Abstract
The Indian Buddhist Mādhyamika master Candrakīrti (ca. 7th century CE) grounds his philosophy in lokaprasiddhi / -prasiddha, “that which is common knowledge / generally accepted among people in the world.” This raises the question of whether Candrakīrti accepts everything that is “common knowledge” or instead distinguishes and privileges certain justifiable beliefs within common knowledge. Tom J.F. Tillemans has argued that Candrakīrti advocates a “lowest common denominator” version of lokaprasiddhi instead of a model which promotes “in some areas at least, more of a qualitative hierarchy of opinions and thus criticism by optimally qualified, insightful individuals.” In this way Candrakīrti is characterized as a “typical Prāsaṅgika” who advocates “a populist lokaprasiddha and global error theory,” leading to “a dismal slough of relativism” in which Candrakīrti is compelled to uncritically acquise in the opinions of “average worldlings.” I argue that Candrakīrti instead employs a version of lokaprasiddhi that distinguishes expert knowledge from the untutored notions of the hoi polloi. This argument is based upon a new interpretation of āgama Candrakīrti twice quotes, and Candrakīrti’s usage of the terms lokaprasiddhi / -prasiddha, loka- / laukikavyavahāra, saṃvṛti and saṃvṛtisatya, and laukika paramārtha. I conclude that Candrakīrti presents himself as an expert in the determination of mundane affairs (laukikārthaviniścayanipuṇa), the foremost of which is the “mundane ultimate” (laukika paramārtha), the Buddha’s teaching of the path to liberation. Candrakīrti illucidates this for those following “the Victor’s path of reasoning” (jinasya yuktipathānuyāyin). He bases his philosophy in a position that is simply mundane (laukika eva pakṣe sthitvā), but which is nevertheless rationally demonstrable within the parameters of that which is common knowledge among people in the world (lokaprasiddhi).
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Notes
MABh (T) [LVP ed.] p. 179.16–20; [UN ed.] pp. 79, 107. It must be emphasized at the outset that my treatment of the Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya here is provisional, subject to revision upon the forthcoming publication of the Sanskrit of its sixth cittotpāda.
Louis de la Vallée Poussin [LVP] first noted this fact: PP (S) [LVP ed.] p. 605. See now also Shenghai Li (2012, p. 132, no. 41). It is noteworthy that Li simply assumes this quotation is from a ‘Nikāya Buddhist’ Saṃyuktāgama, but he quite understandably does not analyze the thorny textual issues or provide an argument in support of this assumption. Also, he does not address Tillemans' interpretations of Candrakīrti's citation of this text (Li 2012, p. 133 & n95).
Tillemans, like many writing on Madhyamaka, uses the Sanskrit lokaprasiddha. Both this and lokaprasiddhi are found in Candrakīrti's writings. I use lokaprasiddhi following, e.g., PP (S) [M ed. §105] p. 1.263.3–4, and PP (S) ad Madhyamakaśāstra (MŚ) 7.34 [LVP ed.] p. 177.7. Also, I use Madhyamakaśāstra (MŚ) to designate Nāgārjuna's foundational work on Madhyamaka, which most etic scholars have called Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK) following LVP's designation of it.
PP (S) ad MŚ 18.8 [N ed.] p. 137.6–10. Note that Niisaku, similar to Li (cf. note 2), marks the quotation “SN” [= Saṃyuttanikāya] without comment. Cf. PP (S) [LVP ed.] p. 370.6–8; de Jong (1978, p. 229) reports no v.l. LVP p. 370n3 first drew attention to “Saṁ[yutta] N[ikāya] III p. 138,” quoting Léon Feer's edition of the Pāli sutta. And LVP adds the following note: “saṃmata = yod par 'dod pa = sad iṣṭa = san mata.” But this is incorrect: yod par 'dod pa translates asti saṃmatam, not saṃmatam alone; Tibetan 'dod pa by itself translates saṃmatam, which in any case is derived from sam-mata, not “san mata.” For the MABh (T) ad MA 6.81 citation, see note 1. In MABh (S) the quotation proper is bracketed by yathoktaṃ bhagavatā…iti; (T) ji skad du | bcom ldan 'das kyis…zhes gsungs pa lta bu'o ||. That is, it is clearly identified as buddhavacana, but it is not specifically identified as being drawn from āgama (āgamāt) as in PP (S). The Sanskrit of this quotation in MABh (S) is for our purposes identical in meaning with the text in PP (S) although there are insignificant differences in wording. I thank Anne Macdonald for kindly providing me the preceding information on MABh (S).
But at times in “Mādhyamikas Playing Bad Hands” the qualification “seems to be [italics added] a Mahāyānist recension of a sūtra” disappears, and it is instead described simply as “the Mahāyānist sūtra text Candrakīrti cited” (Tillemans, 2022, p. 229; likewise 223n1, 226).
I suspect it is significant that in the Saṃyuttanikāya the “Pupphasutta” is immediately followed by the “Pheṇapiṇḍūpamasutta.” Candrakīrti at least four times quotes a Sanskrit version of the first six lines of the udāna found at the end of the “Pheṇapiṇḍūpamasutta”: pheṇapiṇḍopamaṃ rūpam… See MacDonald (2015, 2.162–163n317) for copious references; also MABh (T) [UN ed.] p. 10 (no. 60). At PP (S) [M ed. §72] pp. 1.203–204 Candrakīrti gives thirteen Sanskrit pādas, ten of which correspond to padas of the Pāli udāna; the last three pādas in Candrakīrti's citation are not found in the Pāli. See MacDonald (2015, 2.163–165n319) for extensive discussion of the complex philology and her very important observation that the end of Candrakīrti's version of this sūtra “transforms the verse into much stronger scriptural support for the Mādhyamika viewpoint.”
Or by Seyfort Ruegg (1995, p. 152 & n13) (= 2010, p. 224 & n13); 2000, p. 112n6 (cf. also pp. 148–152). Nevertheless, I agree with Seyfort Ruegg when he says: “The [Pāli] canonical text…does not appear to justify the supposition that the Buddha was somehow anti-philosophical. The context in fact indicates that what the wise agree on as the given must provide the starting point for philosophical discussion” (1995, p. 152 = 2010, p. 224).
Note, however, Bhikkhu Anālayo's (2014, p. 12n30) observation: “[In comparison to the Chinese Saṃyuktāgama text, the Pāli Saṃyuttanikāya version] and the Gāndhārī fragment parallel adopt the opposite sequence, as they first cover the non-existence of a permanent bodily form, etc., before taking up the existence of impermanent bodily form, etc.” Also, the Pāli and the Gāndhārī versions both contain the lotus simile at the end, which is absent from the Chinese Saṃyuktāgama text. Thorough comparative analysis of the three versions is needed.
Indeed, Kalkin Puṇḍarīka says he wrote his Vimalaprabhā (which reached completion during the third or fourth decade of the 11th century CE) for bālapaṇḍitamūrkhāḥ, “infantile scholarly dummies,” and he refers to paṇḍitābhimāna, “the arrogance of scholars.” See likewise A Critical Pāli Dictionary Online s.v. ati-paṇḍita-mānitā, “excessive pride in knowledge,” and V.S. Apte, The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary s.v. paṇḍitamānika, etc., “a pedant.”
Noteworthy also is that—like Candrakīrti's Sanskrit āgama—this text has lhan cig tu (< *sārdham) in the first two clauses, unlike the Pāli “Pupphasutta” and other versions.
It should be noted that this text, BCRD Lhasa Kangyur no. 368, is a translation of the Chinese version of the Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra produced by Dharmakṣema. I did not locate text corresponding to the passages studied here in shorter versions of the sutra.
My reconstruction of the Indic *prājña-paṇḍita is purely hypothetical. Christopher Jones—who is working on Dharmakṣema's expanded version of the Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra from which the above passage is drawn—kindly suggested to me (email 12 May 2023) that the Tibetan mkhas pa shes rab can translates 智者, which in turn may represent *paṇḍita alone. In any case, this passage supports my argument that some Mahāyāna Buddhists believed that the Buddha concurs with views held by informed, discerning people, not the least common denominator of the hoi polloi.
Tillemans (2022, p. 225) suggests that there is a “populist bent…in the Mahāyānist sources” that reference the ‘I do not dispute with the world' sūtra: “Indeed, the Ratnakuṭa, itself, explicitly glossed the term ‘the world’ in the cited passage [of the *Trisaṃvaranirdeśaparivarta] as ‘infantile, ordinary beings,’ in short, bāla and pṛthagjana. The Pāli Saṃyutta reading, emphasizing what experts or ideal individuals think, rather than the opinions of the infantile, does not have the same populist potential at all” (2022, pp. 225–226). But this misrepresents the evidence. Because the TSNP cites only the part of the discourse in which ‘the world contradicts the Buddha,' it is to be expected that those people (loka) are characterized as “spiritually immature ordinary people.” Because this passage in the TSNP does not treat the second part of the discourse—in which the Buddha agrees with opinions held by the world—it cannot be used as evidence to support a claim that there is a generalized “populist bent” in Mahāyāna employments of our ‘I do not dispute with the world' text.
Two noteworthy examples: (1) the Mahāyāna *Āryalokadharaparipṛcchānāmasūtra (BCRD Lhasa Kangyur E-Text, Lhasa no. 175, vol. 60, ff. 53a4–53b4, 105a7–105b1); (2) *Vinayakṣudrakavastu (BCRD Lhasa Kangyur E-Text, Lhasa no. 6, vol. 10, f. 232a4–5); with Śīlapālita, *Āgamakṣudrakavyākhyāna (BCRD Derge Tangyur E-Text no. 4115, vol. 158, f. 56a2 ff.).
Mark Allon, email dated 13 January 2022; I have inserted the material in square brackets, expanded some abbreviations, and italicized some words.
Saṃyuttanikāya 3.140: tam ahaṃ bhikkhave bālaṃ puthujjanam andham acakkhukam ajānantam apassantaṃ kinti karomi || (after GRETIL E-Text version).
Or by Seyfort Ruegg: see note 7.
“everyday things”: ghaṭapaṭādi; bum [pa dang] snam [bu la] sogs [pa]. This a stock phrase for “all things” (niravaśeṣapadārthāḥ), going back at least to Nāgārjuna: see, e.g., PP (S) ad MŚ 10.15d [LVP ed.] pp. 213.14–214.3; cf. likewise PP (S) ad MŚ 14.4 [LVP ed.] p. 252.3–4.
On this see MA/MABh 6.150–165. MA/MABh 6.158 says that the seven types of intrinsic character relations are not established either in reality/ultimately or from the perspective of people. Yet, according to Candrakīrti's own position (kho bo cag gi phyogs la < *asmatpakṣe) of dependent origination as mere conditionality, setting aside this type of critical analysis one designates things based upon their components, in harmony with the way people do this. This is one of many passages that contradict the commonly-held false notion that Candrakīrti holds no philosophical “position” (pakṣa; phyogs).
The same idea is employed in PP (S) [M ed. §104] p. 1.261.5–6: laukike vyavahāra itthaṃ vicārāpravṛtter avicārataś ca laukikapadārthānām astitvāt |.
“distinguished”: vikalpitam; rnam par bzhag / gzhag. I follow the Tibetan choice of connotation here. It strikes me that this could equally be translated into Tibetan as rnam par brtag—“imagined” or “mentally constructed”—and that the semantic ambiguity is probably deliberate. Salvini (2023, p. 413) glosses this as “that is wrongly imagined.”
MABh (T) [LVP ed.] p. 104.17–19; [UN ed.] p. 59: yid kyi gnod par byed pa ni de dag dang yang dag ma yin pas byas pa'i grub pa'i mtha' la sogs pa dang | rjes su dpag pa ltar snang ba dag ste |.
LVP rtog pa, but emend to rtogs pa; see text below.
As a mere work-around I here translate saṃvṛti as “phenomenal/conventional” and, like Theodore Stcherbatsky (cf. Macdonald, 2015, 2.261n495) translate saṃvṛtisatya as “phenomenal reality.” I believe that no single term in English adequately captures all three of Candrakīrti's connotations of saṃvṛti, and any choice one makes is at best a compromise. For example, Seyfort Ruegg and MacDonald often employ “surface” [level] for saṃvṛti, which captures certain dimensions of Candrakīrti's first connotation, but it does not capture the second and third connotations. For lokasaṃvṛtyā MacDonald uses “from the point of view of the worldly surface [level]” (2015, 2.93, §40), but also “from the point of view of worldly convention” (2015, 2.257, §104; 2.271, §111). Tillemans renders saṃvṛtisatya as “customary truth,” corresponding to his theory that a “typical Prāsaṅgika” subscribes to “a global error theory and a dismissal of sophistication in the discovery of truth” (Tillemans, 2022, p. 229). Saṃvṛti is very often translated as “conventional,” which fairly closely corresponds to the third connotation, but I usually prefer to preserve “convention/conventional” for vyavahāra. In brief, I believe there is no single English equivalent for the interrelated complex of concepts Candrakīrti discerns in saṃvṛti, and without explanation and contextualization any single English rendering of the term will—like the Tibetan translation kun rdzob—inevitably flatten and obscure Candrakīrti's subtle deployment of the key term saṃvṛti. Candrakīrti plays his hand with multiple derivations of saṃvṛti from multiple meanings of √vṛ and √vṛt. I do not agree with Tillemans' suggestion that Candrakīrti's employment of three connotations of saṃvṛti “arose due to uncertainties about which of those Sanskrit roots was the right one” and that this might boil down to “a potentially confusing and weighty spelling mistake” (Tillemans 2022, p. 227), but thorough discussion of this very complicated problem would require another study. See, e.g., Salvini (2019, pp. 672–674, 690), Tillemans (2022, pp. 227–228) and Newman (2022, p. 10) for some recent treatments of Candrakīrti's three connotations of saṃvṛti.
That is, this refers to Candrakīrti's third connotation of saṃvṛti just given at PP (S) ad MŚ 24.8 [LVP ed.] p. 492.11–12; de Jong (1978, p. 242) reports no v.l.: atha vā saṃvṛtiḥ saṃketo lokavyavahāra ity arthaḥ | sa cābhidhānābhidheyajñānajñeyādilakṣaṇaḥ ||.
I follow Tillemans' earlier usage in designating this text a vṛtti instead of a ṭīkā, but the question remains open. The text colophon is not available in Sanskrit, and its Tibetan translation reads bzhi brgya pa'i 'grel pa, the 'grel pa of which can represent either Sanskrit term. The existing Sanskrit chapter titles merely read prakaraṇam, which the Tibetan renders as rab tu byed…pa'i 'grel pa.
For “the natural ultimate” (svabhāvaparamārtha) see the discussion of CŚV ad CŚ 8.7 below.
YṢV (S & T) [LY ed] pp. 140–141; YṢV (T) [S-S ed.] p. 73.
The YṢV (S) manuscript is damaged here; Li and Ye restore the Sanskrit as saṃvṛtisatyād aparihāṇārthaṃ, but yongs su ma nyams pa might represent aparihīṇa.
My gloss of pravṛtti as “activity” captures only one connotation of this term, which also encompasses ideas of “appearance,” “manifestation,” “origination,” etc.; Niisaku translates it as “proceeding.” In CŚ 8.9 pravṛtti is contrasted with nivṛtti—“inactivity,” “cessation,” “ceasing from worldly acts,” etc. This pair is in turn explained through the Buddha's two types of teaching—laukikī deśanā and paramārthakathā—which express, respectively, ‘the mundane ultimate' and ‘the natural ultimate,’ emptiness.
For Candrakīrti's ideas on tattvāvatāra, see note 37 below and PP (S) ad MŚ 18.1 [LVP ed.] p. 340.1–12; [N ed.] p. 108.1–10, referring to MA/MABh 6.160 ff. See particularly MABh (T) ad MA 6.162 [LVP ed.] p. 281.6 ff.; [UN ed.] p. 105 ff. Here Candrakīrti presents some of his ideas on dependent designation “in order to not annihilate phenomenal reality, and so that yogis can easily enter into reality” (ji ltar kun rdzob kyi bden pa mi gcad [LVP bcad] par bya ba'i phyir dang | rnal 'byor pa rnams de kho na nyid la bde blag tu 'jug par bya ba'i phyir).
Suzuki suggests the Tibetan de'i phyir is not represented in the Sanskrit, but I read it as representing iti, and thus move the daṇḍa before iti; cf. CŚV (S & T) [S ed.] pp. 126n14, 127n15
Thus CŚV (S) [S ed.]. From this Sanskrit the Tibetan translation de kho na nyid bdud rtsi la 'jug pa'i skabs su gyur pa nyid kyi phyir na should instead read: *de kho na nyid la 'jug pa'i skas su gyur pa nyid kyi phyir na. It looks like the Tibetan translator Pa tshab Nyi ma grags may have read *tattvāmṛtāvatārasopānaº, translated this as *de kho na nyid kyi bdud rtsi la 'jug pa'i skas, the skas of which got corrupted to skabs. But see PP (S) ad MŚ 18.7cd [N ed.] p. 136.11: tattvāmṛtāvatāradeśanā°; PP (S) ad MŚ 18.8 [N ed.] p. 139.8–9: tattvāmṛtāvatāropāya° & tattvāmṛtāvatārānupāya°. These suggest CŚV (S) might be emended to *tattvāmṛtāvatāra-sopāna° or -upāya°, and CŚV (T) might be emended to *de kho na nyid kyi bdud rtsi la 'jug pa'i thabs°.
See footnote 25. Likewise Niisaku (2019, p. 65): “This may be legitimately called Candrakīrti's interpretation of the term vyavahāra as used by Nāgārjuna in [MŚ] 24.10.”
See similarly Salvini: “Abhidharmic categories are valid conventions and a stepping stone towards ultimate truth…” (2023, p. 413); likewise in reference to a “gradation from ordinary speech to Abhidharma and eventually to ultimate emptiness” (2023, p. 410). I would add to this by noting that laukika paramārtha—roughly equivalent to “abhidharma”—is a special subspecies of lokavyavahāra.
PP (S) [M ed. §105–123] pp. 1.263–276; MacDonald, 2015, 2.260–294. The following summaries and translations—and any errors in them—are my own, deeply indebted to the marvelous labor of Anne MacDonald.
MacDonald (2015, 2.260) translates this phrase as “this surface [level], which has reached its own [real] existence (ātmabhāvasattā) through mere error (viparyāsa)”; see also p. 2.260n495 for her discussion. Candrakīrti also invokes the phrase viparyāsamātrāsāditātmabhāvasya at PP (S) [M ed. §48] pp. 1.175.2–3; MacDonald (2015, 2.109–110) translates this as “whose [ascribed] existence (ātmabhāva) has been procured through sheer error.” (Compare samāsāditātmabhāvasattākāyoḥ at PP (S) [M ed. §114] p. 1.272.1–2; MacDonald 2015, p. 2.282.) I base my understanding of this phrase upon viparyāsamātra-labdhātmasattākāyā duḥkhādisaṃvṛteḥ at PP (S) ad MŚ 12.10 [LVP ed.] p. 234.4; de Jong (1978, p. 54) reports no v.l. I understand Candrakīrti to be invoking two of his connotations of saṃvṛti here: the primary sense of saṃvṛti under discussion is his third connotation, lokavyavahāra (see note 25) which is lokaprasiddha. When error (viparyāsa) reifies this as if it had a self-nature (ātmabhāva), it falls under his first connotation of saṃvṛti: samantād varaṇaṃ saṃvṛtiḥ | ajñānaṃ hi samantāt sarvapadārthatattvāvacchādanāt saṃvṛtir ity ucyate |; PP (S) ad MŚ 24.8c [LVP ed.] p. 492.10; de Jong (1978, p. 242) reports no v.l. Viparyāsa indicates a “perverse” cognition of a thing, such as misapprehending a rope as if it was a snake (cf. CŚV ad CŚ 12.8b [k. 283]), or misapprehending the conventional, nominally existent self as if it did not exist (cf. PP (S) ad MŚ 18.6 [LVP ed.] p. 356.1; de Jong (1978, p. 226) corrects to °ātmātmīyāsadviparyāsa°, and this reading is adopted at [N ed.] p. 123.15).
This saṃvṛti, I assume, again refers to Candrakīrti's third connotation of the term; see note 25. MacDonald (2015, 2.261n498) suggests that Candrakīrti here chides Dignāga for “denying lakṣyas as constituent elements of saṃvṛti.” This certainly makes sense given the flow of the argument, but Candrakīrti may also be referring more broadly to his rejection of the Yogācāra denial of external objects which, he says, is contrary to the common belief in the existence of external objects. See, e.g., MA/MABh 6.91–93.
PP (S) [M ed. §105] pp. 1.263.2–264.6; cf. MacDonald (2015, 2.260–261).
See likewise Candrakīrti's ridicule of Yogācāra tenets at MABh ad MA (S) 6.31cd: syāl lokabādhā yadi laukikārtho lokapratītyaiva nirākriyeta | ([LVP ed.] p. 113.6–14; [UN ed.] p. 61).There he gives the example of someone reporting the theft of his possession (rdzas < *dravya). Another person questions him, “What sort of possession?” The victim says, “A pot.” The other says, “A pot is not a thing (‘substance'—rdzas < *dravya) because it is an object to be known by an avenue of knowledge (gzhal bya < *prameya), like a pot in a dream.” In other words, Candrakīrti is accusing Yogācāras of imposing erroneous philosophically fabricated irrelevancies upon common usage, ridiculously superimposing an idealist foundationalist ontology upon everyday thought and language. One may refute such notions simply via that which is established among people in the world (lokapratītyaiva nirākriyeta).
arthādhigama. MacDonald (2015, 2.292) translates this as “apprehension of objects.” I think this collocation is probably deliberately ambiguous, indicating both the epistemic sense indicated by MacDonald's and by my translation, as well as a common sense of “achievement of objectives / acquisition of aims.”
See MacDonald 2015, 2.289–291n541 for extensive discussion of this. She makes a strong case that it is highly unlikely that Candrakīrti follows a Nyāya account of the four pramāṇas. (Cf. Salvini 2023, pp. 417–418.) Candrakīrti's four pramāṇas coincide with the four pramāṇas Nāgārjuna critiques in the Vigrahavyāvartanī, with the difference that Candrakīrti places āgama before upamāna. For an intriguing interpretation of the role of the four pramāṇas in the Vigrahavyāvartanī see Franco, 2022, pp. 130–134. Franco argues that pramāṇas in general “were of a relatively minor importance,” were ‘marginal in Nāgārjuna's time' (pp. 131, 134). However, he does not explain why Nāgārjuna devoted so much energy to attacking his opponents' presentation of the four pramāṇas, or how Candrakīrti can accept the four pramāṇas if Nāgārjuna absolutely rejects them.
PP (S) [M ed. §123] p. 1.275.8–10; MacDonald 2015, 2.292.
Contra LVP, MacDonald excludes this sentence from the critical text of her edition of PP (S). Her argument for excluding it—especially the fact that it is absent from the Tibetan translation—is persuasive (MacDonald 2015, 2.294–295n544). I include this sentence here because it appears (although it is certainly misplaced) in all manuscripts of PP (S) used by MacDonald, and because it echoes Candrakīrti's established position (laukika eva pakṣe sthitvā) stated above, although it may be an interpolation in PP (S).
YṢV (T) ad YṢ 5 [S-S ed.] p. 35: 'khor bar yongs su rtog pa yod na myan ngan las 'das par yongs su rtog ste de gnyi ga yang 'jig rten gyi tha snyad yin pa'i phyir ro ||.
Cristina Anna Scherrer-Schaub (1991, p. 142) translates kun rdzob tu yang as car même en vérité d'enveloppement, presupposing Candrakīrti's first connotation of saṃvṛti. But because Candrakīrti is differentiating conventional knowledge and conventional error I think his third connotation of saṃvṛti is to be foregrounded in this context. See similarly PP (S) [M ed. §40] p. 1.168.3–5: lokasaṃvṛtyābhyupeta°…naitad yuktaṃ saṃvṛtyāpi svata utpattyanabhyupagamāt ||. MacDonald (2015, 2.93–94) translates saṃvṛtyāpi here as “even from [the point of view] of the surface [level of reality],” apparently invoking Candrakīrti's first connotation of saṃvṛti. But because saṃvṛtyāpi is shorthand for lokasaṃvṛtyā, it again seems simpler to understand saṃvṛti in the sense of lokavyavahāra. See also: (1) PP (S) [M ed. §42] p. 1.170.5–6 (MacDonald, 2015, 2.98); (2) PP (S) ad MŚ 18.1 [N ed.] p. 112.7–10; [LVP ed.] pp. 344.11–345.3: saṃvṛtisatyād api paribhraṣṭā…saṃvṛtyāpi pratiṣedho vihita eva ||; (3) PP (S) ad MŚ 21.4 [LVP ed.] p. 413.9: tat saṃvṛtyāpi nāstīty ucyate; (4) MA (S) 6.122d no saṃvṛtyāpīṣyate sattvam asya; and so forth. On occasion more than one of Candrakīrti's connotations of saṃvṛti may be in play, because knowledge which is [3] semantic (saṃketa) and pertains to people's conventions (lokavyavahāra), and [2] occurs relationally (parasparasaṃbhavana), is also [1] unaware of (ajñāna) and thus conceals the ultimate reality of all things (sarvapadārthatattvāvacchādana).
See YṢV (S) ad YṢ 0 [S-S ed.] p. 19n4-4; [LY ed.] p. 126.
In effect, on this issue I do not see the difference between Candrakīrti on the one hand and Kamalaśīla and other so-called “Svatantrika” Mādhyamikas on the other that is posited by Tillemans (2022, pp. 230–233). I hope that this study has established that Candrakīrti makes positive statements about what is and is not the case within the domain of conventional reality.
Following Nāgārjuna, Candrakīrti defines the subject-matter (abhidheya) of Nāgārjuna's Madhyamakaśāstra as pratītyasamutpāda without cessation, origination, etc., and the purpose (prayojana) of the śāstra is “nirvana defined as the welfare which is pacification of all elaboration” (sarvaprapañcopa-śamaśivalakṣaṇaṃ nirvāṇam): see PP (S) ad MŚ 0 [M ed. §3 & §16] pp. 1.117–119, 133–134; MacDonald (2015, 2.15–17, 41–43) (and see similarly YṢV (S & T) ad YṢ 0 [S-S ed.] p. 19 ff.; [LY ed.] pp. 126–127). Candrakīrti defines prapañca here as abhidhānābhidheyādi, which, I think, relates it to his third connotation of saṃvṛti, i.e., saṃketa / lokavyavahāra; likewise Salvini (2019, p. 678). See MacDonald (2015, 2.42–43n98) for extensive discussion of prapañca drawing upon the work of Lambert Schmithausen, etc. Note, however, that I cannot agree with the theory that the stoppage of prapañca facilitates “the realization that nothing exists,” and I am unable to make sense of the claim that “The dependent nature of a thing testifies to and proves its inexistence” (MacDonald, 2023, p. 125). How can a nonexistent thing have a dependent nature? See also Salvini (2019, pp. 674–687) for an extended exploration of prapañca in Candrakīrti. For an interesting recent study of prapañca in Gauḍapāda and Nāgārjuna, see Mills 2021. Mills reviews some information not treated by MacDonald, and makes some valuable observations, but he does not refer to Schmithausen's and MacDonald's indispensable research on prapañca. For my part I have the impression that Candrakīrti employs prapañca in the sense of conceptual/linguistic elaborations which—even when they accurately represent the way things conventionally exist—are superimpositions that conceal the essenceless reality (tattva) of the most profound dependent origination: paramagambhīrasya pratītyasamutpādasya tattvam; PP (S) ad MŚ 15.6 [LVP ed.] p. 267.14; de Jong (1978, p. 58) reports no v.l. Although there are radically divergent interpretations of Candrakīrti's thought, one thing is quite certain: he is not a nihilist (nāstika), he is a proponent of dependent origination. pratītyasamutpādavādino hi mādhyamikā hetupratyayān prāpya pratītya samutpannatvāt sarvam evehalokaparalokādikaṃ niḥsvabhāvaṃ varṇayanti | yathā svarūpavādinaḥ |; PP (S) ad MŚ 18.7 [N ed.] p. 135.1–3; cf. [LVP ed.] p. 368.7–8; de Jong (1978, p. 228) confirms LVP. Likewise, PP ad MŚ 27.1, 27.30, and so forth.
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With apologies to Tom J.F. Tillemans, “Mādhyamikas Playing Bad Hands: The Case of Customary Truth,” Chapter VI in Tillemans (2022, pp. 223–233); this is available as an Open Access eBook: https://verlag.oeaw.ac.at/en/product/views-from-tibet. For Tillemans' previous treatments of the following āgama see: Tillemans (2011, pp. 151–152; 2016, pp. 47, 58–59n1; 2019, pp. 636–638). He also alludes to this in Tillemans (2023, 298n34). For those unfamiliar with the card game poker, “an ace in the hole” refers to the highest card in the game, which has been dealt face down. The player with ‘an ace in the hole’ may have a decisive advantage over other players who cannot see this ace. After I had completed a substantially identical version of this study I belatedly discovered (and then was informed by an anonymous reviewer) that Mattia Salvini has covered some of the same territory, arriving at conclusions on certain points that are very similar to my own (see Salvini 2019, 2023). I consider this a noteworthy and a happy coincidence, and highly recommend Salvini's studies to those interested in complementary treatments of some of the issues studied here. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Anne MacDonald, who generously offered valuable comments on a draft of this paper. To state the obvious, I am responsible for all error.
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Newman, J. Candrakīrti on lokaprasiddhi: A Bad Hand, or an Ace in the Hole?. J Indian Philos 52, 73–99 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-024-09557-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-024-09557-9