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Reasons and Agent-neutrality

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Abstract

This paper considers the connection between the three-place relation, R is a reason for X to do A and the two-place relation, R is a reason to do A. I consider three views on which the former is to be analyzed in terms of the latter. I argue that these views are widely held, and explain the role that they play in motivating interesting substantive ethical theories. But I reject them in favor of a more obvious analysis, which goes the other way around.

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Author notes

  1. Mark Schroeder

    Present address: School of Philosophy, University of Southern California, Mudd Hall, 3709 Trousdale Pkwy, Los Angeles, CA, 90089, USA

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland College Park, Skinner Building, College Park, MD, 20742, USA

    Mark Schroeder

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  1. Mark Schroeder
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Correspondence to Mark Schroeder.

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Schroeder, M. Reasons and Agent-neutrality. Philos Stud 135, 279–306 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9087-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9087-y

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