It seems that at first he ardently desired […] that, to use the popular expressions, Gothia should take the place of Romania, and he, Athaulf, should become all that Caesar Augustus had once been. Having discovered from long experience that the Goths, because of their unbridled barbarism, were utterly incapable of obeying laws, and yet believing that the state ought not to be deprived of laws without which a state is not a state, he chose to seek for himself at least the glory of restoring and increasing the renown of the Roman name by the power of the Goths…. On this account he strove to refrain from war and promote peace.
Orosius (Seven Books of History Against the Pagans, Book 7, p. 396).
Abstract
A roving bandit provides exclusive (rivalrous) collective goods to members of its in-group. A stationary bandit further provides inclusive (non-rivalrous; public) collective goods to the out-group. The inclusive goods are an input to the production of the exclusive goods enjoyed by the in-group. As such, the transition from roving to stationary bandit is likely to involve the redefinition of the in-group, its collective interest, and the type of goods that it provides. To illustrate these points, I employ a case study of the roving Visigothic confederacy as it evolved during the fourth and fifth centuries towards the stationary Visigothic Kingdom. The illustration provides insights into why competition amongst roving bandits does not always (or often) lead to the emergence of a non-predatory state.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
The present paper is motivated by McGuire and Olson’s perspective on state origination. Carneiro (1970) provides an overview of a broader swath of state origin theories.
Nozick (1974) provides a related description of state formation based on competition amongst private protection providers in an environment conducive to regional natural monopolies.
Rowley (2000) argues that in post-independence Africa the stationary autocrats recognized the tenuous nature of their regimes–that “they did not posses a durable monopoly in theft” (p. 139)—and therefore tended to act like roving bandits.
The same experiences have motivated other scholars to explore whether non-predatory, representative governments can arise directly from anarchy, foregoing any intermediate stage where a dominant warlord/stationary bandit arises (Wantchekon 2004).
DeLong and Shleifer (1993, p. 679) observe: “An absolutist government… comes close to Olson’s pure type of a stationary bandit or Brennan and Buchanan’s (1980) constitutionally unconstrained Leviathan.” To the extent that this is true—e.g., in the case of the French absolutism established in the seventeenth century—it remains irrelevant to issues of the roving-to-stationary transition unless one can point to empirical cases of absolutist roving bandits.
Furthermore, Caldara (2013) does not model the provision of public goods.
Relatedly, Young (2015a) studies much earlier societies of Germanic barbarians. He documents the institutional changes in governance institutions that occurred from the first century BC through the first century AD. A notable change was the transition from temporary military kings elected from the nobility to standing armed retinues led by entrepreneurial commanders. The armed retinues essentially were Olsonian roving bandits. The illustrative history provided in the present paper begins with fourth century Gothic retinues of this type.
Ertman (1997) emphasizes how the military revolution differentially affected the Latin European administrations of France and Spain versus that of Britain, with the former tending towards patrimonialism and the latter toward bureaucracy.
Herbst’s arguments are consistent with Kirby and Ward’s (1991) claim that the mechanisms underlying state formation in Africa are essentially the same as those described by Tilly. These authors argue that the key difference is lower productivity in Africa and therefore smaller returns to building state capacity (i.e., lower expected tax revenues).
Olson uses the example of a cartel working to establish an above-competitive price for its members’ output. Given the demand for that particular output, the more firms belonging to the cartel the less each member can sell and the lower is each member’s profits. Furthermore, if the cartel cannot restrict individual firms from over-consuming the above-competitive price (i.e., supplying too much output to the market for sale), then the exclusive good cannot be provided effectively.
Of course, one can imagine scenarios where a roving bandit expects to plunder a given out-group in the future and adjusts its current behavior accordingly. But this distinction between the games played by roving (non-repeated) versus stationary (repeated) bandits with out-groups is a.
An inclusive collective good, as defined by Olson, need not be nonexcludable. However, in the context of this discussion, the sorts of inclusive collective goods that a stationary bandit may provide (e.g., law and order; defense from external threats) are ones that the stationary bandit (or a state) would typically not try to exclude individuals from enjoying. Hence, economists are likely to refer to law and order as a public good regardless of whether or not, say, individuals can be excluded from being able to call upon the services of police.
Here I am assuming that anyone providing labor services for a stationary bandit is part of the in-group. Of course, once a stationary bandit recognizes an encompassing interest, the line between in-group and out-group blurs. (For example, considering the US government, who constitutes the in-group? Policymakers? Government workers? All of the taxpayers?) For now it will be useful to think in terms of a stationary bandit’s in-group as all agents acting under the bandit’s directives. For the literature on state capacity and economic development see Bessley and Persson (2009, 2010, 2011) and the additional references they provide.
The former must be greater than the latter, of course, if the in-group size increases overall.
In 323 Constantine campaigned against Gothic raiders in Thrace and Moesia. In 324 Gothic warriors led by a prince (regalis) named Alica fought against Constantine on the side of the co-emperor Licinius in the Battle of Chrysopolis. Constantine won and subsequently (circa 332) responded to a request for aid from the Sarmatians, a group of Iranian-speaking barbarians who were being harassed by a Gothic army. That winter Constantine crossed the Danube and crushed the Gothic army, reducing them to a state of famine (Anonymous Valesianus, Ch. 5, pp. 525–529).
In addition to the translation of Ammianus Marcellinus listed in the references, I have at times referenced the original Latin provided by http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/ammianus.html.
Famously, Valens and Athanaric concluded a treaty while afloat on the Danube, an arrangement allegedly made so that Athanaric could obey his father’s command never to set foot upon Roman soil (Ammianus, Book 27, pp. 336–337). The standard translation involves Athanaric having sworn an oath to that effect. However, having been defeated by the Huns and his leadership abandoned by his Goths, Athanaric later was received by Theodosius I in Constantinople, where the erstwhile judge died. Wolfram (1975, p. 263) points out that the correct interpretation of the Latin is actually: “the Gothic chief was bound by an especially severe oath and that a paternal order had forbidden him to set foot on Roman soil.” If he did not break and oath, then, the passage begs the question of what exactly this severe oath was!.
As Ammianus (Book 31, pp. 416-417) dryly observes: “[T]he affair seemed matter for rejoicing rather than dread, and the practised flatterers in the emperor’s entourage extolled in exaggerated terms the good fortune which unexpectedly presented him with a large body of recruits drawn from the ends of the earth…. With these high hopes… the greatest care was taken to ensure that… none of those destined to overthrow the Roman Empire should be left behind.” Orosius (Book 7, p. 373) is more concise: the Goths were “received by Valens without negotiating any treaty. They did not even surrender their arms to the Romans.”
Orosius (Book 7, p. 380) counts this as a double victory for the Empire: “for the loss of these [the Gothic auxiliaries] was certainly a gain and their [the usurper and his followers] defeat a victory.” The leading Gothic men may have found the federate status more beneficial than the Gothic rank and file, a point to which I will return to in Sect. 4 below.
This was probably not true, but Stilicho had strongly supported granting the larger subsidies to the Visigoths in exchange for peaceful settlement in Illyricum.
This was much to the chagrin of Honorius who, “seeing that nothing could be done against the barbarians when so many usurpers were opposed to him, ordered that the usurpers themselves should be destroyed” (Orosius, Book 7, p. 393).
The question of why the Visigoths were settled in Aquitaine specifically is controversial. E. A. Thompson argues that it was to provide defense against rebellious Bacaudae peasants north of the Loire; J. M. Wallace-Hadrill (1967) argued that the Visigoths were placed there to counter Saxon and Frankish pirates in the Atlantic; and Vincent Burns argues that the settlement conveniently placed the Visigoths far away from the Mediterranean ports in Arles and Marseilles, with which the Romans were primarily concerned. See Burns (1992) for an overview of this debate and the relevant citations.
Fukuyama (2011, p. 74) refers to such armed retinues as “the most basic and enduring unit of political organization”; “such organizations became virtually universal in subsequent human history and continue to exist today in the form of warlords and their followers, militias, drug cartels, and street gangs.”
See Young (2015a) and the references therein.
Koyama (2012) provides an example from England in the 1800s. Private prosecution associations provided members with detection of crimes, the delivery of criminals to court, and the payment of court fees. These associations generated positive externalities to association non-members by way of deterrence effects.
Bó et al. (2015) discuss how, given initial conditions on productivity and the returns to investments, whether or not violence capabilities can be varied determines whether or not conflict tends to be exacerbated or moderated, allowing socially productive arrangements to emerge.
Emperors dealt with these small-scale raids in ways suggesting that they did not interpret them as orchestrated by some centralized organization. For example, Gothic raids into Thrace and Moesia typically did not provoke an overwhelming response from Rome. Anonymous Valesianus (ch. 5, p. 523) refers simply to Constantine’s “check of their attack”. And even during the period when Valentinian and Valens had granted federate status to some group of Goths, sporadic raids into Thrace and Moesia did not provoke a strong response. Alternatively, when a larger army of Goths (presumably a confederacy) attacked a group of Sarmatians with federate status in 323, Constantius’ (II; Constantine’s son and later co-emperor) winter campaign resulted in “almost a hundred thousand of the Goths […] destroyed by hunger and cold” (Anonymous Valesianus, ch. 6, p. 528). While this contemporary source (circa 390) may be exaggerating that number, there is no doubt that Constantius crushed a well-defined enemy. Similarly, when 3000 Goths joined in support of the usurper Procopious, Valens followed up with 3 years of campaigning across the Danube. This campaigning “reduced the barbarians to such want that they sent a number of delegations to beg for pardon and peace” (Ammianus, Book 27, p. 337). The reference to delegations also suggests that Valens was dealing with a Gothic confederacy. This conclusion also is supported by Ammianus’ (Book 27, p. 332) statement that the initial 3000 Goths supporting Procopious were sent by “their kings, now reconciled to Rome….” The plural “kings” again indicates that it was, again, a confederacy.
See Fukuyama (2011, pp. 56–59, pp. 72–75) for useful discussions of segmentary societies generally and the roles played by segmentary units in military organizations, including that of the Germanic barbarians recorded by Caesar and Tacitus. Baker and Bulte (2010) describe the agglomeration of smaller Viking groups. Kurrild-Klitgaard and Svendsen (2003, p. 261) provide further detail that is reminiscent of the Visigothic experience: “Raiding Vikings began to band together in large fleets and armies [and] sacked towns and markets…. Occasionally the forces disbanded, while at other times they re-united in the so-called ‘Great Army.’” Apparently small-scale roving Viking bandits also (at least initially) took part periodically in short-lived confederacies. Interestingly, the theory that Kurrild-Klitgaard and Svendsen (2003) provide to account for the Viking experience does not explicitly deal with the process of confederating.
This is consistent with the view of Wickham (2009, p. 45): “war encouraged the temporary development of alliances or confederacies of separate tiny tribes, each with its own permanent leader, but choosing a temporary leader for that confederation.” Contemporary Roman literary sources understandably emphasize the larger military conflicts. This has led some modern historians to emphasize the temporary confederacies relative to their constituent retinues. For example, Heather (1998, pp. 18, 57–58, 2006, p. 90) concludes: “By the fourth century… especially in areas close to the Roman frontier… smaller units had given way to fewer larger ones”. However, Heather (2006, p. 81) also notes that “in the fourth century, major conflicts also occurred only about once in a generation on Rome’s European frontiers”.
Given the treaty of 382 with Theodosius, the Visigothic confederacy became an entity with substantial autonomy though nested within the frontiers and institutions of the empire. Given that the confederacy was rooted in a general exodus of Goths across the Danube—including women, children, and the elderly—this likely gave what ultimately became the Visigothic leadership some experience in governance beyond that narrowly applicable to an armed retinue. This is also consistent with Thompson’s (1982, p. 38) comments: “The actual division of land in Moesia [where the Goths crossing the Danube initially were settled] must have been carried out in the main under the direction of the chiefs and councils, and we may be sure that the optimates [leading men; elites] thereby obtained executive power which would hardly have been theirs in the normal course of tribal life. Again, the annual subsidies of grain and cash paid over at times during the years 382–418 by the Roman government were delivered in the first instance into the hands of the chiefs and councils, who then proceeded to distribute them, or part of them, to the tribesmen in general.”
Regarding Visigothic law, it is interesting to note that, following the first promulgation of laws circa 480 in the Code of Euric, King Alaric II in 506 promulgated his Breviary (Lex Romana Visigothorum) containing laws that applied within the Visigothic Kingdom specifically to Romans. Hence, a distinction existed between laws relevant to the in-group versus the out-group.
This is in reference to the fifth century (Visigothic) Code of Euric and the sixth century Burgundian Code.
The conventional view is that fifth and sixth century barbarian settlements occurred within the Roman legal framework for quartering soldiers (Gaupp 1844; Lot 1928). Each barbarian “guest” was allotted a fixed share of a Roman “host’s” property. More recently, Goffart (1980) argues that barbarian allotments were not actual land but rather units of tax assessment associated with the land. Sivan (1987) accepts that allotments of land were made, but argues that the legal framework was applicable to the settlement of retired soldiers rather than the quartering of active ones. See Young (2015b) for a discussion of the alternative interpretations of hospitalitas.
Olson (1993, p. 567) cited a quote from a monarchist in southern Italy (initially quoted in Banfield 1958) as motivating him to study the conditions under which both autocracies and democracies are conducive to economic growth: “Monarchy is the best kind of government because the King is then owner of the country.” See Polishchuk and Syunyaev (2015) for evidence on the importance of elites’ asset ownership for improving the provision of well-defined and enforced property rights. See Blaydes and Chaney (2013) for evidence from medieval Europe and the Muslim world supporting the complementary idea that such ownership aligns incentives more effectively when rulers’ tenures are longer. Also, Kurrild-Klitgaard and Svendsen (2003, p. 261 and p. 266) note that Vikings were often granted land by regions where they had or were likely to raid: “it gave the Vikings a long-term personal interest in defending the area and preventing others from attacking it.”
Some scholars argue that Alaric II was the promulgator of the Code of Euric as well as the Breviary (Heather 1998, p. 184). Wickham (2009, p. 88) observes that “Visigothic… kings legislated, taxed, shipped grain around, used Roman civilian officials, and created integrated Roman and ‘barbarian’ armies, including Roman generals.” While I focus on the incorporation of aristocratic human capital here, Wickham’s observation indicates that the Visigoths were as well also open to incorporating other elements of Roman society into their in-group. Heather (1998, p. 193) echoes Wickham’s observation on its last point: “From c.470, for instance, we find Romans holding military offices to which they had been appointed by [Visi]Gothic kings….”.
This fits the case, described by Leeson (2007b, p. 306), of “strategies employed by permanently weaker individuals to alter the incentive of stronger agents for trade versus banditry.” By becoming essential components of the barbarian bureaucracy and courts, the Gallo-Roman aristocrats were able to trade their services with, rather than just be the prey of, the Visigoths. Relatedly, one notes that the Gallo-Roman aristocrats came also to dominate ecclesiastical positions. The Church provided an institutional check on the government of the (Christian) Visigoths (Mathisen 1993).
One must be careful in interpreting the above evidence. For example, we cannot take Orosius as quoting the Athaulf faithfully; nor can we discount Orosius’ agendas. That being said, Orosius was a Gallo-Roman aristocrat and a priest; his characterization of Visigothic leadership was certainly the way his fellow aristocrats would like to have thought about their new lords. And the characterization probably was an unpopular one from the perspective of some rank-and-file Visigoths.
In the discussion that follows, the working definition of southern Gaul will be that region south of the Loire.
Halsall (1992, 2007) argues that the withdrawal of imperial military presence in the north began as early as the mid-fourth century. Regardless of the precise dating, sometime at the end of the fourth century the seat of Gaul’s praetorian prefect moved from Trier to Arles (Mathisen 1993, pp. 19 and 59).
“Under Gundobad’s [ruled 474–516; son of Gundioc] leadership the Burgundian kingdom reached its greatest extent: the northwest it extended as far as Langres; the northeast to the northern Iura Mountains; to the east to the Alps; to the west it was bounded by a portion of the Rhone River and the upper course of the Loire; and for a time the Burgundian kingdom also included Provence to the south, but this was soon lost to the Ostrogoths” (Drew 1976 [1949], p. 2).
For examples, the Visigothic Code of Euric states that “Ancient boundaries are to stand, just as our father of blessed memory prescribed in another law”; and a Burgundian law states that if a Burgundian wishes to sell his land, his Roman “host” has to be given preference before contracting with anyone else.
For basic facts regarding Theoderic the Ostrogoth, see Hodgkin (2011 [1891]).
While the Ostrogothic Theoderic achieved historical designation as the Great, the defeated Gothic confederacy coincidentally was led by an individual known to us as Theoderic Strabo (the squinty-eyed).
A teenager without any real authority, Romulus suffered the nickname Augustulus, or “little emperor”. Many have had a bad nickname stick; Romulus’s has stuck for over 1500 years.
When Theoderic defeated Odovacer’s forces, the Ostrogoths still faced a long and costly siege of Ravenna where Odovacer was holed up. Theoderic ended the standstill by signing a treaty whereby both he and Odovacer would rule Italy jointly. However, at a banquet organized by Theoderic to celebrate the treaty, Theoderic made a toast and then drew his sword and murdered Odovacer with a brutal strike from above and down through the latter’s collarbone.
In the case of the Franks, this situation may have changed following Clovis’ short-lived consolidation of the Frankish kingdoms. See below.
Britain (and also, to a lesser extent, northern Gaul) suffered from substantial disruption of the trade networks linking it to the Mediterranean economy (Rauch and Michaels 2013). Complementary to the arguments made here, if less wealth simply was available to tax in the north then this would have offset the tendency towards barbarian state formation. However, whether or not Britain ultimately was substantially poorer than the rest of the Western Empire is controversial. See Heather (2009, pp. 268–274) for a discussion of the controversy and the contrary view that “Roman Britain was no backwater” (p. 269).
The distinctive history of regional government in England—shires (counties) and hundreds—is a direct legacy of the Anglo-Saxon migration/invasion and the subsequent proliferation of numerous small Anglo-Saxon polities.
In 1653, Childeric’s tomb was discovered near Tornai. The Merovingian’s identity was confirmed by a signet ring inscribed with his name. Among other items, the tomb included about 300 small golden bees. Napoleon would later harken back to the Childeric and the Merovingians by replacing the Bourbon fleur-de-lys with a bee as the symbol of imperial France (James 1988, p. 61).
The disintegration of Clovis’ kingdom was surely explained partly by Frankish customs regarding the division of property across all male heirs (James 1988, p. 91). That being said, the disintegration is indicative of the fact that a Merovingian state separate from the personality of its king failed to emerge. Also, one might note that the Ostrogothic Kingdom likewise disintegrated shortly after the demise of Theoderic. However, in that case Theoderic failed to produce a male heir and, furthermore, the Ostrogoths had to deal with the eastern emperor Justinian’s efforts to reclaim the territories of the Western Empire.
Despite the fact that Clovis’ Franks had by 508 driven the Visigoths out of Gaul and into the Iberian Peninsula, the Visigothic Kingdom (regardless of its precise borders) was a more durable state than ever formed in Merovingian Gaul. Theoderic I established a Visigothic dynasty in 419 that would last for more than a century and the Visigothic Kingdom lasted through the seventh century until the Muslim conquest. Alternatively, Clovis’ sons (and their successors) presided over small kingdoms that had turbulent relations with one another, often in conflict—sometimes violent—with one another. See Gregory of Tours’ (1974) History of the Franks Book III, ch. 1.
The out-group can also have within-group interactions that reduce the incentives to produce (e.g., out-group members constantly may be stealing from one another.) The out-group might also be more productive and prefer to live with rather than without a stationary bandit if the latter provides internal law and order to the former.
References
Marcellinus, Ammianus. (1986). The later Roman Empire (AD 354-378). London: Penguin Books.
Anonymous Valesianus. (1939). Chronica minora I. Cambridge: Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press. http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Excerpta_Valesiana/home.html.
Baker, M. J., & Bulte, E. H. (2010). Kings and Vikings: on the dynamics of competitive agglomeration. Economics of Governance, 11, 207–227.
Banfield, E. C. (1958). The moral basis of a backward society. Glencoe: The Free Press.
Bates, R. H. (2008). When things fell apart: State failure in late-century Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bates, R. H., Greif, A., & Singh, S. (2002). Organizing violence. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46, 599–628.
Bessley, T., & Persson, T. (2009). The origins of state capacity: Property rights, taxation, and politics. American Economic Review, 99, 1218–1244.
Bessley, T., & Persson, T. (2010). State capacity, conflict, and development. Econometrica, 78, 1–34.
Bessley, T., & Persson, T. (2011). Pillars of prosperity: The political consequences of development clusters. New Haven: Princeton University Press.
Blaydes, L., & Chaney, E. (2013). The feudal revolution and Europe’s rise: Political divergence of the Christian West and the Muslim world before 1500 CE. American Political Science Review, 107, 16–34.
Bó, E. D., Hernández, P., & Mazzuca, S. (2015). The paradox of civilization: Pre-institutional sources of security and prosperity. NBER Working Paper. http://www.nber.org/papers/w21829.
Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. (1980). The power to tax: Analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Buchanan, J. M. (1965). An economic theory of clubs. Economica, 32, 1–14.
Burns, V. (1992). The Visigothic settlement in Aquitania: Imperial motives. Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, 41, 362–373.
Caldara, M. A. (2013). The origins of the state as a stationary bandit. Working Paper. http://www.theihs.org/academic/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Michael-Caldara-Paper.pdf.
Carneiro, R. L. (1970). A theory of the origin of the state. Science, 169, 733–738.
Cassiodorus. (1884). Cassiodori Senatoris variae.In: T. Mommsen (Ed.). http://freespace.virgin.net/angus.graham/Cassiodorus.htm.
Cassiodorus, (1886). In Kindle (Ed.), The letters of Cassiodorus: A condensed translation of the variae epistolae of Magnus Aurelius Cassiodorus Senator. (trans: Hodgkin, T.). London: Henry Frowde.
Collins, R. (2004). Visigothic Spain: 409-411. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Congleton, R. D. (2011). Why local government do not maximize profits: On the value-added by the representative institutions of town and city governance. Public Choice, 149, 187–201.
Cornes, R., & Sandler, T. (1996). The theory of externalities, public goods and club goods (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dally, W. M. (1994). Clovis: How barbaric, how pagan? Speculum, 69, 619–664.
de Lara, Y. G., Greif, A., & Jha, S. (2008). The administrative foundation of self-enforcing constitutions. American Political Science Review, 98, 105–109.
DeLong, B., & Shleifer, A. (1993). Princes and merchants: European city growth before the industrial revolution. Journal of Law and Economics, 36, 671–702.
Demsetz, H. (1970). The private production of public goods. Journal of Law and Economics, 13, 293–306.
Diaz, P. C., & Visigothic political institutions. (1999). In P. Heather (Ed.), The Visigoths: From the migration period to the seventh century. Suffolk: Boydell Press.
Downing, B. M. (1993). The military revolution and political change: Origins of democracy and autocracy in early modern Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Drew, K. F. (1976). The Burgundian code. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Durkheim, E. (1933). The division of labor in society. New York: Macmillan.
Ertman, T. (1997). The birth of the leviathan: Building states and regimes in medieval and early modern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fukuyama, F. (2011). The origins of political order: From prehuman times to the French Revolution. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Fund for Peace. (2015). Fragile states index 2015. Washington, DC: Fund for Peace. http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2015.
Gaupp, E. T. (1844). Die Germanischen ansiedlungen und landtheilungen in den provinzen des Römischen Westreiches. Breslau: Verlage von Joseph Max & Comp.
Goffart, W. (1980). Barbarians and Romans: The techniques of accommodation. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Gregory of Tours. (1974). History of the Franks. London: Penguin Books.
Greif, A., & Laitin, D. D. (2004). A theory of endogenous institutional change. American Political Science Review, 98, 633–652.
Grierson, P. (1941). Election and inheritance in early Germanic kingship. Cambridge Historical Journal, 7, 1–22.
Grossman, H., & Noh, S. J. (1994). Proprietary public finance and economic welfare. Journal of Public Economics, 53, 187–204.
Halsall, G. (2007). Barbarian migrations and the Roman West, 376-568. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Heather, P. (1996). The Goths. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Heather, P. (2006). The fall of the Roman Empire: A new history of Rome and the barbarians. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Heather, P. (2009). Empires and barbarians: The fall of Rome and the birth of Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Herbst, J. (1990). War and the state in Africa. International Security, 14, 117–139.
Herbst, J. (2000). States and power in Africa: Comparative lessons in authority and control. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hodgkin, T. (2011 [1891]). Theoderic the Goth: Barbarian champion of civilization. Amazon Digital Services. https://www.amazon.com/Theodoric-Goth-Barbarian-Champion-Civilisationebook/dp/B004UK111S?ie=UTF8&keywords=hodgkin%20goth&qid=1463350274&ref_=sr_1_1&sr=8-1.
James, E. (1988). The Franks. Oxford: Basil Balckwell.
Kirby, A., & Ward, M. D. (1991). Modernity and the process of state formation: an examination of 20th century Africa. International Interactions, 17, 113–126.
Konrad, K., & Skaperdas, S. (2012). The market for protection and the origin of the state. Economic Theory, 50, 417–443.
Koyama, M. (2012). Prosecution associations in Industrial Revolution England: Private providers of public goods. Journal of Legal Studies, 41, 95–130.
Kurrild-Klitgaard, P., & Svendsen, G. T. (2003). Rational bandits: plunder, public goods, and the Vikings. Public Choice, 117, 255–272.
Leeson, P. T. (2007a). Efficient anarchy. Public Choice, 130, 41–53.
Leeson, P. T. (2007b). Trading with bandits. Journal of Law and Economics, 50, 303–321.
Leeson, P. T. (2007c). Better off stateless: Somalia before and after government collapse. Journal of Comparative Economics, 35, 689–710.
Leeson, P. T. (2011). Government, clubs, and constitutions. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 80, 301–308.
Leeson, P. T., & Williamson, C. R. (2009). Anarchy and development: an application of the theory of second best. Law and Development Review, 2, 77–96.
Little, P. D. (2012). On the Somalia dilemma: adding layers of complexity to an already complex situation. African Studies Review, 55, 191–195.
Lot, F. (1928). Du régime de l’hospitalité. Revue Belge de Philoligie et d’Histoire, 7, 975–1011.
Mathisen, R. (1993). Roman aristocrats in barbarian Gaul: Strategies for survival in an age of transition. Austin: University of Texas Press.
McGuire, M. C., & Olson, M. (1996). The economics of autocracy and majority rule: the invisible hand and the use of force. Journal of Economic Literature, 34, 72–96.
Mehlum, H., Moene, K. O., & Torvik, R. (2002). Plunder & protection Inc. Journal of Peace Research, 39, 447–459.
Mehlum, H., Moene, K. O., & Torvik, R. (2003). Predator or prey? parasitic enterprises in economic development. European Economic Review, 47, 275–294.
Mittal, S., & Weingast, B. R. (2011). Self-enforcing constitutions: With an application to democratic stability in America’s first century. Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 29, 278–302.
Moselle, B., & Polak, B. (2001). A model of a predatory state. Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 17, 1–33.
North, D. (1990). Institutions, institutional changes and economic performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
North, D., Wallis, J. J., & Weingast, B. R. (2009). Violence and social orders: A conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, state, and utopia. New York: Basic Books.
Olson, M. (1971). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Olson, M. (1993). Dictatorship, democracy, and development. American Political Science Review, 87, 567–576.
Orosius, P., & Raymond, I. W. (1936). Seven books of history against the pagans: The apology of Orosius. New York: Columbia University Press.
Polishchuk, L., & Syunaev, G. (2015). Ruling elites’ rotation and asset ownership: implications for property rights. Public Choice, 162, 159–182.
Powell, B., Ford, R., & Nowrasteh, A. (2008). Somalia after state collapse: chaos or improvement? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 67, 657–670.
Rauch, F., & Michaels, G. (2013). Resetting the urban network: 117-2012. University of Oxford Economics Series Working Paper 684. http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/Department-of-Economics-Discussion-Paper-Series/resetting-the-urban-network-117-2012.
Reno, W. (1998). Warlord politics and African states. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Robinson, J. A. (1999). When is a state predatory. CESifo Working Paper 178. http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-1999/cesifo_wp178.pdf.
Rowley, C. K. (2000). Political culture and economic performance in sub-Saharan Africa. European Journal of Political Economy, 16, 133–158.
Salter, A. W. (2015). Rights to the realm: reconsidering western political development. American Political Science Review, 109, 725–734.
Salter, A. W., & Young, A. T. (2016). Market preserving federalism as polycentric sovereignty. SSRN Working Paper. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2735963.
Sandler, T. (2013). Public goods and regional cooperation for development: a new look. Integration & Trade Journal, 36, 13–24.
Sandler, T., & Tschirhart, J. (1997). Club theory: thirty years later. Public Choice, 93, 335–355.
Sanei, A. (2014). Post-transition Somalia: ingredients for peace-building. ASA 2014 Annual Meeting Paper. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2415255.
Sivan, H. (1987). On foederati, hospitalitas, and the settlement of the Goths in A.D. 418. American Journal of Philology, 108, 759–772.
Thompson, E. A. (1982). Romans and barbarians: The decline of the Western Empire. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Thompson, E. A. (2008). The Visigoths in the time of Ulfila. London: Duckworth and Co.
Tilly, C. (1985). War making and state making as organized crime. In P. Evans, Rueschemeyer, & T. Skocpol (Eds.), Bringing the state back in. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tilly, C. (1992). Coercion, capital, and European states, AD 990-1992. Oxford: Blackwell.
Trigger, B. G. (2003). Understanding early civilizations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wallace-Hadrill, J. M. (1967). The Barbarian west: 400-1000. London: Hutchinson and Co.
Wantchekon, L. (2004). The paradox of ‘warlord’ democracy: a theoretical investigation. American Political Science Review, 98, 17–33.
Wickham, C. (2009). The inheritance of Rome: Illuminating the Dark Ages 400-1000. London: Penguin Books.
Wolfram, H. (1975). Athanaric the Visigoth: Monarchy or judgeship. A study in comparative history. Journal of Medieval History, 1, 259–278.
Young, A. T. (2015a). From Caesar to Tacitus: changes in early Germanic governance circa 50 BC-50 AD. Public Choice, 164, 357–378.
Young, A. T. (2015b). Hospitalitas. SSRN Working Paper. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2674270.
Zosimus, (1814). New history. London: Green and Chaplin.
Acknowledgments
I thank the participants at a 2015 West Virginia University Center for Free Enterprise brown-bag for their comments and discussion regarding the ideas that came to constitute this paper. Keith Dougherty and other participants at the 2015 Public Choice Society meetings provided insightful criticisms and discussion. I have also benefited from discussions with Bryan McCannon about the issues discussed within. An anonymous referee provided criticisms and suggestions that have led to a much-improved paper, for which I am thankful; in particular, the comparative analysis of different barbarian group experiences is due to the referee’s request. For anything here that remains barbaric, I alone am to blame.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Young, A.T. What does it take for a roving bandit settle down? Theory and an illustrative history of the Visigoths. Public Choice 168, 75–102 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-016-0350-7
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-016-0350-7
Keywords
- Collective action problems
- Governance institutions
- State emergence
- Roving versus stationary bandits
- Visigoths
- Roman empire
- Ancient economic history
- Nation building