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Step return versus net reward in the voluntary provision of a threshold public good: An adversarial collaboration

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Abstract

This research concerns how costs and benefits affect the voluntary provision of threshold public goods. Cadsby and Maynes (J. Public Econ. 71:53–73, 1999) hypothesized that the difference between the value and cost of such a good, its net reward, influences the likelihood of provision. Croson and Marks (Exp. Econ. 2:239–259, 2000) focused on the ratio of group payoff to total cost, the step return. We find that step return is the best predictor overall, although net reward has some impact, negatively affecting the probability of provision with inexperienced participants and positively affecting it with experienced participants.

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Correspondence to Charles Bram Cadsby.

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Cadsby, C.B., Croson, R., Marks, M. et al. Step return versus net reward in the voluntary provision of a threshold public good: An adversarial collaboration. Public Choice 135, 277–289 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9260-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9260-z

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