Abstract
This paper proposes a dynamic model using a general equilibrium approach and shows that the coordination of public policies with suitable human resources training is a key factor for an economy to industrialize. We analyze three public policy domains: innovation policies; policies regarding human resources training, including wages and employment; and push policies. The omission or implementation of public policies, as well as their coordination, defines whether an economy stagnates in a poverty trap, or on the contrary, whether the economy is activated through industrialization processes. Such outcomes depend on what the initial state of the economy is like: whether it is on the left or the right of the industrialization frontier. The viability of crossing the industrialization frontier will depend on how these types of policies are coordinated.
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Notes
This idea was first developed by Rosenstein-Rodan (1943).
Alternatively, we may define segments within the continuum of goods, so that there are intermediate levels of aggregation. Then, we would have industrialization levels that differ between segments and λμ would be the average level of industrialization in the economy.
In several countries, the cost of formal education and vocational training is subsidized by the public sector, and the entire society absorbs this cost in a continuous form.
Also, this simplification can be approached by assuming that we had numerous generations, and if the new generation did not face the training cost, the proportion of high-skilled labor would be reduced. Since we are focusing on the proportions of different types of labor units, this simplification seems closer to its dynamics than assuming that high-skilled labor units remain so.
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Work partially supported by Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (CONACYT-México) under grant Ciencia Frontera 2019-87787.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Stability Analysis
To study the stability of the dynamic system (36)-(37), we will analyze the characteristic polynomial \(f(\epsilon )=\det (A-\epsilon I)\), where 𝜖 = (𝜖1, 𝜖2), I is the 2 × 2-identity matrix and A is the matrix
where
1.1 1.1 Steady State (0, 0)
In this case
where
By (42), πμ(0, 0) < 0. In this case
which implies that the steady state (0, 0) is an attractor.
1.2 1.2 Steady State (0,1)
For this steady state
where
We have that
which implies that the steady state (1, 0) is a repeller if (43) is satisfied, and it is a saddle if (43) is not satisfied.
1.3 1.3 Steady State (1, 0)
In this case
where
Since (42) is satisfied, then πμ(1, 0) > 0. Moreover
Given πμ(1, 0) > 0, if (35) is not satisfied we have that the steady state (0,1) is an attractor. If (35) is satisfied, then it is a saddle.
1.4 1.4 Steady state (1,1)
For this steady state
where
then πμ(1, 1) > 0. We have that
where πμ(1, 1) > 0. Therefore, the steady state (0,1) is a saddle if (35) is not satisfied, and it is an attractor if (35) is satisfied.
1.5 1.5 Steady State \((\lambda _{\mu _{0}^{*}}, 0)\)
Consider \(\lambda _{\mu _{0}^{*}}\) as in (44). In this case
where
The roots of the characteristic polynomial f(𝜖) are
where 𝜖1 > 0. If (35) is not satisfied, then 𝜖2 < 0. In the other case, i.e., if (35) is satisfied, then it is not possible to determine the sign of 𝜖2. Therefore if (35) is not satisfied, then \((\lambda _{\mu _{0}}^{*}, 0)\) is saddle; in the other case, we only know that it is unstable.
1.6 1.6 Steady State \((\lambda _{\mu _{1}^{*}},1)\)
Consider \(\lambda _{\mu _{1}^{*}}\) as in (45), this steady state does not exist if \(\lambda _{\mu _{1}^{*}}\) is not positive. If \(\lambda _{\mu _{1}^{*}}>0\), then
where
The roots of the characteristic polynomial f(𝜖) are
where 𝜖1 > 0. If (35) is not satisfied, then 𝜖2 > 0. If (35) is satisfied, then it is not possible to determine the sign of 𝜖2. Therefore if (35) is not satisfied, then \((\lambda _{\mu _{1}}^{*},1)\) is repeller; in the other case, we only know that it is unstable.
1.7 1.7 Steady State \((\lambda _{\mu }^{*},\gamma _{h}^{*})\)
Consider \(\lambda _{\mu }^{*}\) and \(\gamma _{h}^{*}\) as (46) and (47), respectively. In this case
where
The roots of the characteristic polynomial f(𝜖) of A as in (48) are
with
Since tr(A) > 0, then \((\lambda _{m}u^{*},\gamma _{h}^{*})\) is not a stable steady state. Therefore \((\lambda _{\mu }^{*},\gamma _{h}^{*})\) is unstable, but it is not possible to determine their classification.
Appendix 2: Comparative Statics of λ μ in the Steady States
1.1 2.1 Parameter in Table 2
Consider the values of \(\lambda _{\mu _{0}}^{*},~ \lambda _{\mu _{1}}^{*},\) and \(\lambda _{\mu }^{*}\), as in (44), (45), and (46), respectively.
-
(i) Partial derivatives of λμ with respect to σ:
$$ \begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} {\partial\lambda_{\mu_{0}}^{*}\over \partial\sigma}&=&0; \\ {\lambda_{\mu_{1}}^{*}\over \partial\sigma}&=&{(w_{\mu}+\omega)c \over (w_{\mu}+\omega)- w_{\tau}}{\kappa L\over NF}>0; \\ {\lambda_{\mu}^{*}\over \partial\sigma}&=& 0. \end{array} $$ -
(ii) Partial derivatives of λμ with respect to c:
$$ \begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} {\partial\lambda_{\mu_{0}}^{*}\over \partial c}&=&{w_{\mu} \over (w_{\mu}-w_{\tau})} {L\over NF}>0; \\ {\lambda_{\mu_{1}}^{*}\over \partial c}&=&{(w_{\mu}+\omega)\sigma\over (w_{\mu}+\omega)- w_{\tau}}{\kappa L\over NF}>0; \\ {\lambda_{\mu}^{*}\over \partial c}&=&0. \end{array} $$ -
(ii) Partial derivatives of λμ with respect to F:
$$ \begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} {\partial\lambda_{\mu_{0}}^{*}\over \partial F}&=&{(w_{\tau}-w_{\mu} c) \over (w_{\mu}-w_{\tau})} {L\over NF^{2}}>0; \\ {\lambda_{\mu_{1}}^{*}\over \partial F} &=&{w_{\tau}-(w_{\mu}+\omega)c\sigma \over (w_{\mu}+\omega)- w_{\tau}}{\kappa L\over NF^{2}}>0; \\ {\lambda_{\mu}^{*}\over \partial F}&=&0. \end{array} $$ -
(ii) Partial derivatives of λμ with respect to N:
$$ \begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} {\partial\lambda_{\mu_{0}}^{*}\over \partial N}&=&{(w_{\tau}-w_{\mu} c) \over (w_{\mu}-w_{\tau})} {L\over N^{2}F}>0; \\ {\lambda_{\mu_{1}}^{*}\over \partial N} &=&{w_{\tau}-(w_{\mu}+\omega)c\sigma \over (w_{\mu}+\omega)- w_{\tau}}{\kappa L\over N^{2}F}>0; \\ {\lambda_{\mu}^{*}\over \partial N}&=&0. \end{array} $$
1.2 2.2 Parameter in Table 3
Consider the values of \(\lambda _{\mu _{0}}^{*},~ \lambda _{\mu _{1}}^{*},\) and \(\lambda _{\mu }^{*}\), as in (44), (45), and (46), respectively.
-
(i) Partial derivatives of λμ with respect to L:
$$ \begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} {\partial\lambda_{\mu_{0}}^{*}\over \partial L}&=&-{(w_{\tau}-w_{\mu} c) \over (w_{\mu}-w_{\tau})} {1\over NF} <0; \\ {\lambda_{\mu_{1}}^{*}\over \partial L}&=&-{w_{\tau}-(w_{\mu}+\omega)c\sigma \over (w_{\mu}+\omega)- w_{\tau}}{\kappa \over NF}<0; \\ {\lambda_{\mu}^{*}\over \partial L} &=&0. \end{array} $$ -
(ii) Partial derivatives of λμ with respect to κ:
$$ \begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} {\partial\lambda_{\mu_{0}}^{*}\over \partial \kappa}&=&0; \\ {\lambda_{\mu_{1}}^{*}\over \partial \kappa}&=&-{w_{\tau}-(w_{\mu}+\omega)c\sigma \over (w_{\mu}+\omega)- w_{\tau}}{L\over NF}<0; \\ {\lambda_{\mu}^{*}\over \partial \kappa} &=&{-w_{\tau} \over \kappa\omega -(1-\kappa)(w_{\mu}-w_{\tau})}-{(1-\kappa)w_{\tau} (w_{\mu}+\omega -w_{\tau} )\over \big(\kappa\omega -(1-\kappa)(w_{\mu}-w_{\tau})\big)^{2}}<0. ~~(*) \end{array} $$(*) If \(\lambda _{\mu _{0}}^{*}>0\) we need that κω − (1 − κ)(wμ − wτ) > 0, which implies that \({\lambda _{\mu }^{*}\over \partial \kappa }<0\).
-
(iii) Partial derivatives of λμ with respect to wμ:
$$ \begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} {\partial\lambda_{\mu_{0}}^{*}\over \partial w_{\mu}}&=&{{-w_{\tau}\left( 1-(1-c){L\over NF}\right) }\over (w_{\mu}-w_{\tau})^{2}}>0~~(*); \\ {\lambda_{\mu_{1}}^{*}\over \partial w_{\mu}}&=&{{-w_{\tau}\left( 1-(1-c\sigma){\kappa L\over NF}\right) }\over (w_{\mu}-w_{\tau})^{2}}>0~~(**); \\ {\lambda_{\mu}^{*}\over \partial w_{\mu}} &=&{(1-\kappa)^{2} w_{\tau} \over\big(\kappa\omega -(1-\kappa)(w_{\mu}-w_{\tau})\big)^{2}}>0. \end{array} $$(*) If (43) is satisfied then
$$(1-c){L\over NF}>\left( 1-{w_{\mu} c \over w_{\tau}} \right) {L\over NF}>1,$$which implies that \({\partial \lambda _{\mu _{0}}^{*}\over \partial w_{\mu }}>0\).
(**) If (43) is satisfied then
$$(1-c\sigma){\kappa L\over NF}>\left( 1-{w_{\mu} c \over w_{\tau}} \right) {L\over NF}>1,$$which implies that \({\partial \lambda _{\mu _{1}}^{*}\over \partial w_{\mu }}>0\).
-
(iii) Partial derivatives of λμ with respect to ω:
$$ \begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} {\partial\lambda_{\mu_{0}}^{*}\over \partial \omega}&=&0; \\ {\lambda_{\mu_{1}}^{*}\over \partial \omega}&=&{{-w_{\tau}\left( 1-(1-c\sigma){\kappa L\over NF}\right) }\over (w_{\mu}-w_{\tau})^{2}}>0; \\ {\lambda_{\mu}^{*}\over \partial \omega} &=&{-(1-\kappa)\kappa w_{\tau} \over \big(\kappa\omega -(1-\kappa)(w_{\mu}-w_{\tau})\big)^{2}}<0; \\ \end{array} $$
1.3 2.3 Parameter of Figures
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Mendoza-Palacios, S., Berasaluce, J. & Mercado, A. On Industrialization, Human Resources Training, and Policy Coordination. J Ind Compet Trade 22, 179–206 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-021-00376-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-021-00376-2
Keywords
- Industrialization policy
- Coordination
- Technological change
- Choice of technology
- Push strategies
- Evolutionary dynamics