Abstract
The problem of free will is ubiquitously articulated in terms of the (in)compatibility of free will with laws of nature. Peter van Inwagen, David Lewis, Robert Kane, and nearly all other contributors to the problem of free will, conceive it as a potential conflict between the laws of nature and free will. Despite dispositional defenses of compatibilism, the putatively dispositional principle of alternative possibilities among defenders of free will, as well as increased sympathy for dispositional and agent-causation versions of source incompatibilist free will, the standard debates remain beholden to a nomological definition of the free will problem. This is surprising since one of the upshots of the causal powers revolution has been the overthrow of laws of nature. Many exponents of the metaphysics of powers either reject laws of nature altogether, or regard them as abstract descriptions of the real work performed by causal powers. What remains unexplored for dispositionalists is to address the question: how to re-think about the problem of free will without the laws of nature? That is the aim of my essay. I will argue the shift to powers requires not only major revisions to the definitions of determinism, compatibilism, etc. put forth by van Inwagen and others, but also a re-thinking of the power of free will itself in light its manifestations.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
For an account of laws of nature that defines them in terms of constraining rather than directing, see Steward, 2022, this volume.
- 3.
For the details of his own view, see van Inwagen, 2017, chs. 1 & 14.
- 4.
While I do not have space to address it here, it is noteworthy that some exponents of power realism – without endorsing DMV – hold only some powers, but not all, manifest according to conditional necessity. These other powers might manifest spontaneously; their manifestations might tend to occur or be more likely given their conditions. See Lowe, 2008; Mayr, 2022, this volume. Some of the criticisms leveled against DMV would also apply to these views.
- 5.
E. J. Lowe argues that the will and “radium’s spontaneous power to undergo radioactive decay” are two kinds of “spontaneous powers” and the latter does not have any “non-deterministic or probabilistic cause” (Lowe, 2008, 50).
- 6.
It is possible that a deterministic universe might exist which contained other kinds of powers, like spontaneous or two-way powers, but these powers never manifested either inexplicably or because they were systematically prevented from manifesting. But, as we will see, there are inherent difficulties positing the existence of such powers, and even if this could be developed as a viable model of power-determinism, it would be a variation on de facto power-determinism.
- 7.
I am extraordinarily grateful to Simon Kittle for his constructive criticisms of an earlier version of this section.
- 8.
Not all exponents of two-way powers endorse conditional necessity. For instance, Lowe’s sui generis view combines his notion of spontaneous powers with an account of the will as a two-way power (Lowe, 2008, 8). I do not have the space to address the details of Lowe’s view here which has characteristics that make it similar to both the DMV and conditional necessity two-way powers, while being importantly different from both.
- 9.
Some advocates of two-way powers might contend that “not φ-ing” and “refraining from φ-ing” are not manifestations of the power. Exponents of two-way powers might also argue that, given its necessary conditions, it is up to the agent whether or not to exercise and manifest its two-way power. I do not have space to address either view at length, but both views require rejecting conditional necessity since they propose that a two-way power might not manifest necessarily even when its conditions obtain without interferences. I thank Simon Kittle for drawing this issue to my attention.
- 10.
I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer and Simon Kittle for enormously helpful feedback and criticisms on earlier versions of this essay.
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De Haan, D.D. (2022). The Power to Will Freely: How to Re-Think About the Problem of Free Will Without Laws of Nature. In: Austin, C.J., Marmodoro, A., Roselli, A. (eds) Powers, Time and Free Will. Synthese Library, vol 451. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92486-7_8
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