Bugging the Strict Vegan

  • Bob FischerEmail author


Entomophagy—eating insects—is getting a lot of attention these days. However, strict vegans are often uncomfortable with entomophagy based on some version of the precautionary principle: if you aren’t sure that a being isn’t sentient, then you should treat it as though it is. But not only do precautionary principle-based arguments against entomophagy fail, they seem to support the opposite conclusion: strict vegans ought to eat bugs.


Entomophagy Insects Veganism Precautionary principle 



For helpful feedback on earlier versions of this paper, thanks to James McWilliams, Jeff Sebo, and three anonymous reviewers. For a wealth of information about insecticides, thanks to Marvin Harris.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyTexas State UniversitySan MarcosUSA

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