Abstract
Within the last decade or so, political philosophers have undergone intense disagreement over the proper methodology of political philosophy. This paper contributes to and tries to move past this debate by offering a new way of thinking about what it is political philosophers are trying to do. Instead of being either ideal or non-ideal theorists, political philosophers can orient themselves east of Eden or west of Babel. After examining different possible research projects, I argue that the most promising route forward for political philosophers is theorizing that is non-ideal and west of Babel. The paper ends by articulating what such a research program might look like.
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Notes
Sometimes the political philosopher’s predictive model is quite rigorous and explicit, however. For an example of this, see Kogelmann and Ogden (2018).
Indeed, even political philosophers that might initially seem opposed to including such components slip them in the back door. On this point see Gaus (2016: xv-xvi).
This is one of the central insights of the robust political economy research program. For an overview see Pennington (2011).
Ideal theory (and non-ideal theory as well) now means many things, and the way I employ the term in this paper is but one possible meaning. For an excellent overview of other ways of understanding the distinction, see Valentini (2012).
It is a simplification to argue that all ideal theorists (and all non-ideal theorists as well) adopt the same behavioral model. As an example of this, though Rawls’s behavioral model is certainly aspirational and deviates from how persons actually behave, some have criticized it for not being aspirational enough – he still lets some unfortunate aspects of human nature slip in. On this point see Cohen (2008: ch. 1). This diversity among ideal theorists (and non-ideal theorists as well) is inessential to the current paper’s central argument, so we shall ignore it.
Note that assuming persons are wicked and knaves does not necessarily imply that we are using an accurate model of human behavior. Just as the ideal theorist is too optimistic, it is possible to overcorrect and be too pessimistic as well. Non-ideal theory (as we have defined it) seeks an accurate model of human behavior. For more on this point as it relates to Buchanan’s work, see Kogelmann (2015); Kogelmann (2018: 27–28).
For detailed comparison of the two respective projects see Kogelmann (2018).
This, of course, assumes that political philosophers are trying to offer practical, action-guiding advice. Some deny this. In the words of G.A. Cohen (2008: 268): “The question for political philosophy is not what we should do but what we should think, even when what we should think makes no practical difference.”
Of course, there are other problems with centrally planned economies besides their incentive-compatibility issues: namely, knowledge problems that stem from getting rid of prices, which serve a valuable epistemic function. For an overview see Boettke (2001).
For criticism of Sen on this point see Simmons (2010).
See also White and Ypi (2016).
For more on jurisdictional rights and dispute resolution, see Chung and Kogelmann (forthcoming).
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Kogelmann, B. The future of political philosophy: Non-ideal and west of babel. Rev Austrian Econ 33, 237–252 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-019-00437-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-019-00437-0