Skip to main content

Advertisement

Log in

Criminal Contemplation, National Context, and Deterrence

  • Original Paper
  • Published:
Journal of Quantitative Criminology Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Using random samples of adults from three European countries rarely surveyed about crime-related issues, this study seeks to identify, with more extensive indicators than is typical, individuals who are likely to contemplate the commission of criminal acts. Then, it assesses the contextual universality of deterrence claims by estimating the deterrent effectiveness of perceived formal and informal sanctions for theft and violence among crime contemplators in Greece, Russia, and Ukraine. With criminal contemplation taken into account, our findings confirm the patterns established in past research. Whereas the threat of formal punishment shows little deterrent effect, perceptions of informal sanctions appear to influence projected crime. However, supportive findings hold only in Russia and Ukraine. Overall, it appears that the deterrent effectiveness of sanctions may be to some extent contingent on cultural or contextual characteristics.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Two-stage sampling design with an initial random selection of street routes followed by the random selection of residences was employed. In each participating household, the resident 18 or more years old with a birthday closest to the date of the interview was targeted. Random replacement from an initial oversampling was employed in instances where locked apartment buildings, inability to book an interview within the designated callback time, lack of success in arranging a mutually agreeable interview time, or refusal failed to produce an interview. Approximately 70% of the respondents were random replacements, a rate that is only slightly higher than is typical in comparable city surveys in the U.S. (for example, see Latimore et al. 2006 for a description of the Oklahoma City Survey procedures) and is generally comparable to surveys in other countries (Couper and Leeuw 2003; Vågerö et al. 2008; Kordos 2005), although one might expect less cooperation in locales like these where surveys on sensitive subjects are relatively rare. In addition, to minimize bias from possible feelings of shame, embarrassment, or fears about anonymity, all questions requiring reports of past or projected crime or moral attitudes were self-administered away from the interviewers, with the respondents returning them to the interviewers in sealed envelopes containing only identifying numbers used to match with the rest of the data.

  2. Early studies trying to assess deterrence hypotheses often used self-reports of past criminal behavior, with different studies employing different lengths of recall ranging from all of the prior lifetime to the past year (see Anderson et al. 1977; Burkett and Jensen 1975; Jensen et al. 1978; Kraut 1976; see discussions by Paternoster et al. 1983; Saltzman et al. 1982). If, as the theory implies, people anticipate sanctions and then decide to act or not, deterrence cannot be assessed by looking at criminal behavior that occurred prior to the measurement of the sanction perceptions. Furthermore, some argue that prior experience with sanctions may influence future perceptions of the chances and severity of punishment. Therefore, using current perceptions to predict prior criminal behavior may not indicate anything at all about deterrence, but instead point to an “experiential” effect of prior behavior on perceptions about sanctions (Lochner 2007; Matsueda et al. 2006; Pogarsky and Piquero 2003; Saltzman et al. 1982).

  3. Projections of crime have become more popular among criminologists in recent decades (for examples see Tittle and Botchkovar 2005b; Grasmick and Bursik 1990; Grasmick and Green 1980; Hay 2001; Piquero and Pogarsky 2002; Pogarsky 2004) and they offer two main advantages for studying deterrence. First, they provide data that are correctly ordered for causal interpretation because the perceptions of sanction characteristics concern the present while the projections of criminal behavior to be predicted from sanction perceptions concern future conduct. Second, they are less threatening to respondents because they do not involve actually committed behavior, the admission of which might subject a respondent to criminal prosecution if known to the authorities. Finally, research suggests that crime projections match the actual chances of criminal involvement reasonably well (examples: Albarracin et al. 2001; Green 1989; Murray and Erickson 1987; Pogarsky 2004).

  4. Some might also contend that the strength of likely contemplation should be treated as a contingency for the effectiveness of deterrence rather than as a pre-condition for any deterrence. Logically, however, potential effects of the level of contemplation on deterrence are contradictory. On one hand, one might argue that greater degrees of contemplation should signal less deterrability because of elevated motivation for crime. Conversely, frequent contemplators may be more deterrable because even low chances of getting caught and punished are more likely to come into play to prevent heavily contemplated crime. Similarly, scant contemplation might signal high potential deterrence because those typically uninvolved in crime may be unusually fearful of sanctions. By contrast, those who rarely contemplate committing crimes may see criminal behavior as a rare opportunity that is worth the potential risk. In other words, there is a clear, definitional requirement for some degree of contemplation to be present to set the stage for deterrence, but there is no clear theoretical guidance about how the degree of contemplation might work as a contingency for deterrence. Given that uncertainty, any investigation of degree of crime contemplation as a potential contingency for deterrence would be no more than an exploratory exercise and would likely produce inconsistent findings (as we found to be the case in empirical explorations not shown).

References

  • Abbott P, Sapsford R (2006) Life satisfaction in post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine. J Happiness Stud 2:251–287

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aiken LS, West SG (1991) Multiple regression: testing and interpreting interactions. Sage, Newbury Park

    Google Scholar 

  • Akers RL (1985) Deviant behavior: a social learning approach, 3rd edn. Wadsworth, Belmont

    Google Scholar 

  • Akers RL (1998) Social learning and social structure: a general theory of crime and deviance. Northeastern University Publishing Company, Boston

    Google Scholar 

  • Albarracin D, Johnson BT, Fishbein M, Muellerleile PA (2001) Theories of reasoned action and planned behavior as models of condom use: a meta-analysis. Psychol Bull 17:142–161

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Andenaes J (1974) Punishment and deterrence. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor

    Google Scholar 

  • Anderson LS, Chiricos TG, Waldo GP (1977) Formal and informal sanctions: a comparison of deterrent effects. Soc Probl 25:103–114

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bachman R, Paternoster R, Ward S (1992) The rationality of sexual offending: testing a deterrence/rational choice conception of sexual assault. Law Soc Rev 26:343–372

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bandura A (1977) Social learning theory. General Learning Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Beccaria C (1963[1764]) On crimes and punishments. Translated with an introduction by Henri Paolucci. Macmillan, New York

  • Becker GS (1968) Crime and punishment: an economic approach. J Polit Econ 76:169–217

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Becker R, Mehlkop G (2006) Social class and delinquency: an empirical utilization of rational choice theory with cross-sectional data of the 1990 and 2000 German General Population Surveys (ALLBUS). Ration Soc 18:193–235

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bentham J (1998[1780]) Punishment and deterrence. In: von Hirsch A, Ashworth A (eds) Principled sentencing: readings on theory and policy. Hart Publishing, Oxford

  • Burkett SR, Jensen EL (1975) Conventional ties, peer influence, and the fear of apprehension: a study of adolescent marijuana use. Sociol Q 16:522–533

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carmichael S, Langton L, Pendell G, Reitzel JD, Piquero AR (2005) Do the experiential and deterrent effect operate differently across gender? J Crim Justice 33:267–276

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Central Intelligence Agency (2007) The world factbook. Retrieved from http://www.cia.gov

  • Cohen A (1983) Comparing regression coefficients across subsamples: a study of the statistical test. Sociol Methods Res 12:77–94

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cohen J (1992) A power primer. Psychol Bull 112:155–159

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Council of Europe (2003) The European sourcebook of crime and criminal justice statistics. Retrieved from http://www.europeansourcebook.org

  • Couper MP, Leeuw ED (2003) Nonresponse in cross-cultural and cross-national surveys. In: Harkness JA, van de Vijver F, Mohler PP (eds) Cross-cultural survey methods. Wiley, New York, pp 157–178

    Google Scholar 

  • Durkheim E (1966 [1897]) Suicide: a study in sociology (trans: Spaulding JA, Simpson G). Free Press, New York

  • Etzioni Amitai (1988) The moral dimension: toward a new economics. The Free Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • FOM (2002) Fond “Obschestvennoye Mneniye”. Retrieved from http://www.fom.ru

  • Freedom House (2007) Freedom in the world. Retrieved from http://www.freedomhouse.org

  • Gibbs JP (1968) Crime, punishment and deterrence. Southwest Soc Sci Q 48:515–530

    Google Scholar 

  • Gibbs JP (1975) Crime, punishment, and deterrence. Elsevier Scientific, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Gilinskiy Y (2006) Crime in contemporary Russia. Eur J Criminol 3:259–292

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grasmick HG, Bryjak GR (1980) The deterrent effect of perceived severity of punishment. Soc Forces 59:471–491

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grasmick HG, Bursik RJ Jr (1990) Conscience, significant others, and rational choice: extending the deterrence model. Law Soc Rev 24:837–861

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grasmick HG, Green DE (1980) Legal punishment, social disapproval and internalization as inhibitors of illegal behavior. J Crim Law Criminol 71:325–335

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grasmick HG, Jacobs D, McCollom CB (1983) Social class and social control: an application of deterrence theory. Soc Forces 62:359–374

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Green DE (1989) Measures of illegal behavior in individual-level deterrence research. J Res Crime Delinq 26:253–275

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Greenberg DF (1981) Methodological issues in survey research on the inhibition of crime. J Crim Law Criminol 72:1094–1101

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hay C (2001) Parenting, self-control, and delinquency: a test of self-control theory. Criminology 39:707–736

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hollinger RC, Clark JP (1983) Deterrence in the workplace: perceived severity, perceived certainty, and employee theft. Soc Forces 62:398–418

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jensen GF, Erickson ML, Gibbs JP (1978) Perceived risk of punishment and self-reported delinquency. Soc Forces 57:57–78

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kalman A (2002) Organized economic crime and corruption in Ukraine. Final report for the National Institute of Justice. Retrieved from http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/rnational/programs/ukraine.html

  • Karamanlis K (2000) Greece: the EU’s new anchor of stability in a troubled region. Wash Q 23:7–11

    Google Scholar 

  • Kiev Gorshenin Institute of Management Issues (2007) Morality of Ukrainian Society. In: Mental basis of choice. Retrieved from http://kipu.com.ua/Sotsyalog_en_mental_main.html

  • Kordos J (2005) Household surveys in transition countries. In: Household sample surveys in developing and transition countries. United Nations, NY. Retrieved from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/hhsurveys/pdf/Household_surveys.pdf

  • Kraut RE (1976) Deterrent and definitional influence on shoplifting. Soc Probl 23:358

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Latimore TL, Tittle CR, Grasmick HG (2006) Child rearing, self-control, and crime. Sociol Inq 76:343–371

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lochner L (2007) Individual perceptions of the criminal justice system. Am Econ Rev 97:444–460

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Loewenstein G, Nagin D, Paternoster R (1997) The effect of sexual arousal on expectations of sexual forcefulness. J Res Crime Delinq 34:443–473

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Matsueda R, Kreager D, Huizinga D (2006) Deterring delinquents: a rational choice model of theft and violence. Am Soc Rev 71:95–122

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McCarthy B (2002) New economics of sociological criminology. Annu Rev Sociol 28:417–442

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Merton RK (1938) Social structure and anomie. Am Sociol Rev 3:672–682

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Merton RK (1968) Social theory and social structure. Free Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Minor WW, Harry J (1982) Deterrent and experiential effects in perceptual deterrence research: a replication and extension. J Res Crime Delinq 19:190–203

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Murray GF, Erickson PG (1987) Longitudinal research: an empirical comparison of projected and subsequent criminality. Soc Sci Res 16:107–118

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nagin DS, Paternoster R (1993) Enduring individual differences and rational choice theories of crime. Law Soc Rev 27:467–496

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nagin DS, Pogarsky G (2001) Integrating celerity, impulsivity, and extralegal sanction threats into a model of general deterrence: theory and evidence. Criminology 39:865–891

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nakamura A, Nakamura M (1998) Model specification and endogeneity. J Econ 83:213–237

    Google Scholar 

  • Norwegian Social Science Data Services (2009) The European Social Survey. ess.nsd.uib.no/

  • Passas N (2000) Global anomie, dysnomie, and economic crime: hidden consequences of neoliberalism and globalization in Russia and around the world. Soc Justice 27:16–44

    Google Scholar 

  • Paternoster R (1987) The deterrent effect of the perceived certainty and severity of punishment: a review of the evidence and issues. Justice Q 4:173–218

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Paternoster R (1989) Decisions to participate in and desist from four types of common delinquency: deterrence and the rational choice perspective. Law Soc Rev 23:7–23

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Paternoster R, Pogarsky G (2009) Rational choice, agency, and thoughtfully reflective decision making: the short and long term consequences of making good choices. J Quant Criminol 25:103–127

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Paternoster R, Simpson S (1996) Sanction threats and appeals to morality: testing a rational choice model of corporate crime. Law Soc Rev 30:549–583

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Paternoster R, Saltzman L, Waldo G, Chiricos TG (1983) Estimating perceptual stability and deterrent effects: the role of perceived legal punishment in the inhibition of criminal involvement. J Crim Law Criminol 74:270–297

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Paternoster R, Brame R, Mazerolle P, Piquero A (1998) Using the correct statistical test for the equality of regression coefficients. Criminology 36:859–866

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Piliavin I, Gartner R, Thornton C, Matsueda RL (1986) Crime, deterrence, and rational choice. Am Soc Rev 51:101–119

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Piquero AR, Pogarsky G (2002) Beyond Stafford and Warr’s reconceptualization of deterrence: personal and vicarious experiences, impulsivity, and offending behavior. J Res Crime Delinq 39:153–186

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Plamenatz J (1958) The English utilitarians. Basil Blackwell, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Pogarsky G (2002) Identifying “deterrable” offenders: implications for research on deterrence. Justice Q 19:431–452

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pogarsky G (2004) Projected offending and contemporaneous rule-violation: implications for heterotypic continuity. Criminology 42:111–135

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pogarsky G (2007) Deterrence and individual differences among convicted offenders. J Quant Criminol 23:59–74

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pogarsky G, Piquero AR (2003) Can punishment encourage offending? Investigating the “resetting” effect. J Res Crime Delinq 40:95–120

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pogarsky G, Piquero AR, Paternoster R (2004) Modeling change in perceptions about sanction threats: the neglected linkage in deterrence theory. J Quant Criminol 20:343–369

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pogarsky G, Kim K, Paternoster R (2005) Perceptual change in the national youth survey: implications for deterrence theory and offender decision-making. Justice Q 22:1–29

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pratt TC, Cullen FT, Blevins KR, Daigle LE, Madensen TD (2006) The empirical status of deterrence theory: a meta-analysis. In: Cullen FT, Wright JP, Blevins KR (eds) Taking stock: the status of criminological theory. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick

    Google Scholar 

  • Pridemore WA, Chamlin MB (2006) A time series analysis of the impact of heavy drinking on homicide and suicide rates in Russia, 1956–2002. Addiction 101:1719–1729

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pridemore WA, Chamlin MB, Cochran JK (2007) An interrupted time series analysis of Durkheim’s social deregulation thesis the case of the Russian Federation. Justice Quarterly 24:271–290

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Richards P, Tittle CR (1982) Socioeconomic status and perceptions of personal arrest probabilities. Criminology 20:329–346

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Saltzman LE, Paternoster R, Waldo GP, Chiricos TG (1982) Deterrent and experiential effects: the problem of causal order in perceptual deterrence research. J Res Crime Delinq 19:172–189

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stafford M, Warr M (1993) A reconceptualization of general and specific deterrence. J Res Crime Delinq 30:123–135

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stafford MC, Gray LN, Menke BA, Ward DA (1986) Modeling the deterrent effects of punishment. Soc Psychol Q 49:338–347

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Steiger JH (1980) Tests for comparing elements of a correlation matrix. Psychol Bull 87:245–251

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tittle C (1980) Sanctions and social deviance: the question of deterrence. Praeger, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Tittle CR, Botchkovar EV (2005) Self-control, criminal motivation and deterrence: an investigation using russian respondents. Criminology 43:307–354

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tittle C, Paternoster R (2000) Social deviance and crime. An organizational and theoretical approach. Roxbury Publishing, Los Angeles

    Google Scholar 

  • Toby J (1964) Is punishment necessary? J Crim Law Criminol Police Sci 55:333–337

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2009) United Nations Surveys on Crime Trends and Operations of the Criminal Justice System. Retrieved from http://www.unode.org

  • Vågerö D, Kislitsyna O, Ferlander S, Migranova L, Karlson P, Rimachevskaya N (2008) Moscow Health Survey 2004—social surveying under difficult circumstances. Int J Public Health 53:171–179

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Varese F (1997) The transition to the market and corruption in post-socialist Russia. Polit Stud 45:579–596

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wikström P-OH (2006) Individual, settings, and acts of crime: situational mechanisms and the explanation of crime. In: Wikström P-OH, Sampson RJ (eds) The explanation of crime: contexts, mechanisms and development. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Wikström P-OH (2008) Deterrence and deterrence experiences: preventing crime through the threat of punishment. In: Shoham SG, Beck O, Kett M (eds) International handbook of penology and criminal justice. CRC Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Williams KR, Hawkins R (1986) Perceptual research on general deterrence: a critical review. Law Soc Rev 20:545–572

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Williams P, Picarelli J (2002) Organized crime in ukraine: challenge and response. Final report for the National Institute of Justice. Retrieved from http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/international/programs/ukraine.html

  • Wright BRE, Caspi A, Moffitt TE, Paternoster R (2004) Does the perceived risk of punishment deter criminally prone individuals? Rational choice, self-control, and crime. J Res Crime Delinq 41:180–213

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zimring FE, Hawkins GJ (1968) Deterrence and marginal groups. J Res Crime Delinq 2:100–114

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zimring FE, Hawkins GJ (1973) Deterrence—the legal threat in crime control. University of Chicago Press, Chicago

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Ekaterina V. Botchkovar.

Appendices

 

Appendix 1 Comparison of countries’ and samples’ characteristics

 

Appendix 2 Deviance, sanctions, and religiosity items

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Tittle, C.R., Botchkovar, E.V. & Antonaccio, O. Criminal Contemplation, National Context, and Deterrence. J Quant Criminol 27, 225–249 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-010-9104-8

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-010-9104-8

Keywords

Navigation