). If such familiarity with firm-specific accounting characteristics is an important determinant of earnings quality, then hiring the affiliated auditor improves earnings quality relative to hiring an individual with audit experience at another audit firm. Consistent with this perspective, Geiger et al. (2008) find that small firms experience positive abnormal security returns around the hiring of affiliated financial executives.
This void in the literature belies the importance of the issue to academic accountants. To illustrate, when discussing auditor independence, Johnstone et al. (2001, p. 15) note that “while the incentive effects of financial dependence are well explored (Simunic 1984 and subsequent studies), other incentives involving personal relationships and potential employment received less attention, although they are likely as important.” Moreover, DeFond and Francis (2005, p.17) “believe this [affiliated hiring] continues to be an important issue and further research is desirable because of the chilling effect it [the ‘cooling off’ period] may have on accounting firms.”
Richardson et al. (2006) make a similar distinction between true and reported earnings in an accruals framework.
The case of Lincoln Savings and Loan illustrates this point. The engagement audit partner of Arthur Young, Jack Atchison, who subsequently joined Lincoln Savings and Loan’s parent company as its senior vice president, wrote “several letters to banking regulators and U.S. senators vigorously supporting the activities of…Lincoln.” During the congressional hearings following Lincoln’s failure, Atchison was criticized for becoming a “proponent of the client’s affairs” rather than a “public watchdog” (Knapp 2006).
Concerns that decisions to make affiliated hires are determined endogenously are discussed later.
For example, Grant Thornton resigned as the auditor of Peoples Community Bank in 2004 after one of its managers was hired as the bank’s CFO (Compliance Week 2004).
Although most firms do not disclose whether the new hire previously worked on the audit engagement team, we know that 24 of the 62 affiliated hires either were on the audit team or worked in the same office. Knowledge of specific audit procedures and reluctance to question actions or professional judgments of individuals who worked previously with the auditor’s firm are reasons why perceptions of auditor independence can be compromised even though a new hire was not part of the firm’s external audit team.
Results are qualitatively similar when we replace market-adjusted CAR with risk-adjusted CAR (i.e., return less value-weighted market return times beta).
Results are comparable when earnings surprise is computed as reported earnings less the median analyst forecasts outstanding over the prior 90 days.
To clarify, the year that the financial executive is hired, not the year that the hire is disclosed, is designated year t. For example, consider a 2001 proxy statement disclosure that the firm hired a financial executive in year 2000. In this case, 2000 is designated as year t. Only firms that disclose the year when the financial executive is hired are in the sample.
For companies that hire multiple financial executives from the same audit firm, the executive with the greater financial oversight role is retained. We presume the oversight role descends in the following sequence: chief executive officer/president, chief financial officer, chief accounting officer, controller, treasurer, vice president of finance, director of financial reporting, and director of internal audit.
For firms missing auditor identity in the year of hire in COMPUSTAT, we searched for 10-K on SEC’s EDGAR. We obtained auditor identity for 6 firms from 10-K filings.
As small firms are less likely to be covered by IBES, our sample is comprised of relatively bigger firms than samples of prior studies investigating other earnings quality metrics such as audit opinion or discretionary accruals.
Eliminating firms without data both before and after the personnel action reduces concerns that results are attributable to differences between pre- and- post-hire portfolios.
Geiger and North (2006) find that audit quality generally increases following the appointment of a new financial executive.
For all continuous variables, values in the 99th (first) percentile of the distribution are set to the value of the 99th (first) percentile.
Results are similar for (1) a sample restricted to new hires at higher levels of authority, specifically, CEO, CFO, chief accounting officer, and controller and (2) a sample where we omit observations where firms switch auditors during the 6-year test period around the year of hire. Results are also similar when Andersen clients are removed from the sample. Economic turbulence during 2001–2002 potentially affects ERC. If ERCs for affiliated firms and for unaffiliated firms are affected differentially, then attributing ERC differences to affiliated hires is misleading. Results are similar when observations during this period are excluded, however.
For each firm-year, we read the proxy filing to determine the number of audit committee members, the number of independent committee members, and the number of committee members who are accounting experts. We deleted 680 firm-quarter observations due to missing proxy filings.
An audit committee member is independent if he or she is an outside director (non-employee) and does not have an affiliation with the company (i.e., so-called gray directors are not independent). Gray directors are former officers or employees of the company, a subsidiary, or an affiliate; relatives of management; professional advisors to the company; officers or owners of significant suppliers of customers of the company; interlocking directors; officers or employees of other companies controlled by the CEO or the company's majority owner; owners of an affiliate company; and creditors of the company. We define a financial expert as someone with accounting expertise, as defined by the SEC in its proposal for the implementation of Section 407 requirement of SOX. Subsequently, the SEC expanded the definition of financial expertise to include persons with other (non-accounting) experience as well (see DeFond et al. 2005 for a discussion). We use the narrow definition because recent studies (e.g., Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008) indicate that earnings quality is higher for firms with accounting experts than firms with non-accounting experts on audit committees. We classify audit committee members with experience as a CPA, or holding or having held current or prior positions as chief auditor, CFO, controller, chief accounting officer, VP-finance, treasurer as accounting experts (Beasley et al. 1999).
Most prior studies (e.g., Menon and Williams 2004; Dowdell and Krishnan 2004) cite well-known examples of failure at Enron, Waste Management, Phar-Mor, etc. Each of these cases involved outright fraud. Anecdotal evidence (e.g., Livent, Enron, Waste Management) suggests loss of auditor independence owing to affiliated hiring as a factor contributing to fraud. Our examination of the association between affiliated hiring and financial fraud extends these prior studies.
We restrict our analysis to settled or continuing lawsuits that allege a violation of SEC Rule 10b-5 (a misstatement, or omission of material information) or lawsuits with any of the following keywords: restate, irregularities or fraud.
We thank the Center for Financial Reporting and Management at University of California, Berkeley, for making these data available. Details of the data are provided in Dechow et al. (2011).
We use the starting and ending fraud or restatement year, if available and the class action period, otherwise.
Menon and Williams (2004) report mean discretionary accruals of 0.0276 and mean absolute discretionary accruals of 0.1144 for affiliated firms. Geiger and North (2006) report mean discretionary accruals of 0.0331 for firms with external hires in the year prior to the year of hire. Dechow et al. (2011) report that the frequency of fraud during 1971–2003 is between 0.12 and 7.89%.
Prior literature elevates concerns about potential econometric consequences of such differences. For example, Geiger et al. (2008) find in a larger sample that firms that hire affiliated auditors are younger, more profitable, and have greater growth potential than firms that hire from other sources.
Audit committee characteristics used to partition observations in Table 6 are not statistically significant when included in probit specifications. Thus these variables are not included as a determinant of hiring affiliated auditors.
Specifically, for each affiliated firm, we identify two firms that have the closest predicted probabilities of hiring an affiliated auditor. If one of the two potential matches is an unaffiliated firm, then we choose the unaffiliated hire as the match; if both potential matches are unaffiliated firms, we choose the firm with the closer predicted probability; and if both potential matches are affiliated firms, then we presume no suitable match and eliminate the test firm from the analysis.
Advantages and disadvantages of the short-window versus the long-window approach for estimating ERC depend on beliefs about how and when earnings information is processed by market participants. If all value-relevant information contained in earnings is disclosed at the earnings announcement date, then short-window ERC is the better metric. On the other hand, if value-relevant earnings information is disclosed throughout the quarter, then the long-window approach has advantages.
Of these six hires, one joined as VP of business development, one as VP overseeing section 404 compliance, one as cost accounting manager, and one as assistant VP-special projects. Two others took undisclosed jobs.
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Acknowledgments
The authors appreciate comments from Patricia Dechow (editor), Ashiq Ali, Jere Francis, Angela Gore, Chris Jones, Sok-Hyon Kang, Jayanthi Krishnan, Krishna Kumar, Stan Markov, the late Damaraju Raghavarao, Heibatollah Sami, Mike Stein, Aida Sy, Robert Thompson, Kumar Visvanathan, Jerry Zimmerman, and workshop participants at American University, the George Washington University, Temple University, the University of Texas at Dallas, Villanova University, Virginia Commonwealth University, the 2008 George Mason University Corporate Governance & Fraud Prevention Conference, and the 2008 Annual meeting of the American Accounting Association. Tom Adams, Keval Amin, Tom Hsu, So Yean Kwack, Sophie Liang, Hak-Joon Song, Ki Kyung Song, Fang Sun, and Chunwei Xian provided excellent research assistance. Jagan Krishnan acknowledges research support from Temple University Fox School’s Merves Research Fellowship.
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Appendix
Appendix
Example of an affiliated hire: A financial executive who worked previously for the firm’s auditor either during the year of hiring or the prior year.
The following paragraph is reproduced from Sara Lee Corp.’s proxy statement filed on September 20, 2000.
CARY D. McMILLAN Executive Vice President and Chief Financial and Administrative Officer of Sara Lee Corporation. Mr. McMillan became a director of Sara Lee in January 2000. Mr. McMillan also is a member of the supervisory board of Sara Lee/DE N.V., a subsidiary of Sara Lee. From 1980 to 1999, Mr. McMillan was employed by Arthur Andersen LLP, most recently serving as the managing partner of Arthur Andersen’s Chicago office.
Arthur Andersen was the auditor for Sara Lee Corp. in 1999.
Example of an unaffiliated hire from the firm’s auditor: A financial executive who worked previously for the firm’s auditor but not in the year of hiring or the prior year.
The following paragraph is reproduced from WMS Industries Inc.’s Form 10-K filed on September 27, 2000.
Scott D. Schweinfurth, 46, joined us on April 19, 2000, assuming the offices of Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer. He is a certified public accountant and was, from June 1996 until March 2000, Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer of Alliance Gaming Corporation, a diversified gaming company. Mr. Schweinfurth also acted as Managing Director of Alliance’s Germany-based Bally Wulff subsidiary from November 1999 to March 2000. Alliance acquired Bally Gaming International in June 1996, where Mr. Schweinfurth had served as Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer since 1995. Prior to that time, he was employed by Ernst & Young for 18 years, the last six as a partner.
Ernst & Young was the auditor for WMS Industries Inc. in 2000.
Example of an unaffiliated hire from a different auditor: A financial executive who worked previously for an auditor other than the client’s current auditor.
The following paragraph is reproduced from PR Newswire on May 20, 1998.
Office Depot, Inc. (NYSE: ODP), the world’s largest seller of office products, today announced that Charles E. Brown, CPA, has joined the Company as Senior Vice President of Finance & Controller. Mr. Brown replaces R. John Schmidt, Jr., who is leaving the company to pursue a new vocation.
Mr. Brown comes to Office Depot from Denny’s, Inc., where he spent the last 2 years as Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer. Prior to that he spent several years as VP and CFO at the Aramark Corporation, and a total of 10 years at PepsiCo, where Mr. Brown started as Director of International Audit, later spent almost 3 years in London as CFO of Pizza Hut (U.K.) Ltd., and eventually rose to the position of Vice President and Controller of Pizza Hut International. Mr. Brown began his career at KPMG Peat Marwick, where he spent 9 years and rose to the position of Senior Manager.
Deloitte & Touche was the auditor for Office Depot Inc. in 1998.
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Baber, W.R., Krishnan, J. & Zhang, Y. Investor perceptions of the earnings quality consequences of hiring an affiliated auditor. Rev Account Stud 19, 69–102 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-013-9244-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-013-9244-9