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Methodological worries for humean arguments from evil

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Abstract

Humean arguments from evil are some of the most powerful arguments against Theism. They take as their data what we know about good and evil. And they argue that some rival to Theism better explains, or otherwise predicts, that data than Theism. However, this paper argues that there are many problems with various methods for defending Humean arguments. I consider Philo’s original strategy; modern strategies in terms of epistemic probability; phenomenological strategies; and strategies that appeal to scientific and metaphysical explanations. None of these methods have been sufficiently developed to provide a clear and distinctive defense of Humean arguments. Defenders of Humean arguments need to spend more time on the underlying methodology of their arguments.

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Notes

  1. Some authors distinguish between a hypothesis predicting some data and a hypothesis accommodating that data (cf. Maher (1988), Lipton (2004: chp. 10) for some standard discussions). There are different ways of drawing this distinction. But normally prediction occurs only if the hypothesis is formulated prior to the data being known, whereas accommodation occurs only if the hypothesis is formulated after the data is known. The distinction shouldn’t matter for discussion here.

  2. For more discussion of what makes up O, see Perrine (2024).

  3. I’ll present this problem in terms of propositions and conjunctions instead of sets, but either way will work.

  4. See Plantinga (1972, 1974) for the classic statements. Kraal (2013) objects to Plantinga’s view. But Kraal’s argument seems to require the falsity of the following principle: if (p, q, r) is logically consistent and q is false, then (p, r) are logically consistent. Sterba (2019) also objects to Plantinga’s view. But Sterba doesn’t show that there is a logical incompability, since Sterba’s argument requires additional claims that are neither logical truths nor logical implications of the relevant claims. Further, Sterba’s additional claim strike me as wholly implausible. I can’t defend these criticisms of Kraal and Sterba here—though I hope to do so in future work.

  5. A different family of solutions to the problem of old evidence denies that the probability of a proposition p, on a set of coherent propositions q that logically imply p, is 1. Rather, one might learn a logical truth, e.g. that the coherent set of propositions q logically implies p, thereby changing the conditional probability of p on q [for discussion see Sprenger (2015), Hartmann and Fitelson (2015)]. Developing this solution requires a fair bit of technical machinery. But this solution is unlikely to succeed in this context. For the relationship between O and k is not just one of implication. O is amongst the conjuncts of k. And while it is sometimes challenging to see that a coherent set implies a proposition, it is normally quite easy to see that some of the conjuncts of a conjunction are implied by that conjunction.

  6. Strictly speaking, Morriston’s interest is “demonism” that idea that there is an all knowing, all powerful but perfectly malevolent creator (2014: 224). But Morriston sees demonism as structurally analogous to theism. I agree. So I have switched his discussion back to the case of theism.

  7. Of course, it might be that one has an “inferential seeming,” that Central Claim must be true on the basis of some set of arguments. However, it may also just be that, upon considering the content of Central Claim, it will seem true to a person. For a sympathetic discussion of “inferential seemings,” see Huemer (2016).

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Acknowledgements

For helpful comments, I thank Ben Cross, Fan Da, Peter Finocchiaro, Liu Xiaofei, Matt Lutz, Jonathan Rutledge, Dean Zimmerman, and the Rutgers philosophy of religion reading group.

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The author did not receive support from any organization for the supported work.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, 106 Somerset St, 5th Floor, New Brunswick, NJ, 08901, USA

    Timothy Perrine

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Perrine, T. Methodological worries for humean arguments from evil. Philos Stud (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02135-5

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