Are some of these concerns surrounding E-numbers private matters indeed? In his essay Public Goods, Private Goods, Geuss discusses three historical cases in each of which the meaning of the public/private distinction is established. Although overlapping, these meanings differ from context to context: it may refer to a conception of intimacy and appropriate behavior, to republican ideas of interests and responsibilities, or to what counts as cognitive access to beliefs and desires. His conclusion is that no single clear and substantial distinction between the public and the private can be drawn that would be generally meaningful. He argues that we should not start from a basic understanding of what is private/public and only later consider what it implies for collective action. “Rather, first we must ask what this purported distinction is for, that is, why we want to make it at all” (Geuss 2001:107). This does not mean that the line between public and private concerns does not exist, but that rethinking or redrawing that line should be part of any debate over concrete and contextualized matters. I suggest that we understand, perhaps not all, but at least some of the consumer concerns about food additives as an attempt to re-imagine what impacts of food technology count as public matters.
In this respect, there are good reasons to recognize concerns about the way we relate to our food as legitimate and public issues. These reasons have been offered in the field of political philosophy by critics of political liberalism, who advocate ethical deliberation on the good life in the public and political sphere. More interesting, however, are the arguments made in the field of philosophy of technology, since they pertain to the social and ethical impacts of technology in particular.
Albert Borgmann, for example, has argued that in modern society, the overall availability of technological devices reflects a pattern in how we perceive and interact with the world. The pattern is one of disengagement: many activities with intrinsic meaning and value have become redundant with technological devices to which their technical functions are now delegated. Borgmann presents the table dinner as an exemplary case of such an activity: “Once food has become freely available, it is only consistent that the gathering of the meal is shattered and disintegrates into snacks, TV dinners, bites that are grabbed to be eaten; and eating itself is scattered around television shows, late and early meetings, activities, overtime work, and other business.” (1984: 204). Borgmann’s point is not that we are somehow forced to do so by food technology. But it would be naïve to claim that our food habits remain unaffected by it. Invisible and self-evident, pervasive and consistent, the pattern of technological delegation has become the default position or background against which we make choices. “Living in an advanced industrial country, one is always and already implicated in technology and so profoundly and extensively that one’s involvement normally remains implicit.” (1984:104–5—italics are mine).
Also, Bruno Latour has criticized the instrumentalist assumption that technological artifacts are neutral instruments that in themselves do not prescribe or effectuate particular actions. Rather, he argues, artifacts are inscribed with a certain program of action: they embody a particular view of how they are supposed to be used, what context is appropriate, and what kind of actions are to be promoted. In this sense, artifacts have the ability to mediate our actions in the sense that what we do is co-shaped by both artifacts and by ourselves. This is conceivable only if we recognize that things, like human beings, can be actors with a certain agenda (Latour 1999; see also Winner 1986 and Akrich 1992).
Bringing together Borgmann’s and Latour’s conceptions of technology, Verbeek (2005) has argued that although artifacts can and often do have a decisive role in how we lead our lives, their influence is not necessarily coercive or strictly determined. That is, they rather invite or discourage certain ways of acting—and this includes those practices that we consider to be part of the good life. To be sure, Verbeek revises Borgmann’s gloomy claim that artifacts would only draw us away from meaningful practices; they might as well enable us to engage with the world around us in new ways that are different, but just as meaningful (Verbeek 2005: 186–191).
In pointing at the mediating character of technology, and by making explicit the ways in which human action is implicated by artifacts, these authors have made clear that technologies can invite, hinder, enable, transform, guide, seduce, delay, restrict, or assist our actions. To qualify technologies as matters of public or even political concern, as these authors have done, means to question the pervasiveness and desirability of their impacts. From this perspective, the ethical, cultural, and aesthetic concerns surrounding food additives cannot be dismissed for the reason that the consumption of processed food is simply a matter of individual and free choice, because that is exactly the claim that is contested in the first place. Even though such concerns do not draw a direct causal relation between the use of food additives and the way we eat, they point out cases where food additives mediate the practices of preparing, identifying, memorizing, enjoying and sharing food that they value so much.