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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 171, Issue 1, pp 161–175 | Cite as

Metaphysical analyticity and the epistemology of logic

  • Gillian K. RussellEmail author
Article

Abstract

Recent work on analyticity distinguishes two kinds, metaphysical and epistemic. This paper argues that the distinction allows for a new view in the philosophy of logic according to which the claims of logic are metaphysically analytic and have distinctive modal profiles, even though their epistemology is holist and in many ways rather Quinean. It is argued that such a view combines some of the more attractive aspects of the Carnapian and Quinean approaches to logic, whilst avoiding some famous problems.

Keywords

Epistemology of logic Metaphysical analyticity Truth in virtue of meaning Two dogmas Web of belief Regress argument 

Notes

Acknowledgments

I’m grateful for the input from my commentors at the 2013 Pacific APA—Roberta Ballarin and Sinan Dogramaci—as well as to Richard Zach for organising the session. Thank you also to audiences there and at NIP in Aberdeen, Arché in St Andrews, Eiden in Edinburgh, and Logos in Barcelona, as well as at St Louis University, UMSL, and the Universities of Genova, Oslo, Miami, Missouri, Omaha, and British Columbia for helpful comments.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyWashington University in St LouisSt LouisUSA

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