Abstract
This paper analyses the role of the unanimity rule—known as liberum veto—in medieval Poland. We argue that the primary effect of the liberum veto was that it secured religious freedom and established domestic peace in an otherwise deeply divided and fractionalised country. What is more, this institution succeeded in doing so during an era which was characterised by violent religious conflicts and rise of absolutist monarchies throughout the European continent. Even after 1652, when the liberum veto seemed to have practically paralysed the decision-making of Polish-Lithuanian parliament, there were still reasons—related to religious issues—why its use could have been preferable to less inclusive voting rules. It can be argued, however, that the use of unanimity was not warranted in questions related to defence, especially in situations of national emergency, although it is questionable to which extent the sole presence of the liberum veto was susceptible to bring about the demise of the Polish-Lithuanian Republic.
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Notes
The Republic of Two Nations, Polish and Lithuanian was established in December 1568, completing thus the personal union of Krewo of 1386. In its original institutional form, it had lasted until the Constitution of 3 May 1791 and the following Partitions which deleted Poland from the map of Europe.
Although the Polish-Lithuanian Republic experienced a long-term stagnation in terms of GDP per capita—due to shocks to agricultural production per capita—data show that Poland lived also through periods of rather steady growth. These were interrupted by massive negative shocks during wars and invasions. See Zanden (2004) for a comparison of Poland’s economic performance with those of other European countries. Allen (2003) shows that development indicators in the Rzeczpospolyta were similar to other countries of Central and Eastern Europe of the era. According to Broadberry and Gupta (2006, pp. 5–8), silver wages of skilled and unskilled labourers in major Polish cities—Gdansk, Warsaw and Krakow—were similar or even exceeded those in Vienna, Leipzig or Augsburg. In terms of rye, wages in Krakow were higher than those in Amsterdam. And in terms of real consumption, Polish urban labourers fared better than those in other major cities of Central and Eastern Europe—and even better than the ones in Milan or in Florence.
Polish word poseł cannot be translated accurately as “representative” or “MP” because it means also “ambassador” and “messenger”.
Obviously, these numbers changed over the history of the Republic.
Zamoyski (1987, p. 101).
See Tiebout’s (1956) famous discussion.
Zamoyski (1987, p. 80).
See Davies (1984, p. 162).
Davies (1984, pp. 339–340) describes Confederation as an armed league of men sworn to pursue their grievance until justice was obtained. Unlike an ordinary rebellion or a civil war, the Confederation was perceived as a legal and constitutional instrument of resistance. Major confederations were formed among towns and nobles. In 1573 the whole Sejm joined the confederation of Warsaw which aimed at establishing religious tolerance.
See Miller (1990).
Jędruch (1993, p. 71).
See also Jędruch (1993, p. 62).
Zamoyski (1987, p. 75).
St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre was a wave of violence against the Huguenots in France, started on 24th August 1572 (the feast of Barthomolew the Apostle). The total number of victims is unknown but estimates are of the order of tens of thousands.
See for instance Lukowski and Zawadzki (2006).
Jędruch (1993, p. 155).
Ibid: 155.
See Vagts and Vagts (1979).
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Acknowledgements
The author is thankful for valuable comments and suggestions to Tyler Cowen, Pavol Hardos, Peter T. Leeson, Dennis C. Mueller and Charles K. Rowley. Gordon Tullock deserves credit for bringing the issue to our attention. The usual caveat applies.
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Roháč, D. The unanimity rule and religious fractionalisation in the Polish-Lithuanian Republic. Constit Polit Econ 19, 111–128 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-008-9037-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-008-9037-5