Abstract
Violent groups sometimes invest significant resources in social work, notably in the form of charities and NGOs. The present paper models a terrorist group's charities as a means to advertise its cause in order to raise popular support. The analysis explains how different types of organizations arise in equilibrium, depending on government policies. Then, the interaction between a purely terrorist group and an independent local NGO is examined. It is shown that a purely terrorist group always invests in more attacks than an integrated terrorist-charity organization. Furthermore, the latter may have more NGO activity than a separate local NGO.
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