Abstract
Honoring Russell Hardin’s seminal contributions to the study of collective action, this paper describes several collective action problems faced by the citizens of American colonies and states in the years leading up to 1787, and demonstrates how they occasionally and temporarily managed to overcome them. In particular, the paper considers the cooperative or non-cooperative behavior of colonies and states in three arenas: contributions of soldiers and money in wars; participation in the non-importation, non-exportation, and non-consumption movements directed against Great Britain; and trade relations among the states after independence. I observe that whereas farmers, planters, and artisans were willing to forsake their self-interest, under the influence of quasi-moral or social norms, merchants and politicians were not. Finally, I conclude that cooperation was rooted in the anger and enthusiasm of the first movers, who triggered the conditional cooperation of other citizens, and could easily unravel.
This chapter is adapted from a work in progress devoted to a comparison between the Federal Convention of 1787 and the first French Constituent Assembly of 1789–91. I thank the editors for their comments on an earlier draft. Special thanks are due to Jack Rakove for his incisive critical comments on the draft. He should not be held responsible for any mistakes that remain.
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Notes
- 1.
Starr (2000), p. 227; my italics.
- 2.
Schlesinger (1968), p. 468.
- 3.
Some of his examples of “Trespasses of the States on the rights of each other” may illustrate this model, an example being “the law of Virginia restricting foreign vessels to certain ports – of Maryland in favor of vessels belonging to her own citizens – of N. York in favor of the same”. See also his memoranda from 1783 discussed and quoted below.
- 4.
Under some conditions, agents might be motivated to cooperate out of long-term self-interest . With many agents, this can happen if they all adopt the “grim-trigger” strategy: cooperate until one agent defects and never cooperate thereafter. Whereas this mechanism might conceivably explain the stability of cartels, it is highly implausible as an account of cooperation among states.
- 5.
Dougherty (2003).
- 6.
White (1987), Chap 7; also Elster (forthcoming).
- 7.
The list of proposed plans for union is selective. For a fuller compilation, see Stone (1889), vol. II.
- 8.
According to the Journal of the Continental Congress, “[a]ll the men of property, and most of the ablest speakers, supported the motion, while the republican party strenuously opposed it”. See also comments by Richard Barry cited later. Ammerman (1974, pp. 58–60) dismisses the Galloway plan as unimportant. The fact that Congress later struck it from its Journal seems to count against this view. The contemporary evidence is summarized in Smith (1976, pp. 112–17).
- 9.
In 1774, some colonists also demanded the non-payment of the crippling debts to British merchants (Schlesinger 1968, pp. 404–5, 414, 416). This proposal was not made part of the platform of the Continental Association.
- 10.
- 11.
- 12.
See Elster (2015), pp. 388–97, for analyses and examples.
- 13.
Breen (2004), p. 213.
- 14.
Schlesinger (1968), p. 63.
- 15.
Ibid., p. 77. Once the Stamp Act was repealed, “people again bowed to the custom of expensive funerals” (ibid., p. 86). After the Townshend Acts, frugality came back in the colonies (ibid., pp. 107, 110, 143, 146).
- 16.
Some opponents to non-consumption claimed that concerted actions to punish innocent third parties, the British producers, were illegal. Writing in the South Carolina Gazette, “William Wragg […] argued that it did not follow that a number of persons associating together had a right to do what one man might do, and he said that Parliament had acted on this doctrine in punishing tailors for combinations to increase wages” (ibid., p. 205 n.). (The Americans did not, of course, want to benefit at the expense of the producers in the way the tailors wanted to benefit at the expense of their employers.) See also Maier (1991), pp. 133–34.
- 17.
- 18.
Weslager (1976), p. 242.
- 19.
Ibid., pp. 240–41.
- 20.
Ibid., p. 240.
- 21.
Maier (1991), p. 145.
- 22.
In the following I rely on Jensen (1968) and on the much more detailed narrative in Schlesinger (1968). The main point on which they diverge concerns the causes of the adherence to non-importation in the Southern colonies and its impact on the Northern ones. Not being a specialist, I assume that Jensen’s more recent account is the more reliable.
- 23.
Jensen (1968), pp. 272–73. As he explains (ibid., p. 279), “the stationing of the custom boards [for all the colonies] in Boston was one of the major political blunders of the age; in any other American city it would have had less trouble”.
- 24.
Ibid., p. 302. Schlesinger (1968) does not refer to this proposal to explain second wave of non-importation. He does, though, cite it when discussing the later wave of non-exportation (op. cit., pp. 397, 416).
- 25.
Jensen (1968), p. 331.
- 26.
Ibid., p. 359.
- 27.
Jensen (1968), p. 329.
- 28.
Schlesinger (1968), p. 217.
- 29.
Ibid., p. 229.
- 30.
On the emotional character of the British reactions, see Ramsay (1990), vol. 1, pp. 88–89; on the emotions they triggered in America, see ibid., pp. 89–90.
- 31.
Schlesinger (1968), p. 309. The fifth Act was the Quebec Act, which “aroused a wider variety of complaints than any of the other four statutes”: it established a government without a representative assembly, permitted the continuation of a legal system not allowing in all cases for jury trial, created a feudal system of land tenure that frustrated the hopes of speculators, and by providing for the Catholic religion raised the specter of an established church (Ammerman 1974, p. 11).
- 32.
Ibid., p. 310.
- 33.
Tocqueville (2004), p. 610. Tocqueville was proud of the fact that his great-grandfather Malesherbes was among those who did resist in both directions.
- 34.
- 35.
Breen (2010), p. 189. Earlier, similar proto-constitutional organizations had arisen at the colony level. By 1770, “the various [non-importation] associations came to serve as social compacts, analogous to the formal constitutions that would be set up by the various colonies in the mid-1770s” (Maier 1991, p. 136).
- 36.
Ibid., p. 18.
- 37.
Schlesinger (1968), p. 477. He adds (ibid., p. 478) that “the failure of the loyalist association was due to the superior organization of the radicals rather than to lack of support for it”. The empirical issue seems hard to resolve: how many sanctioned violators of the regulations out of patriotism or out of fear of being sanctioned for non-sanctioning?
- 38.
The examples in this paragraph are from Schlesinger (1968), pp. 477, 481, 483, 488, 504, 505, 511, 514.
- 39.
True, the coordination of non-actions may require action, which may be why governors demanded that non-importation and non-exportations could be banned as illegal. In many cases, however, the coordination was the spontaneous result of observing what other people were doing.
- 40.
- 41.
Irvin (2003) examines about 70 cases of “tar and feather” between 1768 and 1776. In the period before the outbreak of hostilities, the main targets were custom officials, importers, and informers; see also Maier (1991), pp. 128–29. Irvin does not include a single case in which consumption was punished in this manner.
- 42.
Breen (2010), p. 211.
- 43.
Maier (1991), p. 122.
- 44.
See Elster (1999), pp. 146–47, 234, for examples.
- 45.
- 46.
Mason (1970), vol. I, pp. 116–17, see also Franklin (1959–), vol. XVII, p. 202. Mason seems to have thought that importers were shameless, but that customers might be deterred by shame before their peers. On shame as the “false coin” that must substitute for the true coin of virtue, see also Montaigne (1991), p. 715.
- 47.
Cited after Breen (2004), p. 299; my italics.
- 48.
Jensen (1968), p. 129. If George Mason was right, the merchants would be worried more by the loss of income through non-consumption than by the loss of reputation through attacks in the newspapers.
- 49.
Schlesinger (1968), p. 114.
- 50.
Breen (2004), p. 23; my italics.
- 51.
Ibid., p. 200; my italics; see also Breen (2010), p. 103, on this problem of trust among strangers.
- 52.
Ramsay (1778), p. 64; his italics.
- 53.
- 54.
Shannon (2000), p. 71.
- 55.
Ibid.
- 56.
Bumsted (1974), p. 550.
- 57.
See, for instance, Acemoglu et al. (2004).
- 58.
Nelson (2011), p. 64.
- 59.
Cited after Miller (1985), p. 339.
- 60.
Morgan (2012), pp. 47–8. Jack Rakove (personal communication) agrees with Morgan, but adds that “the great puzzle here is why the British doubled down on [the divide and rule] policy in 1775 when it had so obviously failed in 1774”.
- 61.
Simmel (1908).
- 62.
On quasi-moral norms, see Elster (2015), Chap. 5.
- 63.
Breen (2004), p. 250. As we shall see shortly, newspapers could also make people realize that they were being seen.
- 64.
Breen (2010), pp. 150–51.
- 65.
Wood (1991), p. 27.
- 66.
Elster (2015), Chap. 21.
- 67.
Breen (2004), p. 261.
- 68.
- 69.
Breen (2004), p. 271.
- 70.
Cited after Ward (1961), p. 37. The same obstacles of time and space prevented American representation in the British parliament.
- 71.
For the role of “just wars” in the Union, see Muehlbauer (2008).
- 72.
Articles of Confederation of 1643, Appendix A to Ward (1961). The voting rule was adopted unanimously by a first meeting of the commissioners and ratified by the legislatures of all the colonies. At that time, unlike later founding moments, “deciding how to decide” was not a contentious issue.
- 73.
Ward (1961), p. 54.
- 74.
Ibid., p. 178.
- 75.
Ibid. Massachusetts claimed, speciously, that the war was not just. “In its puritanical way, [it] had sought to assume moral responsibility to prevent war with the Dutch and their Indian allies. Actually, practical considerations were foremost: the brunt for carrying on a war would rest with MA, the largest member of the Confederation, and the Bay colony would have the least to gain” (ibid., pp. 191–2). According to Muehlbauer (2008), p. 329, “The disparate assessments of danger among the Puritan colonies practically destroyed the Confederation in 1653”.
- 76.
As Franklin and Governor Shirley noted, the free-rider problem also arose in the French-Indian wars.
- 77.
Dougherty (2001), pp. 13–14 and passim.
- 78.
Hazard (1794), vol. II, p. 199. They added slyly that they would agree to any other colony also having three commissioners if it was willing to bear the same charge as Massachusetts.
- 79.
Articles of Confederation of 1672, Appendix B to Ward (1961).
- 80.
Ward (1961), p. 43, writes that the Hanseatic League, “like the later confederations of the Dutch and the [New England] Puritans […] was to suffer from the aggrandizement of the leading province over the lesser states”.
- 81.
Reprinted as an Appendix to Shannon (2000).
- 82.
- 83.
Adams (1976a), p. 10; see also Kromkowski (2002), pp. 153–55.
- 84.
They added that “As this [resolution] was objected to as unequal, an entry was made on the journals to prevent it being drawn into a precedent”. As we shall see in Chap. 8, this entry had no effect.
- 85.
“The impossibility of fixing the comparative weight of each province […] induced congress to resolve, that each should have one equal vote” (Ramsay 1990, vol. 1, p. 106); the members “agreed that the delegates of each province should cast one vote collectively” (Schlesinger 1918, p. 412); “In the end each colony was given one vote” (Jensen 1950, p. 59); “it was agreed that each colony should have one vote” Burnett (1964, p. 38); “Congress finally agreed that each colony should have one vote” (Jensen 1968, p. 492); “the delegates then resolved ‘that … each colony or province should have one vote’” (Jillson and Wilson 1994, pp. 52–53). The authors of the phrases I have italicized do not indicate the voting rule.
- 86.
Hutson (1987), p. 416. Barry’s book has no footnotes or other scholarly apparatus. Other scholars are even more dismissive; see for instance Haw (1997), p. vii. However, Forrest McDonald (1979, p. 266), whose judgment I tend to trust , says that Barry’s book “has a great deal of data and penetrating analysis”. I leave it to readers to judge whether the passages I cite in the text ring true, or at least appear to have some basis in facts.
- 87.
Barry (1942), pp. 161–2.
- 88.
Ibid., p. 162.
- 89.
Rakove (1979, p. 42) criticizes the (at that time) common view that at the First Continental Congress, Samuel Adams, John Adams, and Richard H. Lee “somehow manipulated events and debates to foreclose the possibility of reconciliation and enhance the likelihood of independence”. He does not, however, address the issue of how the voting rules were adopted; in fact, he does not even mention the adoption of the rules on September 6, 1774. His strictures are mainly addressed toward those who, from Joseph Galloway onward, have asserted that the unanimous adoption by Congress of the Suffolk Resolves on September 17 was an effect of the “superior application” of Samuel Adams.
- 90.
Jefferson (1950–) vol. 1, p. 324. As we shall see, Delaware adopted bound mandates in 1787 as well.
- 91.
Jensen (1970), p. 132.
- 92.
For the extent of the dilution, see Freedman (1992).
- 93.
Jensen (1970), p. 148.
- 94.
Jefferson (1950–), vol. 1, p. 327.
- 95.
Ibid., p. 326. The last statement seems to assume, implausibly, that the small states have common interests that will enable them to act as a unitary pivotal actor. In a letter to John Adams from May 16 1777, Jefferson asked him to propose to Congress that “any proposition might be negatived by the representatives of a majority of the people of America, or of a majority of the colonies of America. The former secures the larger the latter the smaller colonies”. The second claim also seems to rest on an assumption that the small states will have common interests.
- 96.
Jensen (1970), p. 145.
- 97.
Individual voting by members of equal-sized delegations would, however, have shown up the spurious nature of many “unanimous” decisions (Schlesinger 1968, p. 412).
- 98.
- 99.
Adams (1976b), p. 593.
- 100.
Madison (1962–), vol. 6. p. 291; see also ibid., p. 310, for some modifications.
- 101.
I have not seen evidence that state legislatures acted as either unconditional or conditional cooperators during the war. Unconditional cooperation in the war against Britain would imply that a state mobilized more when it could do more damage to the British rather than when itself was more exposed to danger (as predicted by the self-interest hypothesis). Conditional cooperation would imply that a state would mobilize more when it observed other states mobilizing rather than less (as that hypothesis would predict). After the war, the very notion of cooperation breaks down because, as (following Madison ) I note below, the notion of the common interest was not well-defined.
- 102.
McDonald (1979), p. 38.
- 103.
Galloway (1780), p. 74.
- 104.
Dougherty (2001), p. 3 and passim.
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Elster, J. (2018). Collective Action in America Before 1787. In: Christiano, T., Creppell, I., Knight, J. (eds) Morality, Governance, and Social Institutions. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61070-2_7
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