Abstract
This paper examines the interactions between financial development, economic growth and (macro)prudential policy on a sample of 12 euro area countries. Our main takeaway is that active (macro)prudential policy supports the positive finance-growth nexus instead of disrupting it. These benefits are found to be more likely to materialize during tightening of (macro)prudential policy measures and not during easing. This result is conditional on the ability of (macro)prudential policy to curb excess credit growth and mitigate systemic risk, which would otherwise disrupt the market. Moreover, we assert that when analysing the effects of (macro)prudential policy, it is important to account for the direction of (macro)prudential measures, not just for the frequency at which they are implemented.
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Notes
Bekaert and Popov (2019) argue in favour of using rolling windows to compute average GDP growth over a given period (typically three to five years). This is to correct for relative heterogeneity of sample countries. Given that our sample is a relatively homogeneous monetary union, we pursue our analysis using annual growth rates, but we use the averages in our robustness check section.
Note that for both indexes, we assign the same weights to the different measures. This allows us to investigate the overall effectiveness of (macro)prudential tools.
The capital-based measures are limits on domestic and foreign currency loans, time-varying/dynamic loan-loss provisioning, reserve requirements, limits on interbank exposures, concentration limits, capital requirements, capital buffers, leverage ratio and capital surcharge on SIFIs,
In both indexes, loan-to-value ratio limit is the only borrower-based (macro)prudential instrument.
The instruments used in the System-GMM regression are lagged levels (two periods) of the dependent variable. For the level equation the instruments are the lagged differences (one period). The exogenous covariates and the crisis dummy are instrumented by themselves in the differenced and level equations.
The control variables were chosen in line with previous studies on the finance-growth nexus. For a detailed overview of the use of control variables in such studies, please refer to the dataset of the meta-analysis by Biljsma et al. (2017).
The MCI combines 14 different variables in four categories, namely interest rates, monetary aggregates, balance sheet items and the exchange rate. This enables us to capture the effects of both conventional and unconventional monetary policies, which is essential in the post-crisis period. For details on the calculation of the MCI, please refer to Malovana and Frait (2017) and the "Appendix 2".
In this case, a reverse causality would imply a situation where faster economic growth would lead to greater use of (macro)prudential policies. In fact, it also motivates the use of GVA growth side by side with GDP and GDPPC growth. GVA corrects for excess growth just on account of increased tax collection due to better compliance/coverage.
For example, several countries argue that the counter-cyclical capital buffer should be set at non-zero value for a normal risk environment (ESRB, 2020b).
The original macroprudential policy index of Cerutti et al. (2017b) ends in 2014.
Our findings are in line with Agénor et al. (2018) who also find a positive effect of (macro)prudential tightening on economic growth of around 0.7 pp.
For example, the Czech Republic is graded 1 (fully compliant), as the central bank (CB) is the macroprudential authority. On the other hand, countries like Finland are graded 0.25 (materially non-compliant), because a financial stability authority separate to the CB is tasked with macroprudential policy.
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Acknowledgements
We would like to thank two anonymous referees for valuable comments. We are gratefull to Simona Malovaná, Michal Franta, Roman Horváth, Jan Frait, Zuzana Rakovská, Jan Libich, Lukáš Pfeifer, Jiří Gregor and Peter Molnár for comments on an earlier version of the paper. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Czech National Bank or its management.
Funding
The authors acknowledge the financial support provided by the Technical University of Ostrava Grant SP2020/110 and the project APVV under Grant APVV-20–0499. Ngoc Anh Ngo declares that this paper has been elaborated in the framework of the grant programme "Support for Science and Research in the Moravian-Silesian Region 2021" (RRC/10/2021), financed from the budget of the Moravian-Silesian Region.
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Appendix
Appendix
1.1 Appendix 1: Data
In order to provide more information, Table 8 reports all our variables, their summary statistics and their data sources.
1.2 Appendix 2: Monetary conditions index estimation procedure
There are a number of approaches that allow a large number of time series to be combined into a single composite index. In the case of the indicator presented in this paper, we use a factor model estimate. Consider an n-dimensional vector of stationary observable variables \(X={\left({X}_{1},\dots ,{X}_{n}\right)}^{^{\prime}}\) that are linearly dependent on an m-dimensional vector of originally unobservable factors \(F=\left({F}_{1},\dots ,{F}_{m}\right)\). The baseline factor model then takes the following form:
where \(\Lambda\) is a matrix of factor loadings, \({A}_{i}\) is a matrix of autoregression coefficients for \(p\) lags and \({\varepsilon }_{t},{u}_{t}\) are i.i.d. Gaussian error terms. We use the maximum likelihood method to estimate the factor model. While more complicated to calculate, the maximum likelihood method, unlike the principal components method, makes it possible to test whether the number of common factors selected is sufficient. The optimal number of factors to estimate is primarily based on parallel analysis. The optimal number of lags is chosen based on the Schwarz information criterion. For our data, results of statistical tests prefer a factor model with 3 estimated factors and 1 lag. The robustness and sensitivity analysis of the selected model specification to calculate MCI was performed with respect to the number of lags used, number of factors estimated, the estimation period, and the variables included in the estimation.
Table 9 summarizes the set of 15 variables that reflect the monetary conditions in the euro area. Variables in respective blocks were treated as follows: (1) interest rates enter the estimation in levels; (2) monetary aggregates are expressed in year-on-year change and in reciprocal values (switched sign) so that that an increase would correspond to a monetary tightening, as for interest rates; (3) ECB balance sheet items are expressed in year-on year change with a negative sign for all these variables; and (4) exchange rate is transformed into a year-on-year change with the sign left unchanged.
To save space, we do not report all the robustness checks performed; they are available upon request. Figure
4 (left-hand graph) shows the relative contribution of each of the estimated factors to the final index. The figure also plots the MCI as normalized using the mean and standard deviation of the 3-month EURIBOR. The right-hand graph shows results of a simulation exercise in which the index was estimated multiple times, each time with one variable excluded from the input data set. This approach is very similar to a more formal bootstrapping proposed by Gospodinov and Ng (2013).
1.3 Appendix 3: Dating of financial crises in the Euro area
In identifying crisis-type events, we rely on a financial crises database for European countries maintained by the ESRB. The dates, presented in Table 10, were selected by the ESRB based on a quantitative identification approach, which had been cross-checked with expert judgement from national and European authorities (qualitative approach). This expert judgement was sought by the ESRB whenever the adopted quantitative approach did not identify event dates included in Laeven and Valencia (2013) and Babecky et al. (2014). In such cases, the dates were submitted to national authorities for revision in order to assess the most appropriate dates to be included in the dataset.
1.4 Appendix 4: Additional estimates
Section 4 discussed several additional empirical specifications. Results are reported below in Tables 11, 12, 13. The first reports estimates of the interaction term from Eq. 2 using richer lag structure. The second contains estimates of the interaction term from Eq. 2 for various sample perturbations. The final table reports the estimates of the model as specified in Eq. 2 using alternative estimator (Table 14).
1.5 Appendix 5: The index of macroprudential authority strength
We use the ESRB (2014) assessment of the implementation of the ESRB's Recommendation on the macro-prudential mandate of national authorities to set up a macroprudential authority strength index. In 2014, the ESRB evaluated the degree to which EU member states are compliment with the Recommendation. We are interested in the assessment related to the Sub-recommendation B.3. which requires that the central bank plays a leading role in macro-prudential policy, given their institutional and functional strengths.
Table 15 summarizes the extent of the central bank’s role in the macro-prudential policy of individual countries. The ESRB grades countries according to their efforts to implement the ESRB Recommendation on a zero to one scale (0 = Non-compliant; Materially non-compliant = 0.25; 0.5 = Partially compliant; 0.75 = Largely compliant; 1 = Fully compliant). Table 16 show the standards as set by the ESRB regarding grading the Sub-recommendation B.3.
Figure 5 shows the index values for our sample countries. Since the ESRB performed its assessment in 2014, we re-do the assessment for 2017 to check for any changes in the institutional setup.
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Hodula, M., Ngo, N.A. Finance, growth and (macro)prudential policy: European evidence. Empirica 49, 537–571 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10663-022-09537-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10663-022-09537-w