Abstract
Uncertainty is ubiquitous and has a significant impact on individuals’ actions. Inspired by the reality, this paper considers a population affected by changing evolutionary environments with both payoff noise and demographic noise. Meanwhile, we discuss two different types of changing environments, one with deterministic fluctuations and the other with stochastic fluctuations. To explore how changing environments influence the dynamics of cooperation, we first build a theoretical model, which introduces a geometric mean instead of an arithmetic mean of growth rate to present a time-dependent performance of cooperation. Through simulation results, we find that a fluctuating environment with the two noises is beneficial for promoting cooperation, and a deterministic environment is better at promoting cooperation than a stochastic environment. Besides, both deterministic and stochastic fluctuations can make the cooperative species get a higher payoff than the defective species, which is the cause of cooperation promotion. Moreover, in an environment with stochastic noises, the type of time-dependent noise distribution has little impact on evolutionary dynamics. In addition, a high noise variance is beneficial for promoting cooperation, but not for maintaining cooperation.
Similar content being viewed by others
Data availability
The datasets generated during and/or analyzed during the current study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.
References
Colman, A.M.: The puzzle of cooperation. Nature 440(7085), 744–745 (2006)
Rusch, H., Gavrilets, S.: The logic of animal intergroup conflict: a review. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 178, 1014–1030 (2020)
Boyd, R., Richerson, P.J.: Culture and the evolution of human cooperation. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. 364(1533), 3281–3288 (2009)
Hardin, G.: The tragedy of the commons. Science 162(5364), 1243–1248 (1969)
Perc, M., Jordan, J.J., Rand, D.G., et al.: Statistical physics of human cooperation. Phys. Rep. 687, 1–51 (2017)
Wang, X., Chen, W.: Effects of attitudes on the evolution of cooperation on complex networks. J. Stat. Mech: Theory Exp. 2020(6), 63501–63516 (2020)
Capraro, V., Perc, M.: Mathematical foundations of moral preferences. J. R. Soc. Interface 18(175), 20200880 (2021)
Nowak, M.A.: Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science 314(5805), 1560–1563 (2006)
Henrich, J., McElreath, R., Barr, A., et al.: Costly punishment across human societies. Science 312(5781), 1767–1770 (2006)
Saeaeksvuori, L., Mappes, T., Puurtinen, M.: Costly punishment prevails in intergroup conflict. Proc. R. Soc. B-Biol. Sci. 278(1723), 3428–3436 (2011)
Sigmund, K., Hauert, C., Nowak, M.A.: Reward and punishment. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 98(19), 10757–10762 (2001)
Hauert, C.: Replicator dynamics of reward and reputation in public goods games. J. Theor. Biol. 267(1), 22–28 (2010)
Szolnoki, A., Perc, M.: Reward and cooperation in the spatial public goods game. EPL 92(3), 38003 (2010)
Forsyth, P., Hauert, C.: Public goods games with reward in finite populations. J. Math. Biol. 63(1), 109–123 (2011)
Andreoni, J., Harbaugh, W., Vesterlund, L., et al.: The carrot or the stick: rewards, punishments, and cooperation. Am. Econ. Rev. 93(3), 893–902 (2003)
Cadsby, C., Croson, R., Marks, M., et al.: Step return versus net reward in the voluntary provision of a threshold public good: an adversarial collaboration. Public Choice 135, 277–289 (2008)
Wang, X., Chen, W.: The evolution of cooperation in public good game with deposit. Chin. Phys. B 28(8), 80201 (2019)
He, N., Chen, X., Szolnoki, A.: Central governance based on monitoring and reporting solves the collective-risk social dilemma. Appl. Math. Comput. 347, 334–341 (2019)
Quan, J., Yang, X., Wang, X., et al.: Withhold-judgment and punishment promote cooperation in indirect reciprocity under incomplete information. EPL 128, 28001 (2020)
Gross, J., De Dreu, C.K.W.: The rise and fall of cooperation through reputation and group polarization. Nat. Commun. 10(1), 776 (2019)
Liu, L., Chen, X., Perc, M.: Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with pool exclusion strategies. Nonlinear Dyn. 97(1), 749–766 (2019)
Perc, M.: Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders. Sci. Rep. 2, 344 (2012)
Sasaki, T., Okada, I., Nakai, Y.: The evolution of conditional moral assessment in indirect reciprocity. Sci. Rep. 7, 41870 (2017)
Zhao, J., Wang, X., Niu, L., et al.: Environmental feedback and cooperation in climate change dilemma. Appl. Math. Comput. 397, 125963 (2021)
Zhao, J., Wang, X., Gu, C., et al.: Structural heterogeneity and evolutionary dynamics on complex networks. Dyn. Games Appl. 11(3), 612–629 (2020)
Chen, X., Szolnoki, A., Perc, M.: Competition and cooperation among different punishing strategies in the spatial public goods game. Phys. Rev. E 92(1), 012819 (2015)
Szolnoki, A., Chen, X.: Environmental feedback drives cooperation in spatial social dilemmas. EPL 120(5), 58001 (2017)
Wang, L., Jia, D., Zhang, L., et al.: Lévy noise promotes cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game with reinforcement learning. Nonlinear Dyn. 108, 1837–1845 (2022)
Taitelbaum, A., West, R., Assaf, M., et al.: Population dynamics in a changing environment: random versus periodic switching. Phys. Rev. Lett. 125(4), 048105 (2020)
Perc, M.: Transition from Gaussian to Levy distributions of stochastic payoff variations in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. Phys. Rev. E Stat. Nonlinear Soft Matter. Phys. 75(2), 022101 (2007)
Yan, F., Chen, X., Qiu, Z., et al.: Cooperator driven oscillation in a time-delayed feedback-evolving game. New J. Phys. 23, 53017 (2021)
Chen, X., Wang, L.: Effects of cost threshold and noise in spatial snowdrift games with fixed multi-person interactions. EPL 90(3), 38003 (2010)
Perc, M.: Coherence resonance in a spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. New J. Phys. 8, 22 (2006)
Perc, M., Marhl, M.: Evolutionary and dynamical coherence resonances in the pair approximated prisoner’s dilemma game. New J. Phys. 8, 142 (2006)
George, W.A., Constable, T., Rogers, T., et al.: Demographic noise can reverse the direction of deterministic selection. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 113(32), E4745–E4754 (2016)
Chen, W., Wang, X., Quan, J.: Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in multi-game populations. Phys. Lett. A 2022(426), 127882 (2022)
Stollmeier, F., Nagler, J.: Unfair and anomalous evolutionary dynamics from fluctuating payoffs. Phys. Rev. Lett. 120(5), 058101 (2018)
Perc, M., Szolnoki, A., Szabó, G.: Cyclical interactions with alliance-specific heterogeneous invasion rates. Phys. Rev. E Stat. Nonlinear Soft Matter. Phys. 75(5), 52102 (2007)
Acknowledgements
This paper is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 71871173, 72031009, 71871171), Chinese National Funding of Social Sciences (No.20&ZD058), and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (WUT: 2022IVA131, 2021III036JC).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
Conflict of interest
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
About this article
Cite this article
Chen, W., Quan, J., Wang, X. et al. Evolutionary dynamics from fluctuating environments with deterministic and stochastic noises. Nonlinear Dyn 111, 5499–5511 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11071-022-08067-1
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11071-022-08067-1