Abstract
In recent years, scholars have become increasingly interested in reconstructing a Buddhist stance on the free will problem. Since then, Buddhism has been variously described as implicitly hard determinist, paleo-compatibilist, neo-compatibilist and libertarian. Some scholars, however, question the legitimacy of Buddhist free will theorizing, arguing that Buddhism does not share sufficiently many presuppositions required to articulate the problem. This paper argues that, though Buddhist and Western versions of the free will problem are not perfectly isomorphic, a problem analogous to that expressed in Western philosophy emerges within the Buddhist framework. This analogous problem concerns the difficulty of explaining karmic responsibility in a world governed by dependent origination. This paper seeks to reconstruct an approach to free will consistent with Madhyamaka philosophy and, in so doing, to demonstrate that the mutual exclusivity of positions such as hard determinism and libertarianism is, from the Madhyamaka perspective, merely superficial. By building on the perspectivalist theory advanced by Daniel Breyer, it is clear that a Madhyamaka stance on free will demands the wholesale abandonment of perspectives, such that the idea of any one solution as definitive is disavowed. Taken to its logical conclusion, therefore, perspectivalism entails the relative truth of perspectivalism itself.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Keble College, Oxford, where I have been the recipient of a Sloane Robinson scholarship as well as The Spalding Trust and the Khyentse Foundation for their generous support. I would also like to thank Jan Westerhoff, Richard Gombrich and the anonymous reviewer(s) for helpful comments on this manuscript.
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Javanaud, K. Reformulating the Buddhist Free Will Problem: Why There can be no Definitive Solution. J Indian Philos 46, 773–803 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-018-9362-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-018-9362-6