Abstract
Can a normative reason be understood as a kind of explanation? I here consider and argue against two important analyses of reasons as explanations. John Broome argues that we can analyze reasons in terms of the concepts of explanation and ought. On his view, reasons to ϕ are either facts that explain why one ought to ϕ (what he calls “perfect reasons”) or facts that play a for-ϕ role in weighing explanations (what he calls “pro tanto reasons”). I argue against Broome’s account of both perfect and pro tanto reasons. Other philosophers, including Joseph Raz, analyze reasons in terms of the concepts of explanation and good. On this view, some fact is a reason to ϕ if and only if that fact explains why ϕ-ing would be good in some respect, to some degree. This view avoids the objections to Broome’s view, but should be rejected since not all explanations of why ϕ-ing would be good constitute reasons to ϕ.
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Notes
Scanlon (1998, p. 17).
Another influential analysis of reasons, which I won’t consider here, is the analysis of reasons as evidence of what one ought to do, which has been defended by Daniel Star and Stephen Kearns. See Kearns and Star (2008, 2009, forthcoming), and Thomson (2008). For criticism, see Broome (2008) and Brunero (2009).
Broome (2004).
See Raz (1999, p. 23).
See Finlay (2006, pp. 7–8), and Finlay forthcoming.
Broome (2004, p. 31).
Ibid., pp. 34–35.
Ibid., p. 35.
Ibid., pp. 36–42.
Ibid., p. 42.
Ibid., p. 35.
Ibid., p. 35.
We might be tempted to allow that this conjunctive fact is a normative reason since it could guide an agent’s practical deliberations in the way that normative reasons might be thought to do so. Perhaps there’s a way to model Carla’s deliberations so that she proceeds from this conjunctive fact to the formation of an intention to go see the film. But this, I think, doesn’t provide us with sufficient grounds for thinking that the conjunctive fact is a normative reason. We might equally well be able to model Carla’s deliberation so that she proceeds from some report about the normative reasons for going (perhaps her belief that the combined weight of the reasons for going is greater than the combined weight of the reasons against going) to the formation of an intention to go. But surely we don’t want to be forced to admit that a report about normative reasons is itself a normative reason, simply because it figures into her practical deliberation in this way.
Another option for Broome would be to allow that perfect reasons could be constituted not only by natural facts, like the fact that Stephanie will be at the film, but also by fundamental ethical principles, like the principle of utility. On this view, some non-fundamental ought facts, like the fact that Carla ought to go see the film, would be explained by fundamental ought facts, like the fact that everyone ought to maximize overall utility. This view would have an advantage in having it come out that Carla’s perfect reason is normative. But it would also have a disadvantage in that this fundamental ought fact wouldn’t itself be explained, and so Broome would have to give up or modify his claim, quoted above, that “no ought fact is inexplicable.” He would have to concede that it’s not the case that if one ought to ϕ, there is a perfect reason to ϕ. (Even if these fundamental ought facts are themselves explained in some way, surely they are not explained by a normative reason.) Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out this possibility, and its limitations.
Ibid., p. 39.
Ibid.
We need to consider the possibility of incommensurability between reasons, and the possibility that the “weight” of reasons cannot be expressed in a precise number (like a measure of kilograms or pounds), and the possibility that the combined weight of reasons may not be a simple matter of adding together the weights of individual reasons. Broome is aware that these possibilities would be neglected if weighing explanations employing pro tanto reasons were taken to be analogous in every way to the physical weighing explanations on a two-pan beam balance weighing scale. See Broome (2004, pp. 36–38).
For this point, see the discussion in Kearns and Star (2008, pp. 43–44). (They also consider a possible response to this objection drawn from Broome’s book manuscript and object to it.) It’s also worth noting here that Broome’s analysis of perfect reasons into two component parts—explanation and ought facts—doesn't seem vulnerable to this objection. We do have an independent grasp on the concept of explanation, since we employ that concept in other contexts, as when the explanandum is some non-normative fact, and an independent grasp on the concept of ought.
Recall the passage cited above: “My definition is this: a pro tanto reason for you to ϕ is a fact that plays the for-ϕ role in a weighing explanation of why you ought to ϕ, or….” And later (p. 41) he writes: “The definition [of a pro tanto reason] specifies just what counting in favor of amounts to. To count in favor of ϕ is to play a particular role in an explanation of why you ought to ϕ. Counting in favor of is sometimes thought to be the basic normative notion. But it cannot be, because it is complex. It incorporates the two elements of normativity and explanation. The notion of a reason has the same complexity.” These passages both suggest the interpretation that follows in the text below.
This point is made in Kearns and Star (2008, p. 41).
Broome (2008, p. 100).
Since Broome thinks something can play a role in explaining P only if P is the case, and since the “explaining” and “making it the case” formulations are supposed to be equivalent, he would also think that something can play a role in making P the case only if P is the case.
There are other possible analyses of reasons using the concept of making it the case and ought. Here’s one: some fact F is a reason for one to ϕ if and only if F would make it the case that one ought to ϕ were there no reasons not to ϕ. This view seems plausible when applied to our example: the fact that Bert’s friends are at the party would make it the case that he ought to go, were there no reasons not to go. I don’t have space to consider this view here, but it’s clear that much depends on how we understand the counterfactual. In the context of a debate about moral explanations, Nicholas Sturgeon (1985) observed that, in considering such counterfactuals, we can’t simply hold constant the natural facts and change the normative ones. (Consider his example: “If Hitler weren’t evil, then …”. To consider a world in which Hitler weren’t evil, we’d have to consider a world in which his motives, intentions, and actions are vastly different from his actual motives, intentions, and actions.) If Sturgeon is right, when we consider, “if there were no reasons not to ϕ…” we’d have to imagine the natural facts differently. But problems loom, since if the facts were different, it could be that there’s no reason to ϕ. Here’s an example. As a child, I had a terrifying experience that wasn’t harmful apart from the terror produced, after which an rather unsympathetic adult told me, “Whatever doesn’t kill you, makes you stronger,” suggesting that there’s at least one reason to undergo a terrifying experience: it builds character. Suppose he was right; suppose that the character-building effects of being terrified constitute a reason to undergo a terrifying experience, though it’s a reason that’s vastly outweighed by the reasons not to do so – namely, by all those features of the experience that make it terrifying. But if we consider “if there were no reason not to undergo the experience” we’d have to consider a world in which there were no terrifying features of the experience, and hence a world in which there would be no such features to build character. In this example, there’s a reason to have the terrifying experience (it builds character), but it need not be the case that if there were no reasons not to have the experience, it would be the case that I ought to. This is so because the reason to have the experience depends for its existence upon the existence of the reasons not to have it, specifically, upon the existence of the terror-inducing properties of the experience. An analysis along these lines would have to present some way of understanding the counterfactual to avoid these worries. But, as I said, I don’t have space to consider such views here.
The phrase “in some respect and in some degree” is borrowed from Raz (1999, p. 23), who presents a view along these lines.
“Good in some respect” includes both final and instrumental value. Bert’s enjoying friendship would have final value, while his attending the party, which is a means to enjoying friendship, would have instrumental value. There are of course other senses of “good” not relevant to this view: for instance, when we speak of some particularly efficient thief as being a “good thief,” or his particularly efficient act of stealing as “a good theft,” we don’t want to say that the efficiency of the act constitutes a reason for him to steal. His stealing may lack any final or instrumental value. If R is to get off the ground, it must be value in this sense that’s relevant. Thanks to Jonathan Way for helping me clarify this point.
Way, forthcoming.
For an overview of the history of buck-passing analyses, and some of the advantages and disadvantages of those accounts, see Suikkanen (2009).
See for instance Moore (1954, pp. 146–148).
Proponents of reasons-first views have recognized such neutrality as a virtue of their views. For instance, in his presentation of the buck-passing account of value, T.M. Scanlon is careful to show how his account is compatible with both consequentialist and deontological views. See Scanlon (1998, pp. 98).
Pettit (1991, p. 232), presents a definition of consequentialism: “Returning now to the definition of consequentialism, we can identify two propositions which consequentialists generally defend:
1. Every prognosis for an option, every way the world may be as the result of a choice of option, has a value that is determined, through perhaps not up to uniqueness, by the valuable properties realized there: determined by how far it is a happy world, a world in which liberty is respected, a world where nature thrives, and so on for different valuable properties…
2. Every option, every possibility which an agent can realize or not, has its value fixed by the values of its prognoses: its value is a function of the values of its different prognoses, a function of the values associated with the different ways it may lead the world to be.”
For Raz, the “classical approach” to agency, which he defends, includes the thesis that “reasons are facts in virtue of which actions are good in some respect and to some degree.” Raz (1999, p. 23). Finlay presents a semantic theory which holds that that “[t]he meaning of ‘a normative reason to X for ϕ’ is a fact that would answer a query as to why X ought to ϕ/it would be good that X ϕ.” Finlay (2006, p. 8). See also Finlay forthcoming. Finlay’s account, which is developed in greater detail in his unpublished book manuscript, Confusion of Tongues, ultimately reduces the normative to the non-normative, since the concept of a reason is understood terms of the concept of good, which itself is understood in non-normative terms – specifically, in terms of the promotion of ends.
Kearns and Star take this to be an advantage that their analysis of reasons (according to which reasons to ϕ are evidence one ought to ϕ) has over Broome’s. See 2008, p. 45. R would share this advantage. Also, Schroeder (2007, pp. 35–36), has objected that Broome’s account implausibly identifies two senses of “a normative reason” where it seems that there is only one. I won’t discuss Schroeder’s objections here. But it is clear that R wouldn’t be subject to these objections since there is a single sense of “a normative reason” identified by R.
Raz (1999, ibid).
Way, forthcoming.
Broome’s view wouldn’t be subject to this objection, since he analyses reasons in terms of the concepts of explanation and ought. If some “ought implies can” principle is in place, then it wouldn’t be the case that one ought to ϕ when ϕ-ing is impossible. So, there wouldn’t be an explanation, of any sort, of why one ought to ϕ when ϕ-ing is impossible. So, there wouldn’t be a reason to ϕ when ϕ-ing is impossible.
Kolodny (2005, p. 548).
Korsgaard (1986, p. 11).
Schroeder (2007, pp. 165–166). Schroeder believes that the example is one in which there is a reason for Nate to go next door, and so he would reject these internalist restrictions.
We’ll assume here that there’s no other desire in Nate’s subjective motivational set, such as a concern to be grateful to those who went through all the trouble of organizing the party, that could combine with his belief that there’s a surprise party next door, to allow for a line of practical reasoning to issue in his going next door.
For an excellent recent discussion of these issues, see Shah (2006).
Thanks to Daniel Star for this point. There may be a way to amend the reasons-as-explanation view to meet this objection. For instance, Stephen Finlay (forthcoming, esp. §5.) understands reasons for belief as, roughly, explanations of why believing P would promote the constitutive aim of belief – that is, the aim of believing P if and only if P is true. I won’t have the space to consider this view here.
The claims made here on behalf of the Kearns and Star view would not be endorsed by Kearns and Star themselves, since they reject “reasons imply can” (2009, 235–236). Nonetheless, I think this line of thought would be open to defenders of the reasons-as-evidence thesis, as well as defenders of Broome’s reasons-as-explanations view.
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Acknowledgments
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2012 Central APA in Chicago, with helpful comments from Karsten Stueber, and at the Boston University Ethics Reading Group, where I received many useful questions, especially from Daniel Star and Daniel Cohen. I’m also very grateful to Stephen Finlay, Robert Northcott, Daniel Star, Jonathan Way, Eric Wiland, and an anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies, for valuable written comments and advice on early drafts of this paper. Work on this paper was supported by a summer Research Award from the College of Arts and Sciences at UMSL.
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Brunero, J. Reasons as explanations. Philos Stud 165, 805–824 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9982-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9982-8