Abstract
Plantinga’s The Nature of Necessity (1974) contains a largely neglected argument for the claim that the proposition “God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good” is logically consistent with “the vast amount and variety of evil the universe actually contains” (not to be confused with Plantinga’s famous “Free Will Defense,” which seeks to show that this same proposition is logically consistent with “some evil”). In this paper I explicate this argument, and argue that it assumes that there is more moral good than evil in the cosmos. I consider two arguments in favour of this assumption, proposed by William King and Plantinga respectively, and argue that they are flawed. I then consider a sceptical objection to the assumption due to David Hume, and argue that this objection is at least prima facie plausible.
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Kraal, A. A Humean objection to Plantinga’s Quantitative Free Will Defense. Int J Philos Relig 73, 221–233 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-012-9378-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-012-9378-x