Public Choice

, Volume 151, Issue 1–2, pp 363–397 | Cite as

Do the IMF and the World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly?

  • Axel DreherEmail author
  • Jan-Egbert Sturm
Open Access


Using panel data for 188 countries over the 1970–2008 period, this paper analyzes empirically the influence of the IMF and the World Bank on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. Countries receiving adjustment projects and larger non-concessional loans from the World Bank vote more frequently in line with the average G7 country. The same is true for countries obtaining non-concessional IMF programs. Regarding voting coincidence with the United States, World Bank non-concessional loans have a significant impact, while IMF loans do not. This overall pattern of results is robust to the choice of control variables and method of estimation.


IMF World Bank UN General Assembly Voting Aid 

JEL Classification



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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of GoettingenGoettingenGermany
  2. 2.KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH ZurichZurichSwitzerland
  3. 3.IZABonnGermany
  4. 4.CESifoMunichGermany

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