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Idealized Models as Selective Representations

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Abstract

This paper calls into question one fundamental claim at the basis of an alleged puzzle for veritistic accounts of the value of idealized models: the claim that idealized models cannot be veridical representations of the world. Catherine Elgin has argued that the value of idealized models can only be explained if we construe them as exemplars, which do not represent the world. I argue that Elgin’s proposal is problematic and cannot accommodate central cases of idealization. Nevertheless, there is value in Elgin’s proposal. I rescue her notion of selectiveness in exemplification and incorporate it within a revised account of representation. I provide independent motivation in favour of a form of veritism, which motivates a revision of Elgin’s case against it. I argue that an account based on selective representation has the resources to rescue veritism from the problems raised by Elgin. In the proposal I advance, idealized models are literally veridical representations of the world.

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Notes

  1. See specially Elgin (2006; 2007; 2009).

  2. I present veritism as identifying veridicality, and not truth, as the fundamental aim of cognition because I want to leave open the possibility of epistemic achievements which do not have propositional (nor conceptual) content, but which do have content with veridicality conditions. For instance, perceptual experiences according to some philosophers (see Dretske (2003), Siegel (2010)). On this view, perceptions can be construed as epistemically valuable by virtue of representing the world veridically.

  3. See Goldman (2001; 1999, especially Ch. 1), for a defence of veritism and a response to a series of objections. See also Alston (2005) for a defence of veritism and a discussion of the different relations to veridicality mentioned here. See also Grimm (2008) for a critical discussion of some of the ideas advanced by Goldman and Alston.

  4. Barberousse and Ludwig (2009, 57), explicitly defend such position.

  5. See Pappas and Swain (1978, 14) for a formulation of the principle along these lines.

  6. See Shope (1983), and Pappas and Swain (1978).

  7. However, this kind of position counts with many actual defenders, independently motivated. For instance, prominently, Bas van Fraassen (1980) has argued in favour of a similar position on entirely independent grounds.

  8. As it will become clear, I do not set aside this worry because I think it is unimportant. Below, I will seek to defend a kind of veritism that explains the value of idealized models without renouncing to the possibility that using idealized models might provide us with knowledge of the phenomena represented by them.

  9. See McMullin (1985), and Weisberg (2007b).

  10. See, for instance, the majority of the essays in Suárez (2009).

  11. See Mizrahi (2012, 241-242) Elgin (2017, 15).

  12. Similar claims can be found in Elgin (2006, 209; 2009, 84; 2017, 14–15, 25–27).

  13. See Elgin (2017, 27–32).

  14. An important source of inspiration for Elgin with respect to these issues is Nancy Cartwright’s work. See Cartwright (1983), especially “Do the Laws of Physics State the Facts?”

  15. See Elgin (2017, 25–27).

  16. Although there are other legitimate uses of “understand”, Elgin’s focus is on objectual understanding, for this seems to be the relevant kind of understanding in scientific practice. Other kinds of understanding include understanding a person; or propositional understanding, such as understanding that something is the case. See Elgin (2017, 33–45).

  17. See Elgin (2007, 39; 2017, 43 − 44).

  18. For discussions on understanding and whether or not it requires truth see Zagzebski (2001), Pritchard (2009), and Kvanvig (2003).

  19. In Sect. 3.3 I explore Michael Strevens (2017) account of understanding. A case can be made for thinking that his view would fall under this category.

  20. See Elgin (2009, 81; 2017, 184–191).

  21. See Elgin (2017, 186-188).

  22. Borges (1975). For philosophical discussion of this story by Borges see Frigg and Nguyen (2017, 52) and Boesch (2019, 5500-5501).

  23. See Elgin (2009, 82 − 83).

  24. This example plays a similar role in Elgin (2009, 81; 2017, 187-188).

  25. The point is merely that abstracta cannot instantiate certain (physical) properties. A fact which might be partly explained by their not being spatio-temporal. This is perfectly consistent with the claim that concreta can, and often do, instantiate abstract properties.

  26. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this important point to my attention.

  27. I thank two anonymous reviewers for this journal for calling my attention to this important point.

  28. See Teller (2008).

  29. I thank an anonymous reviewer for calling my attention to this important point.

  30. Of course, these observations are consistent with the fact that measuring instruments get better as technology advances and that human interference might be abolished by technological improvements, or diminished by practice and care.

  31. On the issue of inexactitude in measurement see Tal (2013) and Chang (2004).

  32. Of course, there might be some specific very strong construals of representation, which make it impossible for any representation to be absolutely precise and exact. Think of a construal of representations according to which a concrete representation needs to occupy the same space occupied by the target phenomena represented. For a defense of the claim that the notion of an absolutely precise and exact representation seems to be logically consistent See Teller (2009; 2008, 437).

  33. Similar examples and issues are discussed by Austin in (1962b, 143; 1950; 1979).

  34. Austin’s own view in the matter of truth is much more complex and subtle tan these quotations (and my discussion of them here) might suggest. See Longworth (2013) for a discussion of the potential ways in which Austin’s view on truth could be fleshed out.

  35. See Van Fraassen (2008) for a similar position.

  36. For useful discussion of the underground example see Contessa (2011, 127 − 130) and Bolinska (2013, 230).

  37. Whether and how an aspect is distorted might respond to desiderata outside the verististic framework, such as simplicity or convinience.

  38. In addition, the model is explicitly advanced as a representation which applies under “normal conditions”. At least in this respect the selectivity of the representation is made explicit.

  39. I thank two anonymous reviewers for calling my attention to this important point.

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This work was made possible thanks to the financial support of the postdoctoral program of the National Autonomous University of Mexico at the Institute for Philosophical Research.

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  1. Faculty of Philosophy, National Autonomous University of Mexico, Facultad de Filosofía, Circuito Escolar s/n, 04510, Mexico City, Mexico

    Alfonso Anaya

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…In that Empire, the Art of Cartography attained such Perfection that the map of a single Province occupied the entirety of a City, and the map of the Empire, the entirety of a Province. In time, those Unconscionable Maps no longer satisfied, and the Cartographers Guilds struck a Map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, and which coincided point for point with it.

The following Generations, who were not so fond of the Study of Cartography as their Forebears had been, saw that that vast Map was Useless, and not without some Pitilessness was it, that they delivered it up to the Inclemencies of Sun and Winters. In the Deserts of the West, still today, there are Tattered Ruins of that Map, inhabited by Animals and Beggars; in all the Land there is no other Relic of the Disciplines of Geography.

-Jorge Luis Borges, “On Exactitude in Science”.

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Anaya, A. Idealized Models as Selective Representations. J Gen Philos Sci 54, 189–213 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-022-09612-7

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