Abstract
Despite the fact that Husserl did not write a book on aesthetics, it is widely accepted that a Husserlian aesthetics can be developed from his writings. In this article, I describe and analyze a feature of Husserlian aesthetics which I call the “radical individuality of the aesthetic object.” This radical individuality stems from Husserl’s interpretation of aesthetic consciousness in terms of the neutrality modification. I make the case for a radical reading of the neutrality modification by contrasting it with the inactuality modification and the notion of foundation and I argue that the neutrality modification must be kept distinct from these concepts. I further describe the concept of the radical individuality of the aesthetic object by reference to Ingarden’s notion of the aesthetic object as monosubjective. The thesis of the radical individuality of the aesthetic object prima facie leads Husserlian aesthetics close to axiological relativism expressed in the adage that de gustibus non est disputandum. I explain that despite such proximity, Husserlian aesthetics does not entail an axiological relativism and does not preclude discussions concerning aesthetic values. On the contrary, Husserlian aesthetics ultimately shows that such discussions are necessary for keeping the possibility of aesthetic perception itself alive, and thereby encourages such discussions. I conclude with a practical demonstration of the results of my Husserlian analyses by critically engaging some aspects of Proust’s theory of art in À la recherche du temps perdu.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Crowther (2022, 1) claims with regard to Hua XXIII solely that “within nearly 600 pages (and, in fact, over 700 in the English translation) there are enough relevant arguments to yield a short monograph on aesthetics, one, indeed, with highly original content.” Steinmetz (2011, 7) calls “Husserlian aesthetics” “fragmentary, systematic and problematic.”
A detailed analysis of the distinction between perceptual phantasy and reproductive phantasy can be found in Carreño Cobos (2013, 152 ff.).
For example, Husserl in one note determines to investigate “what is most universal about the ‘epoché’ as act-abstraction in relation to the idea of neutrality” (Husserl, 1980, 571). The affinity between the aesthetic and the phenomenological attitude is also put straightforwardly in the famous letter to Hofmannstahl (Husserl, 1994, 133), and has been recognized also by other scholars, for example by Brainard (2002, 160) or Vydrová (2008, 620 f.), the latter drawing parallels between phenomenological reduction and aesthetic attitude directly in Husserl’s texts on reduction.
Steinmetz (2011, 57), for his part, particularly refers to Husserl’s (1973a, 73) claim in the Cartesian Meditations that the phenomenological ego is established as the “disinterested onlooker” [uninteressierter Zuschauer]. Ferencz-Flatz (2009, 492), while correctly distinguishing Husserl’s account of image consciousness from his account of the neutrality modification and therefore criticizing the use of the notion of disinterestedness in relation with phenomenology of image consciousness, nonetheless agrees that there is an affinity between Kant’s notion of disinterestedness and Husserl’s notion of neutrality modification which he interprets, inter alia, as an aesthetic consciousness. For a detailed discussion of the relation between Husserl’s notion of neutrality and Kant’s disinterestedness, see also Rozzoni (2019, 120 ff.).
Aktualitätsmodifikation and Inaktualitätsmodifikation are sometimes translated as “actionality” and “inactionality” modification.
The issue of attention is here mostly tackled in connection with criticism of theories of abstraction which interpret abstraction through attention (see Husserl, 1984, 155 ff.). The subject of attention is analyzed more thoroughly in the 1904/05 lectures (see Husserl, 2004, 68 ff.). The notions of Aktualität and Inaktualität may map onto the notions of the noticed [bemerkt] and the unnoticed [unbemerkt], the latter involving the overlooked [Übersehene] and also the seen together [Mitgesehene] which is nonetheless ready for perception, only momentarily not available. The unnoticed in this sense is different from the not noticed [nicht bemerkt], which is not even available for perception (Husserl, 2004, 89). Aktualität is, moreover, also linked to achten, “paying attention” (Husserl, 1976a, 76).
For the relationship between Husserl’s phenomenology and Gestaltpsychology, see Holenstein (1972, 275 ff.). Husserl himself was critical of various aspects of Gestaltpsychology, as can be seen from his comment that Gestaltpsychologists considered “Gestaltqualitäten” to be “readymade objects” [fertigen Gegenständen] (Husserl, 1974, 292). See also Merleau-Ponty (1967, 140) for a very similar criticism.
It is applicable to both perceptive and conceptual sphere, as was the notion of attention (see Husserl, 2004, 88).
In Ideen II, Husserl (1952, 11 ff.) suggests that actuality and inactuality modifications map onto activity and passivity of consciousness. Interpreting passivity as inactuality implies that everything that is passive can be freely thematized. While this implication nicely reflects Husserl’s rationalist optimism, it turned out to be untenable when passive syntheses were analyzed in greater detail (see Husserl, 1966). In Formal and Transcendental Logic, Husserl (1974, 61 f., 224) occasionally interprets “thoughtless” [gedankenlos] reading and listening as “passive”—where meanings of the read or the heard can become actual by focusing on them. However, the “passive synthetic unity” of nature and world, mentioned in the Conclusion alongside “transcendental aesthetic” in Kantian sense (Husserl, 1974, 297), is certainly more than an inactual halo of perceptive experience.
At those points he multiplies the terminology with terms like axiontic [axiontisch] and inaxiontic [inaxiontisch], referring roughly to positing and non-positing, aligning them at times with positionality and neutrality, but also stressing in a later note that neutrality is not to be confused with supposition [Ansatz] (Husserl, 1980, 395).
Since we are “free intelligent beings” (Husserl, 1952, 89), we are supposed to be able to “move freely into [a new style of attitude which is entirely altered in contrast to the natural attitude of experience and thinking] without relapsing into the old attitudes,” although it requires “peculiar and laborious studies,” too (Husserl, 1976a, 5). For example, we also need a “free possibility to carry out ideation” (Husserl, 1976a, 15), with “ideating abstraction” [ideierende Abstraktion] (Husserl, 1984, 690) being a precursor to the phenomenological attitude as well.
Husserl earlier claimed that “the delight in acknowledging [Kenntisnahme] the aesthetically excellent work is not attention,” but added that it is based [begründet] on attention (Husserl, 2004, 160). The formulation in Ideen I—that it is founded on neutrality modification—can be interpreted as shifting the explanation of aesthetic consciousness away from the concept of attention entirely. A lot depends on the relationship between neutrality and inactuality. It is clear, though, that Husserl was at least wary of explaining aesthetic consciousness by means of attention.
He also considers such truthfulness to be a peculiar aesthetic quality (Ingarden, 1966b, 403 f.).
Given this non-interability of neutrality modification, the final remark by Ferencz-Flatz (2009, 493)—in his otherwise convincing study—when he speaks of “the various strata of neutralization,” is unclear and confusing.
Alloa (2021, 181) speaks here of a limit: “For Husserl, the neutrality modification becomes emblematic of the modifying attitude as such, yet on the other hand, it breaks out of this framework again insofar as in it, the—in principle infinite—variation comes up against its limit: while every propositional judgment can itself in turn become the object of a higher-level (modifying) judgment, the neutrality modification provides something like an appearance that balks at any conversion into the assertory.”
A thorough explanation of Ingarden’s position would require a detailed presentation of his ontology of the work of art, but there is obviously no space for that here. Such a thorough exposition is, however, not necessary for my argument. It can be found, for example, in Mitscherling (1997, 79 ff.).
Ingarden defines intentional objects ontologically as objects that exist heteronomously, while Husserl considers intentional object to be any correlate of consciousness. This led to well-known misunderstanding between Husserl and Ingarden (see 1975, 64), but also to other misunderstandings, such as when Dufrenne clearly interpreted “intentional object” in Ingarden through Husserlian lens, overlooking Ingarden’s ontological shift, and thus accusing Ingarden of being “unfaithful to Husserl” (Dufrenne, 1973, 208). As a matter of fact, Ingarden is not unfaithful, but critical, offering his own conception.
This passage is quoted from the Polish version of O poznawaniu dzieła literackiego, published in 1957. In 1968, Ingarden published his own German translation of this work, and this German translation was then translated into English as Cognition of the Literary Work of Art. I primarily use the English translation, but in some places I revert to the Polish version. These situations happen when I need to quote Dodatek: Przedmiot i zadania “wiedzy o literaturze” [Appendix: Subject matter and tasks of “literary science”], which was not included in the German translation (see Ingarden, 1973a, 413). And in this passage in particular, the differences are important, since in the 1968 German version the passage is toned down and reads: “It will happen only very rarely that two concretizations of the same work, formed by different readers, will be completely alike in all features which are crucial for the formation of the aesthetic value” (Ingarden, 1973a, 411). The differences are glaring: “it will surely never happen” [zapewne nigdy się nie zdarzy] is changed to “it will happen only very rarely”, and “formed either by the same reader, or by different readers” [wytworzone czy to przez jednego, czy też przez różnych czytelników] is limited only to “formed by different readers.” While Ingarden’s agenda is to fight against the relativist adage that de gustibus non est disputandum and ultimately to claim some options for the verifiability of individual judgments about monosubjective objectivities, nowhere does Ingarden explain why he toned down the passage in the 1968 version.
And also Ingarden (1973b, 233–241) for the literary work. This aligning of neutrality modification and “quasi-” prefix can be found in Husserl as well. What Husserl (1939) qualifies as temporal with the prefix “quasi-” are objects of imagination, which are approached in an imaginative or neutralized mode of consciousness, as opposed to positional consciousness: “The phantasy object is present to consciousness as temporal and temporally determined, enduring in time; but its time is a quasi-time [Quasi-Zeit]. […] It is a time without actual, strict localization of position [Örtlichkeit der Lage]” (196 f.).
This is not necessarily controversial if we follow Ferencz-Flatz’s (2009, 482 f.) suggestion to keep Husserl’s teachings on image consciousness and neutrality modification (i.e., aesthetic perception of images) apart, arguing that Husserl has unduly muddled these issues. There are statements by Husserl that can be interpreted as claiming that image consciousness is founded on unmodified perception; it is not necessary to address them here, because it is not necessary to analyze non-aesthetically perceived images or signs. Alloa (2021, 175 f.) interprets neutrality modification as corresponding to Bildobjekt in the triad of image consciousness, but he also points out, correctly, that Husserl later tried to distinguish aesthetically valent image consciousness—“pictoriality as an originary access to the essential unity inaccessible in perception”—from “pictoriality as a merely reproductive mode” (182). However, Ingarden could not benefit from such caveats, since he explicitly defines image consciousness already by means of neutrality modification; it is already operative in image consciousness, and according to him it does not—as we will see—have the effect of transforming both the centre and the periphery.
Construing intersubjectivity out of subjectivity is, according to Steinbock (1995, 63 ff.), why Husserl himself fails to properly account for intersubjectivity in the fifth Cartesian meditation.
Here we do not speak about what Husserl at certain points terms “Urassoziation,” such as passive syntheses of heterogeneity or homogeneity. On the difference between such passive syntheses and distant syntheses of association, see Holenstein (1972, 32 ff.).
I also consider this to be phenomenological reinforcement of Adorno’s (2002) thesis that “finished works only become what they are because their being is a process of becoming, [and thus] they are in turn dependent on forms in which their process crystallizes: interpretation, commentary, and critique” (194).
There may be certain affinity with Heidegger’s (1960, 70) interpretation of the work of art as maintenance of “rift” [Riß] (sometimes more interpretatively translated as “rift-design”), whereby the rift is preserved by critics and philosophers as “preservers” [die Bewahrenden] (Heidegger, 1960, 81). “In the work, […] truth is cast toward the future preservers, that is, to a historical humanity” (Heidegger, 1960, 86).
Referring to Proust in phenomenological inquiries is not unusual. Due to its detailed, descriptive and introspective nature, Proust’s work was closely followed by many phenomenologists; for an example of using Proust as a starting point in order to elucidate a phenomenological topic, one can look to Merleau-Ponty (see 2010, 29ff). For the relationship between Proust’s novel and Husserl’s phenomenology, see also Rozzoni (2016, 75 ff.).
I agree with Genette’s (1972) argument that Proust as narrator of Recherche shall be differentiated from Marcel as hero of the story: “The subject-matter of Recherche is not ‘Marcel the writer,’ but that ‘Marcel becomes a writer’: Recherche is a novel about formation. […] It is thus necessary that the narration is interrupted before the hero rejoins the narrator and it is not conceivable that they write together the words: The End. […] The distance between the end of the story and the moment of narration is the time the hero needs to write this book, which both is and is not the book that the narrator, in his turn, reveals to us in a flash” (237 f.).
In all quotes from Proust, I am using the English translation by C. K. Scott Moncrieff.
Alloa notes that Merleau-Ponty’s point about Berma has consequences for his understanding of “the quasi-corporeality of signification” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 88) in that it shows that “the medium of meaning (whether gesture, letter, or voice) operates only through a relative self-effacement, […] the ‘invisibilization’ of the material, sensible signifiers” (Alloa, 2017, 52). Here, the actor’s body acquires the strongest meaning when it disappears, rather than when it—as young Marcel longed for—exhibits itself in grand gestures, dramatic declarations, extravagant emotional outbursts, and so on. Paraphrasing Alloa, the aesthetic works via “an-aesthesia.”
Rozzoni (2016, 81) uses the French term “abîme” in reference to French translation of Erste Philosophie, where it is used as translation of “himmelfern” (Husserl, 1996, 13), not “Kluft.” In that passage, Husserl says that a common job and a true vocation are something completely different, that they are “worlds apart.” In any case, “abyss” is a fitting expression of the separation between the two vastly differing aesthetic perceptions, too, and expressing the separation in this way links it neatly to Husserlian themes in his remarks on aesthetics and art.
References
Adorno, T. W. (2002). Aesthetic theory (R. Hullot-Kentor, Trans.). Continuum.
Aldea, A. S. (2020). Modality matters: Imagination as consciousness of possibilities and Husserl’s transcendental-historical eidetics. Husserl Studies, 36(3), 303–318.
Aldea, A. S. (2022). Husserlian phenomenology as radical-immanent critique – or how phenomenology imagines itself. In A. S. Aldea, D. Carr, & S. Heinämaa (Eds.): Phenomenology as critique. Why method matters (pp. 56–79). Routledge.
Aldea, A. S., & Allen, A. (2016). History, critique, and freedom: The historical a priori in Husserl and Foucault. Continental Philosophy Review, 49(1), 1–11.
Alloa, E. (2017). Resistance of the sensible world. An introduction to Merleau-Ponty. Fordham University Press.
Alloa, E. (2021). Looking through images. A phenomenology of visual media. Columbia University Press.
Bernet, R., Kern, I., & Marbach, E. (1993). An introduction to Husserlian phenomenology. Northwestern University Press.
Brainard, M. (2002). Belief and its neutralization. Husserl’s system of phenomenology in Ideas I. State University of New York Press.
Brinker, M. (1984). Roman Ingarden and the “appropriate aesthetic attitude” to the literary work of art. Poetics Today, 5(1), 129–148.
Brough, J. (2008). Consciousness is not a bag: Immanence, transcendence, and constitution in the Idea of Phenomenology. Husserl Studies, 24(3), 177–191.
Carreño Cobos, J. E. (2013). The many senses of imagination and the manifestation of fiction: A view from Husserl’s phenomenology of phantasy. Husserl Studies, 36(3), 143–162.
Crowther, P. (2022). The phenomenology of aesthetic consciousness and phantasy. Routledge.
Dastur, F. (1991). Husserl et la neutralité de l’art. La Part de l’Oeil, 7, 19–29.
Derrida, J. (1973). Speech and phenomena and other essays on Husserl’s theory of signs (D.B. Allison, Trans.). Northwestern University Press.
Dufrenne, M. (1973). The phenomenology of aesthetic experience. Northwestern University Press.
Eco, U. (1990). The limits of interpretation. Indiana University Press.
Ferencz-Flatz, C. (2009). The neutrality of images and Husserlian aesthetics. Studia Phænomenologica, 9, 477–493.
Genette, G. (1972). Figures III. Éditions du seuil.
Heidegger, M. (1960). Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes. Reclam.
Holenstein, E. (1972). Phänomenologie der Assoziation. Martinus Nijhoff.
Hume, D. (1757). On the standard of taste. In Four dissertations, pp. 203–240. A. Millar.
Husserl, E. (1939). Erfahrung und Urteil. Academia.
Husserl, E. (1952). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution (M. Biemel, Ed.). Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1966). Analysen zur passiven Synthesis (M. Fleischer, Ed.). Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1973a). Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge (S. Strasser, Ed.). Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1973b). Die Idee der Phänomenologie (W. Biemel, Ed.). Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1974). Formale und transzendentale Logik (P. Janssen, Ed.). Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1976a). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie (K. Schuhmann, Ed.). Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1976b). Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie (Walter Biemel, Ed.). Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1980). Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung (E. Marbach, Ed.). Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1984). Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band. Erster Teil: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis (U. Panzer, Ed.). Springer.
Husserl, E. (1989). Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922–1937) (T. Nenon and H. R. Sepp, Eds.). Kluwer.
Husserl, E. (1994). Briefwechsel. Band VII: Wissenschaftlerkorrespondenz (Elisabeth Schuhmann and Karl Schuhmann, Eds.). Kluwer.
Husserl, E. (1996). Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Zweiter Teil (R. Boehm, Ed.). Kluwer.
Husserl, E. (2004). Wahrnehmung und Aufmerksamkeit (T. Vongehr and R. Giulliani, Eds.). Springer.
Husserl, E. (2013). Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie. Analysen des Unbewusstseins und der Instinkte. Metaphysik. Späte Ethik (R. Sowa and T. Vongehr, Eds.). Springer.
Ingarden, R. (1966a). O poznawaniu dzieła literackiego. In Studia z estetyki I (pp. 3–377). Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe.
Ingarden, R. (1966b). O różnych rozumieniach prawdiwósci w dziele sztuki. In Studia z estetyki I (pp. 395–412). Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe.
Ingarden, R. (1973a). The cognition of the literary work of art (R.A. Crowley, Trans.). Northwestern University Press.
Ingarden, R. (1973b). The literary work of art (G.G. Grabowicz, Trans.). Northwestern University Press.
Ingarden, R. (1975). On the motives which led Husserl to transcendental idealism (A. Hannibalsson, Trans.). Martinus Nijhoff.
Ingarden, R. (1986). The work of music and the problem of its identity (A. Czerniawski, Trans.). MacMillan Press.
Ingarden, R. (1989). Ontology of the work of art (R. Meyer and J.T. Goldthwait, Trans.). Ohio University Press.
Lohmar, D. (2003). Husserl’s type and Kant’s schemata: systematic reasons for their correlation or identity. In D. Welton (Ed.), The new Husserl. A critical reader (pp. 93–124). Indiana University Press.
Marbach, E. (1993). Mental representation and consciousness. Towards a phenomenological theory of representation and reference. Springer.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964). Signs (R.C. McCleary, Trans.). Northwestern University Press.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1967). The structure of behavior (A.L. Fisher, Trans.). Beacon Press.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (2010). Institution and passivity. Course notes from the Collège de France (1954–1955) (L. Lawlor and H. Massey, Trans.). Northwestern University Press.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (2012). Phenomenology of perception (D.A. Landes, Trans.). Routledge.
Mitscherling, J. (1997). Roman Ingarden’s ontology and aesthetics. University of Ottawa Press.
Mukařovský, J. (2007). Genetika smyslu v Máchově poesii. In Studie II (pp. 305–375). Host.
Płotka, W. (2020). A controversy over the existence of fictional objects: Husserl and Ingarden on imagination and fiction. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 51(1), 33–54.
Proust, M. (1946a). À la recherche du temps perdu, III. À l’ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs (première partie). Gallimard.
Proust, M. (1946b). À la recherche du temps perdu, VI. Le côté de Guermantes (première partie). Gallimard.
Proust, M. (1946c). À la recherche du temps perdu, X. Sodome et Gommorhe (deuxième partie). Gallimard.
Rozzoni, C. (2016). Marcel Proust. Portrait d’un jeune écrivain en philosophe. Classiques Garnier.
Rozzoni, C. (2019). A Husserlian approach to aesthetic experience: Existential disinterest and axiological interest. Phainomenon, 29, 115–133.
Schutz, A. (1959). Type and eidos in Husserl’s late philosophy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 20(2), 147–165.
Steinbock, A. J. (1995). Home and beyond. Generative phenomenology after Husserl. Northwestern University Press.
Steinmetz, R. (2011). L’esthétique phénoménologique de Husserl. Éditions Kimé.
Vydrová, J. (2008). Fenomenologický a estetický postoj. Poznámky k ich svojbytnosti a prekrývaniu. Filozofia, 63(7), 619–624.
Funding
This work was produced at the Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, v.v.i. and supported by the Agency APVV (Slovak Research and Development Agency) under the project “Philosophical Anthropology in the Context of Current Crises of Symbolic Structures,” APVV-20-0137.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
Conflict of Interest
The author states that there is no conflict of interest.
Additional information
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
About this article
Cite this article
Lipták, M. Husserl and the Radical Individuality of the Aesthetic Object. Husserl Stud (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-023-09340-w
Accepted:
Published:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-023-09340-w