Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Epistemic Normativity & Epistemic Autonomy: The True Belief Machine

  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Here I will re-purpose Nozick’s (1974) “Experience Machine” thought experiment against hedonism into an argument against Veritic Epistemic Consequentialism. According to VEC, the right action, epistemically speaking, is the one that results in at least as favorable a ratio of true to false belief as any other action available. A consequence of VEC is that it would be epistemically right to outsource all your cognitive endeavors to a matrix-like “True Belief Machine” that uploads true beliefs through artificial stimulation. Rather than reflecting, inferring or inquiring, all of your beliefs would be the product of updates coming from the machine. This implication of VEC is counter intuitive. I will spend much of the paper considering defensive maneuvers and showing them to be lacking. The problem with going in for the True Belief Machine seems to be that the subject forfeits her autonomy. There has been much work lately on the virtue of intellectual autonomy and some of it has the potential to explain what is epistemically amiss about plugging into the machine. However, I will argue that the proponent of VEC cannot appeal to it without abandoning her preferred order of explanation.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. The joke is from Loader (2013).

  2. Epistemic utility theory (e.g. Joyce 1998, 2009, Leitgeb & Pettigrew 2010, Easwaran 2013, Easwaran & Fitelson 2015, Pettigrew 2013; 2016) is a form of epistemic consequentialism that focuses on credential states rather than full belief. They hold that accuracy (as determined by their preferred scoring system) is what is fundamentally valuable. Then Bayesian updating is derivatively valuable insofar as it is conducive to greater accuracy scores. I will focus on full belief in this paper, although my argument could be extended to deal with other states with a mind-to-world direction of fit.

  3. Some involve saying that it confuses well-being with morality (e.g., Railton 1989; Goldsworthy 1992; Silverstein 2000). Even if this is true, I am considering it as an objection to hedonistic consequentialism as a moral theory, so they could agree with what I say here.

  4. At the very least, this is the story told in most introductory ethics textbooks. See Haber (1993:7), Sher (1996: 612), and Carson and Moser (1997: 7).

  5. See Donner (1991), Feldman (1997; 2002), and Heathwood (2006).

  6. See Brandt (1979).

  7. Neil Sinhababu told me in conversation this is his preferred response.

  8. Kawall (1999) makes a similar move defending mental-state theories of well-being from Nozick’s thought experiment.

  9. Thanks to Kathryn Pogin for raising this point.

  10. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out the need to be clear about this.

  11. Thanks to Sandy Goldberg for pressing me on this point.

  12. Thanks to Baron Reed for pressing me on this point.

  13. Goldman (1986: 97) gives this impression at times by comparing his view to rule consequentialism. Cf. Percival (2002: 121), Chase (2004: 124Berker (2013b: 350).

  14. Cf. Ahlstrom-Vij and Dunn (2017) for a carefully qualified answer.

  15. For example, the subject can’t have defeaters for the beliefs they produce for those beliefs to be justified (Goldman, 1979).

  16. Cf. Jones (1997: 426), Riggs (2002), Kvanvig (2003) to whom we owe the term “swamping”, Zagzebski (2003).

  17. Ahlstrom-Vij (2013) argues that the swamping problem isn’t really a problem at all for veritists. For my purposes here, that is fine. I am offering a different but similar problem.

  18. For an argument that it is not, see Berker (2015). It doesn’t matter for my purposes if he is right.

  19. Cf. Proust (2013).

  20. See Sosa (1991;2007), Greco (2003; 2010; 2013), Pritchard (2010; 2012); Turri (2011); Carter (2014).

  21. See Pritchard (2010), Greco (2010).

  22. Thi Nguyen (2019) argues that a certain kind of autonomy, “delegational autonomy”, involves the prudent outsourcing of some of our intellectual projects.

  23. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point.

  24. Here I am assuming this is consistent with veritism just to imagine a best-case scenario for the veritist.

  25. See Hills (2016) for a defense of this claim about understanding.

  26. I’d like to thank Sandy Goldberg, Regina Hurley, Jennifer Lackey, Nate Lauffer, Jonathan Matheson, Luis Oliveira, Kathryn Pogin, Baron Reed and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and conversations.

References

  • Ahlstrom-Vij, K. (2013). In defense of veritistic value monism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 94, 19–40.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ahlstrom-Vij, K., & Dunn, J. (2014). A defence of epistemic consequentialism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64, 541–551.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ahlstrom-Vij, K., & Dunn, J. (2017). Is reliabilism a form of consequentialism? American Philosophical Quarterly, 54(2), 183–194.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baehr, J. (2011). The inquiring mind. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Battaly, H. (2022). Intellectual autonomy and intellectual interdependence. In J. Matheson, & K. Lougheed (Eds.), Routledge Studies in Epistemology: Epistemic Autonomy (pp. 153–173). N.Y: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Berker, S. (2013a). Epistemic teleology and the separateness of propositions. The Philosophical Review: 337 – 93.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Berker, S. (2013b). The rejection of epistemic consequentialism. Philosophical Issues, 23, 363–387.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Berker, S. (2015). Reply to Goldman: Cutting up the one to save the five in epistemology. Episteme, 12, 145–153.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • BonJour, L. (1980). Externalist theories of empirical knowledge. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5, 53–74.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brandt, R. (1979). A theory of the right and the good. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carson, T., & Moser, P. (Eds.). (1997). Morality and the good life. N.Y.: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carter, J. (2020). Intellectual autonomy, epistemic dependence and cognitive enhancement. Synthese, 197, 2937–2961.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carter, J. (2022). Epistemic autonomy and externalism. In J. Matheson, & K. Lougheed (Eds.), Routledge Studies in Epistemology: Epistemic Autonomy (pp. 21–41). N.Y: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chase, J. (2004). Indicator reliabilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69(1), 115–137.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Copp, D. (2013). Indirect epistemic teleology explained and defended. In A. Fairweather, & O. Flanagan (Eds.), Naturalizing epistemic virtue (pp. 70–91). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Darwall, S. (1977). Two kinds of respect. Ethics, 88, 36–49.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • David, M. (2005). Truth as the primary epistemic goal: A working hypothesis. In E. Sosa, & M. Steup (Eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (pp. 296–312). Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  • Donner, W. (1991). The liberal self: John Stuart Mill’s moral and political philosophy. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Easwaran, K. (2013). Expected accuracy supports conditionalization- and conglomerability and reflection. Philosophy of Science, 80, 119–142.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Easwaran, K., & Fitelson, B. (2015). Accuracy, coherence and evidence. In T. Gendler, & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology (5 vol., pp. 61–96). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Feldman, F. (1997). Utilitarianism, hedonism & desert: Essays in moral philosophy. Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Feldman, F. (2002). The good life: A defense of attitudinal hedonism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65(3), 604–628.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goldman, A. (1979). What is justified belief? In G. Pappas (Ed.), Justification and knowledge: New studies in epistemology (pp. 1–25). Dordrecht: Reidel.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goldman, A. (1986). Epistemology and cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goldman, A. (1999). Knowledge in a social world. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Goldman, A. (2015). Reliabilism, veritism, and epistemic consequentialism. Episteme, 12, 131–143.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goldman, A., & Olsson, E. (2009). Reliabilism & the value of knowledge. In A. Haddock, A. Millar, & D. Pritchard (Eds.), Epistemic value (pp. 19–41). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Haber, J. G. (1993). Introduction. In J. G. Haber (Ed.), Doing and being: Selected essays in moral philosophy. New York: MacMillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heathwood, C. (2006). Desire-satisfactionism & hedonism. Philosophical studies: 133. Pp. 539 – 63.

  • Hills, A. (2016). Understanding Why Noûs 49 (2):661–688.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hooker, B. (2007). Rule-consequentialism and internal consistency: A reply to card. Utilitas, 19, 514–519.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jones, W. (1997). Why do we value knowledge? American Philosophical Quarterly, 34.

  • Joyce, J. (1998). A non-pragmatic vindication of probabilism. Philosophy of Science, 65, 575–603.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Joyce, J. (2009). Accuracy and coherence: Prospects for an alethic epistemology of belief. In F. Huber, & C. Schmidt-Petri (Eds.), Degrees of belief (pp. 263–300). Dordrecht: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Kawall, J. (1999). The experience machine and mental state theories of well-being. Journal of Value Inquiry, 33(3), 381–387.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • King, N. (2020). The excellent mind: Intellectual virtue for the everyday life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kornblith, H. (2012). On reflection. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kornblith, H. (2017). How central are judgment and agency to epistemology? Philosophical Studies, 174, 2585–2697.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kvanvig, J. (2003). The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Lehrer, K. (1990). Theory of knowledge. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leitgeb, H., & Pettigrew, R. (2010). An objective justification of bayesianism I: Measuring inaccuracy. Philosophy of Science, 77, 236–272.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Loader, P. (2013). Existential Times. The Onion and Philosophy Ed. Sharon Kaye. Chicago: Carus Publishing Company.

    Google Scholar 

  • Matheson, J. (2022). The Virtue of Epistemic Autonomy. In J. Matheson, & K. Lougheed (Eds.), Routledge studies in epistemology: Epistemic autonomy (pp. 173–195). N.Y: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Narveson, J. (1973). Moral problems of population. The Monist, 57, 62–86.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nguyen, C. T. (2019). Expertise and the fragmentation of intellectual autonomy. Philosophical Inquiries, 6(2), 107–124.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, state, and utopia. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Percival, P. (2002). Epistemic consequentialism. Proceedings of the Aristotleian Society Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 76, 121–151.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pettigrew, R. (2013). Epistemic utility and norms for credences. Philosophy Compass, 8, 897–908.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pettigrew, R. (2016). Accuracy and the Laws of Credence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Pritchard, D. (2010). Cognitive ability and the extended cognition thesis. Synthese, 175(1), 133–151.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Proust, J. (2013). The philosophy of Meta-Cognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Railton, P. (1989). Naturalism and prescriptivity. Social Philosophy and Policy: 151 – 74.

  • Reed, B. (2016). In M. A. Fernández (Ed.), Who knows? In performance epistemology (pp. 106–123). Oxford University Press.

  • Riggs, W. (2002). Reliability and the value of knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64(1), 79–96.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ross, W. D. (1930). The right and the good. London: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sher, G. (1996). In Ed. (Ed.), Moral philosophy: Selected readings (2nd Edition.). Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Silverstein, M. (2000). In defense of happiness: A response to the experience machine. Social Theory and Practice: 279–300.

  • Steup, M., & &Neta, R. Epistemology. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/epistemology/.

  • Sylvan, K. (2020a). An epistemic non-consequentialism. Philosophical Review, 129(1), 1–51.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sylvan, K. (2020b). Reliabilism without epistemic consequentialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 100, 525–555.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zagzebski, L. (2003). The search for the source of epistemic good. Metaphilosophy, 34(1/2), 12–28.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Sanford Goldberg, Jennifer Lackey, Nate Lauffer, Kathryn Pogin, Jonathan Matheson, Luis Oliveira, Baron Reed and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and conversations.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Northwestern University, Kresge 3512, 1880 Campus Drive, Evanston, IL, 60208, USA

    Spencer Paulson

Authors
  1. Spencer Paulson
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Spencer Paulson.

Ethics declarations

Conflict of interest

I have no conflicting interests to declare.

Additional information

Publisher’s Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Paulson, S. Epistemic Normativity & Epistemic Autonomy: The True Belief Machine. Philos Stud 180, 2415–2433 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-01987-7

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-01987-7

Keywords

Search

Navigation