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Reply to Shafer-Landau, Mcpherson, and Dancy

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Notes

  1. See particularly Schroeder (2007b), but also Schroeder (2006, 2010).

  2. See Schroeder (2006, 2007a, b, c).

  3. Compare Garcia (1986) and Portmore (forthcoming).

  4. In the most resourceful challenge to this kind argument that I know of, Wedgwood (2007) utilizes his rejection of S5 for metaphysical modality to argue (as I would put it) that some metaphysical impossibilities can be contingent but not brute, because they are themselves explained by contingent facts. See Schroeder (2009) and especially Schmitt and Schroeder (2010) for discussion.

  5. ‘Anti-Transcendental Particularism’ is coined by McKeever and Ridge (2006), so the kind of generalism to which it is opposed would naturally be called ‘Transcendental Generalism’.

  6. See Schroeder (2009)

  7. I defend a modified version of this view in Schroeder (2010), but arguably further modifications are still needed.

  8. See Schroeder (2007c), and contrast Korsgaard (1996).

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  1. University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA

    Mark Schroeder

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  1. Mark Schroeder
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Schroeder, M. Reply to Shafer-Landau, Mcpherson, and Dancy. Philos Stud 157, 463–474 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9659-0

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