Abstract
Although a great deal of research examines the impact of the voter initiative process on the state legislature, the consequences for the state executive branch have been largely ignored. The voter initiative process provides the governor with a method to circumvent the legislature, which may increase the power of the governor in theory. However, it also provides citizens with a means to bypass the traditional lawmaking process and avoid the governor’s veto. This may reduce the power of the governor and lead to policies farther from the preferences of the governor. This study examines the impact of the voter initiative process on the power of the state governor by estimating total election cycle spending. Campaign expenditures are expected to reflect any sustained gain or loss in power due to the availability of the voter initiative process. The results indicate that gubernatorial campaign expenditures are significantly lower in states in which the voter initiative process is available. This finding suggests that state governors sustain a loss in political power when the voter initiative is available. Additionally, the findings imply that individuals may employ the voter initiative process as a substitute for gubernatorial support.
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Notes
In addition to political influence and political resources, the ambitions of the individual politician may also impact campaign expenditures (Schlesinger 1966). Therefore, a candidate and his donors may spend money on a campaign in order to continue climbing the political ladder. However, research has shown that political influence and resources have significant effects on campaign expenditures.
While the legislature and the governor are elected by the voters, Matsusaka (2005) notes that the preferences of the median voter in the state may not coincide with the preferences of the legislature as a whole. State legislators are elected in district elections and typically represent the median voter of the district. Gilligan and Matsusaka (2001), Bradbury and Crain (2001), and Baqir (2002) discuss this issue.
This simple model ignores gubernatorial veto power. While the governors of all states except for North Carolina have some type of veto power, the passage of a voter initiative avoids the governor’s veto powers.
Gerber (1996, 1999) and Matsusaka and McCarty (2001) find that the threat of a voter initiative can cause the state legislature to enact legislation to avoid a less favorable outcome through the voter initiative process. Matsusaka (1995), Gerber and Hug (2001), Arceneaux (2002), and Randolph (2010) find that the indirect effect of the voter initiative has an impact on legislation and policy outcomes.
While candidates and their donors may spend money to gain election to a political office in order to progress toward more desirable political positions, other variables concerning political influence and political resources have significant explanatory power concerning campaign spending. The impact of the voter initiative process on gubernatorial campaign expenditures is significant in this study even though some candidates may simply aspire to greater political positions.
Beyle (1998) develops two scales in order to measure the governor’s appointment power and the governor’s budgetary power. Governor appointment power is measured by examining the governor’s ability to appoint positions in public utilities, transportation, education, health, corrections, and welfare. The scale ranges from 0 when the legislature is able to select the position to 5 where the governor appoints the position without any approval (rounded to the nearest 0.5). Governor budgetary power is measured on a scale where 1 indicates that budget responsibilities are shared among elected officials and the legislature has an unlimited ability to change the budget and 5 indicates that the governor has full control of the budget and the legislature cannot alter the budget. Higher scores indicate a higher degree of power. The updated index is available online through the website listed in the references.
Incumbents enjoy recognition and status benefits over challengers, allowing them access to greater finances. Open seat candidates are also well financed as they have a greater chance to win than challengers. Gierzynski and Breaux (1991) and Moncrief (1998) show that incumbents and open seat candidates spend more in elections in comparison to challengers.
Previous research has found that greater degrees of competition are associated with higher campaign spending as donors are more willing to contribute in more competitive races (Thompson et al. 1994). Candidates generally have an idea of the closeness of the election and spend accordingly. This follows Muth’s (1961) rational expectations and is used in Kirchgässner and Meyer Zu Himmern (1997).
While there are numerous ways to examine campaign finance law, Primo et al. (2006) argue that the dummy variable approach best suits the analysis of campaign finance law as other issues (such as specific dollar limitations, enforcement of campaign finance law, and other differences between states) are difficult to measure and can be subjective in nature.
While some recent research has argued that the voter initiative process is endogenous to historical factors in states (Marschall and Ruhil 2005), others have argued that political landscapes have changed as the voter initiative process in most states was enacted prior to 1915 (Matsusaka 1995). Matsusaka (2005) offers empirical evidence to the theoretical evidence against the endogeneity issue.
Wyoming is not included as a voter initiative state because it has an extremely high signature requirement at 15%. Illinois is not included as a voter initiative state because it is the only state in which a proposal can only be used to alter the organization of the state legislature. This follows the logic of Matsusaka (2004). The inclusion of Wyoming and Illinois does not significantly alter the results.
24 states have a form of the voter initiative at the state level. The signature requirement varies from a low of 3% to a high of 15% (Initiative and Referendum Institute n.d.a). This difference in signature requirements results in substantial differences in the effects of the voter initiative process. It can be very difficult to collect the signatures required for states with high signature requirements.
Bowler and Donovan (2004) use the number of formal provisions required to place a voter initiative on the ballot in order to develop the qualification difficulty index. The number of provisions that restrict the ability of the legislature to alter the effects of a successful voter initiative is used to develop the legislative insulation index. Their indices have been reversed in this paper in order to simplify the interpretation of the indices. Bowler and Donovan (2004) find that reversing the indices do not alter the results.
State fixed effects are not included in the analysis because the availability of the voter initiative process does not change from 1980 to 2002, with the exception of Mississippi in 1992.
Regional variables are constructed as follows: North (CT, MA, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT), South (AL, AR, DE, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA, WV), Midwest (IA, ID, IL, IN, KS, MI, MN, MO, ND, NE, OH, SD, WI), and West (AZ, CA, CO, MT, NM, NV, OR, UT, WA, WY).
Louisiana uses an open election format instead of the traditional primary and general election format used by other states. All candidates compete in an initial election regardless of party affiliation. If one candidate receives more than 50% of the vote, they are awarded the position of governor. Otherwise, a runoff election is held with the top two candidates from the initial election.
Regressions including the four outliers were also performed. While the inclusion of the outliers does not change the primary results, the outliers do have a large impact on the magnitude of coefficients. The mean for per capita gubernatorial spending is $2.68 across all elections. Per capita spending in New Hampshire, 2002 was $14.21. Millionaire businessman Craig Benson spent a large amount of his own money in a year where a record number of voters participated. Per capita spending in West Virginia, 1980 was $13.66. This could be a data error as election winner Jay Rockefeller is reported as spending in excess of $11 million dollars for re-election. Per capita spending for South Dakota, 2002 was $12.22. This election was an upset victory for Mike Rounds in which a great deal of money was spent by other candidates in the primary and again in the general election. Finally, per capita spending was $11.49 in Rhode Island, 1990. Bruce Sundland (in his third attempt at the governor seat) spent a great deal of money to defeat incumbent Edward DiPrete.
The results of this analysis are robust to any changes in the model employed. An analysis excluding the primary election independent variables was performed as an additional check. The primary results of the analysis persist.
A number of the independent variables in the gubernatorial are either difficult or impossible to include in the Senate analysis. However, the results regarding the voter initiative variables are consistent regardless of the empirical specification.
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I am grateful to two anonymous referees, editor Alan Hamlin, and Russell S. Sobel for helpful comments and suggestions.
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Randolph, G.M. The voter initiative and the power of the governor: evidence from campaign expenditures. Const Polit Econ 22, 265–286 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-011-9106-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-011-9106-z