Defining and measuring the network flexibility of humanitarian supply chains: insights from the 2015 Nepal earthquake

Abstract

The efficient and effective response to disasters critically depends on humanitarian supply chains (HSCs). HSCs need to be flexible to adapt to uncertainties in needs, infrastructure conditions, and behavior of other organizations. The concept of ‘network flexibility’ is, however, not clearly defined. The lack of an unanimous definition has led to a lack of consistent understanding and comparisons. This paper makes a threefold contribution: first, it defines the concept of network flexibility for HSC in the context of sudden onset disasters. Second, it proposes a framework to measure network flexibility in HSCs. Third, we apply our framework to the 2015 Nepal earthquake case and provide evidence-based insights regarding how humanitarian organizations can improve network flexibility in HSCs. Our analyses for Nepal case show that delivery, IT support, and fleet criteria have the most influence on flexibility. Also, the application of our framework on the downstream network of nine humanitarian organizations shows low levels of network flexibility in all but one. This finding explains why several disruptions happened in relief distributions during the Nepal response.

Appendices

Evaluation grids

Table 16 shows the measurement grid for flexibility criteria.

Table 16 Metrics and measurement grid for flexibility criteria

Details of field findings

1.1 Volume

Up 21st June 2015, nearly 8733 mt of relief items were sent to the affected areas by 110 different organizations (UNWFP 2015a). The share of relief items for distribution depended on the objectives of the HOs and changed over time: all interviewees mentioned that in the first days they primarily wanted to access the affected areas and distribute any relief item available to address the tremendous humanitarian needs. Therefore, the quantity of distribution was determined exclusively by available capacities and means for distribution. If standard items could not be sourced, some HOs replaced scarce standard items by entirely different products, e.g. food items instead of shelter sheets, that they could manage to procure in high volumes. However, we observed that volume and mix flexibility interrelate to each other and HOs often face trade-offs between these two criteria.

“So the government put restrictions in place which made [procuring and distributing shelter sheets] impossible and so we withdrew that and said: Okay, were not going to do it ...we decided food items it was the right decision.” (26. 06. 2015, UMN, Kathmandu)

“We had to stay in a long queue for sheets; then we decided to focus on kitchen items.” (28. 06. 2015, Humedica, Kathmandu)

In the later response, almost 2 weeks after the major aftershock of 12th May, organizations targeted a service level of 80 to 85 percent across all affected areas within food, health, and shelter clusters. However, data uncertainties were a major barrier to planning: all interviewees confirmed that the estimated needs were incorrect, although initial assessments based on Government Census reports were replaced by the multi-cluster initial rapid assessment (MIRA) and assessments by country teams of some HOs (WVI, UMN, UNWFP).

“But both [assessments] didnt match, because it kept increasing, so we still dont know what the final number of households is.” (24. 06. 2015, Cordaid, Kalikasthan)

“...in the beginning it was about 7,000 households and then it increased up to 9,000 households and by the time we are done it‘s been more than 10,000 households We are coming to the conclusion that it will be more than 11,000.” (26. 06. 2015, UMN, Kathmandu)

Indeed, a lack of concrete information regarding the needs, and limitations due to government policies in procurement and customs control, hampered operations. HOs who had volume flexibility adapted their supply chains to fluctuations in demand and changes in policies. However, our observations in field trips revealed that these HOs with volume flexibility were either focusing on only one relief material in few village development committees (VDCs) (Humedica) or they had establishments in Nepal prior to the earthquakes (UMN).

1.2 Mix

All representatives mentioned that their product mix flexibility is relatively low in overall: except for the first days of the response, they prefer to focus on one category of relief items, typically linked to a specific cluster.

“...currently we are only involved in shelter cluster ...we have already signed the contracts, and the local manufacturer is delivering the sheets to our warehouse.” (24. 06. 2015, Cordaid, Kalikasthan)

“We couldn‘t wait in the long queue to provide sheets for shelter...we decided to focus on food items.” (26. 06. 2015, UMN, Kathmandu)

“We wanted to provide something that can be procured easily from the local market. Therefore, we found some vendors for kitchen items” (28. 06. 2015, Humedica, Kathmandu)

In comparison to relatively low flexibility in overall, we observed that high levels of mix flexibility in one cluster brought some challenges to beneficiaries. Despite the available guidelines for kitted relief items, relief, packages were not standardized in terms of included items, size, and weight. Sometimes they were too heavy to be carried by beneficiaries and porters. For instance, a package that one organization was distributing weighed overall more than 50kg, and it required at least two persons to carry (2015b). Other packs only included 10Kg of rice which brought about criticisms:

“Two days, they needed to eat on the way. Now that 10kg is gone by the time they get home, so it wasnt worth coming. And not only that, all the bridges were affected, and there were so many landslides. They had to risk their lives to come and get those things, so it wasnt worth coming...It caused a few problems elsewhere because communities just said, no, we dont want yours, were going to wait for UMN to come and give us theirs.” (26. 06. 2015, UMN, Kathmandu)

Despite the variety of demands in different affected areas, HOs preferred to work on only one cluster in Nepal response. Providing standardized relief packages was challenging due to procurement problems. For instance, active HOs in food cluster faced several challenges with respect to requirements for storage and transportation due to less flexibility in those domains. In this regard, we observed that sharing resources improved the situation considerably.

1.3 Local sourcing

Different affected areas had distinct priorities and needs. As the surge of demands exceeded the local market capacity, local sourcing for shelter items, specifically CGI sheets, was causing delays. Only two local manufacturers were present at the moment of our field research and all their products, were sold out for the next 4 months to the HOs who signed the first contracts.

“We contacted local manufacturer...they told us that their CGI sheets are sold out, and we have to wait in the queue...” (26. 06. 2015, UMN, Kathmandu)

“Currently, it is extremely hard to find CGI sheets, locals are sold out, and there is a long queue.” (26. 05. 2015, IRW, Kathmandu)

“In cluster meetings, we found out that one organization has a lot of CGI sheets in their warehouses because they already had contracts with the manufacturer before the earthquake...We contacted them...We asked them to give us a part of their supplies...We will give them back when our own purchase arrives.” (23. 06. 2015, WVI, Kathmandu)

These sheets were used in shelter roofing and therefore, other HOs who wanted to remain active in the shelter cluster needed to procure them internationally. The Nepalese Government, on the other hand, had put strict regulations on importing CGI sheets and some relief items.

“We brought several items to the Indian border, but we couldn‘t get them in after three weeks. It was a bad situation because of spoilage. Our trucks were kept there. Therefore, we decided to distribute items near the border and send the trucks back.” (26. 05. 2015, IRW, Kathmandu)

“Our partners are trying their best to get customs clearance. It has been two weeks, I think.” (23. 06. 2015, WVI, Kathmandu)

The lack of flexibility in local sourcing almost doubled prices for high priority relief items on the local market (28. 06. 2015, local newspaper) and caused significant delays up to several weeks. Therefore, some representatives mentioned that they changed their targeted relief items if they had enough mix flexibility (WVI and Humedica). As a result, these HOs also needed to change their coordination cluster as well (from shelter to food cluster). Some HOs (UMN and Oxfam) tried to procure relief items from the same category in the local market (tarpaulin instead of CGI sheets).

1.4 Assets

In terms of asset flexibility, we focus here on warehouses. The observed structure of HSC networks in Nepal differed from literature, which typically assumes a layered network of local distribution centers. The mountainous and hard to access areas outside the capital, however, implied that there were hardly any local distribution centers. After arrival at the international airport in Kathmandu or at the borders, the material was shipped to the central warehouse(s) of the HOs. From there, relief items were sent directly to the affected areas. Figure 5 depicts a HSC downstream scheme typical for the situation in Nepal.

Fig. 5

Typical HSC downstream network in Nepal response

Interviewees from iNGOs mentioned that the strategic facility locations decisions were made immediately upon arrival in Nepal based on availability and distance to affected areas (IRW, UMN, WVI, Cordaid, and Humedica representatives). Some of them already had pre-deployed assets due to their presence before the event of earthquakes (UMN and Cordaid) and few interviewees referred to the possibility to share assets with other HOs (UMN and WFP).

“I took the first place that I found because the cargo was coming and I didn‘t have enough time to look further!” (28. 06. 2015, Humedica, Kathmandu)

“By the time the disaster comes, our current warehouse was used for something else. And actually, it worked out quite well because it took us a couple of weeks to get a procurement coming in, goods coming in. ...I mean even now I think were looking for another one because of the ongoing work.” (26. 06. 2015, UMN, Kathmandu)

Our interviews and observations confirmed that there is a connection: asset flexibility is a constraint for volume flexibility. More effort invested in suitable assets meant less probability to change location during the response. Given time pressure, sharing assets or using portable warehouses provided more flexibility. However, we observed only few HOs sharing their assets (WFP). Furthermore, not all HOs have the access and resources to deploy portable warehouses, e.g. big tents.

1.5 Fleet and transportation

The mountainous topography of Nepal brought many logistics challenges. Standard road transportation was often impossible, although HOs truck provision worked in general well. Some hired fleet delegates from local logistic service providers (Canadian Red Cross and IRW), and others did their road transportation themselves or through the Logistics Cluster. However, all interviewees mentioned that access to helicopters the only asset for air transportation to remote mountain areas - was difficult and required seven to ten days pre-planning. Because of the shortage of helicopters, air transport was dedicated to high priority relief items only, i.e. corrugated galvanized iron (CGI) sheets for shelter. Therefore, HOs who specialized on shelter, or those who were flexible in the product mix were able to request air transportation. Also, some of them took the benefit of a pre-established connection with the air transport service providers.

“We wanted to deliver NFI kits and Food packages, but also, we knew that we have to mention CGI sheets also in the forms to be in the queue. So we fill request forms with CGI sheets and after that with other items.” (22. 06. 2015, WVI, Kathmandu)

“I prioritize [shelter] relief items and apart from that, I put the other food stuff items into one form so that we were in the queue.” (23. 06. 2015, UMN, Kathmandu)

“When they first arrived [in Nepal] nobody really knew about them [MAF] but we, we used them. We were the first one on the list first day of operation.” (23. 06. 2015, UMN, Kathmandu)

Because some affected areas were located in high altitudes and helicopters could not reach them, animal or human porters were used for last mile distribution (UNWFP 2015b). In this case, staging points to break bulks were set up, which could be reached by trucks or helicopters. From there, porters were responsible for the last mile delivery to beneficiaries which sometimes took 2–3 days (UNWFP 2015c). Overall, a combination of transportation modes was used by a few HOs among our participants (WFP, WVI, and UMN) since the others were not active in the most remote mountainous affected areas.

Due to delivery challenges (see Sect. B.6), most HOs struggled with challenges in substituting fleets in the last minutes or rescheduling (all representatives except Canadian Red Cross) that resulted in delivery delays. For instance, during our field trip to Rasuwa, we observed that delays in delivering shelter sheets combined with the start of the rainy season, forced several families to move together.

1.6 Delivery

Transportation planning was dominated by operations, and typically, plans were made and updated daily (interviews with UMN, Cordaid, and WVI representatives). Owing to the volatility of the situation, and the continuous risk of road blockage (e.g., by landslides), relief organizations had to update their plans every time new information was received (WVI and UMN representatives).

“Every five minutes! Whenever new information comes, we change the plan. For instance, the helicopter thing was really crucial, and we didnt know ...I mean how many times we had to ask in those first days for the helicopter. We had no idea how long it would take.” (26. 06. 2015, UMN, Kathmandu)

Because of those conditions, drivers frequently refused transports (IFRC representative). Since no alternative schedules were pre-planned (confirmed by all interviewees), and because there were no systems for rapid rescheduling, delivery dates were frequently not met, causing backlogs and under-supplies.

1.7 IT support

The use of computers, networking, cell-phone data and other physical devices to handle data were visible at headquarters level in Kathmandu. The logistics cluster supported other HOs with information products and maps (129 situation updates until the date of field research). Other HOs contributed by reporting their field observations during relief operations, like roads status.

We observed a similar information management set up at different coordination centres in Kathmandu. All interviewees indicated the important role of IT tools specifically for coordination and information sharing during their relief operations. Despite the lack of common data sharing system among HOs, cluster meetings acted as a coordination place where representatives could find answers for some of their questions. However, not all of HOs could participate in such meetings due to their human resource restrictions, and they prefer to read the meeting minutes that were shared online or were sent to registered email addresses.

“Cluster meetings are really helpful, and everyone tries to get information there...If we have a question or need something, we can go directly and ask.” (23. 06. 2015, WVI, Kathmandu)

“We always have someone in cluster meetings we have to find what we need there...WFP helps us with updated information in cluster meetings...” (26. 06. 2015, UMN, Kathmandu)

“We are only three, and we cannot be at several places at the same time. I try to participate but since I have been here [4 weeks], I could go there only once...so I usually use minutes” (28. 06. 2015, Humedica, Kathmandu)

Our field observations confirmed that ICT helped significantly in coordinating relief operations. Since communication infrastructures in many affected areas were back to work quickly (in two to three days), HOs were able to establish their remote connection for coordination. According to local newspapers, access to cell-phone networks, radios, and satellites was effectively possible in Kathmandu two days after the earthquakes. However, not all affected areas experience the same. Up to the date of our field research, practitioners still had a lot of problems to contact their partners in mountainous areas.

“They have to go to the top of the hill, a certain hill, and there they get reception. Anywhere else they cant get reception...So sometimes it was so frustrating like when we needed information and [...] or when we needed to communicate, like, “We have helicopter tomorrow,” they wouldnt call us and its so frustrating. So it was challenging sometimes...” (26. 06. 2015, UMN, Kathmandu)

By improving the IT support, HOs could enhance their assessments, data collection, information sharing and coordination in Nepal response. Furthermore, they could compare the information through different sources (WFP) and verify them before sharing through online platforms (like Reliefweb). In this regard, access to reliable information was enhanced since the aftermath of disaster.

1.8 Information database

Despite the increasing availability of tracking and tracing technology, incoming and outgoing items in Nepal were counted manually. Related paper-based forms were completed by warehouse managers and then transferred to Excel sheets. The lack of integrated inventory management software and human error resulted in the need for several inventory controls during the distribution operations for all interviewed organizations.

In the Rasuwa district, various HOs conducted surveys to assess the humanitarian needs and opportunities for local sourcing. During our visit, which coincided with the formal transition from the response to the early recovery phase, the majority of HOs were in the process of adding granularity to their data. As in other natural disasters (Altay and Labonte 2014; Van de Walle and Comes 2015) the Nepal case also followed a transition from initial high-level assessments to more granular information products as time passed. This information often composed of the number of current habitants/households, their personal information, belongings, losses, land/house status, and received financial assistance.

“It is like a newspaper. If you read about an area you do not know, its always informative and seems right, but if you read about your area, you always know its incomplete.” (22. 06. 2015, Canadian Red Cross)

“Our partner in collaboration with our own staff do the need assessment ...they went door-by-door and ask their needs.” (23. 06. 2015, WVI, Kathmandu)

As we witnessed, the methods and detail at which such information was collected varied tremendously; for instance, door to door assessment, local representatives, and households documents. However, no database was developed to manage and store this information.

“International NGOs rarely had a database system that tracks the field updates from the beginning of response.” (26. 06. 2015, UNWFP, Kathmandu)

We also observed duplication of need assessment efforts. International HOs and their partner NGOs were running various needs assessments to fulfill their data needs and hence, the ones operating in similar areas collected the same data. Therefore, due to common use of papers and lack of specifically developed database, the need of more experienced human resources was increased in HOs. In response, one HO (Cordaid) decided to develop an ad-hoc information database which could share assessments and beneficiaries information with the Nepalese Government as well. Linking information databases with inventory management systems in WFP, expanded more visibility in the downstream and enabled rapid adaptation. It also facilitated information sharing within other relief organizations.

1.9 Decision support system (DSS)

Interviewees confirmed the frequently reported skepticism against technology and computational decision support tools in the field (Crum et al. 2011; Kovács and Spens 2012; Comes and Van de Walle 2016). Arguments against the operational use of DSS include that the tools require time, processing capacity, computational resources, and specific expertise to enter data and interpret results. Among our interviewees, only the logistics cluster used a DSS¹ for transportation scheduling. In addition, we also found evidence of field staff trying to avoid the role of decision-maker.

“We are not deciding, but the partner is. The partner will come with the new plan so after the assessment, they have some documentation about what is the need for this VDC. After that, we will decide together.” (24. 06. 2015, Cordaid, Kalikasthan)

“We don‘t have much time for that [DSS] I have some considerations myself for making decisions.” (26. 05. 2015, IRW, Kathmandu)

The lack of technology support resulted in overly simplifying assumptions and the use of heuristics, which is well documented also for other cases (Comes 2016). In Nepal, typically, few variables and parameters were considered in decision-making, although the underlying problems were complex, e.g. having numbers of warehouses with capacities $\le 500\,\mathrm{m^2}$ in different places instead of one with capacity $\ge 1500\,\mathrm{m^2}$, the available parking space for trucks, or access to the helipad for decisions regarding warehouse locations.

This lack of structured support in addressing complex problems resulted in inefficiencies such as congestions, loading/offloading problems, and delays, which were reported by all interviewees.

1.10 Human resources

Human resources in HOs were keys to coordination and efficient use of assets, fleets, and materials. Since all studied HOs were international, most of their high and mid-level human resources were international. Operational levels were staffed with local human resources since they had the most interactions with local communities. HOs hired local human resources as fleet delegates, warehouse or procurement manager to strengthen the negotiation capacity and overcome language or cultural barriers.

Furthermore, through local staff, HOs accessed vital information during relief operations, e.g., regarding roads, bridges, and village status. Therefore, they improve the capacity of HO with new and reliable information.

“So I [as a local HR] can call the locals and know about the road conditions and every other thing that we want. We can call them in advance and ask like [whether the] road is OK or not? Sometimes there are landslides in Dhunche, and first, we have to know the road conditions and other related things, so I do that before the departure...on the highway, we also know all the police stations...because we cannot work if we don‘t have any connection.” (22. 06. 2015, Canadian Red Cross, Kathmandu)

“Its quite difficult to verify the new information about the situation. You dont verify when youre trying to use it. You can waste several days taking goods on a path that doesnt exist. So I mean its a pretty big risk unless you had confidence that the source of the information was a good source [like local HR].” (23. 06. 2015, WVI, Kathmandu)

We observed only simple and inefficient mechanisms to organize volunteers in Nepal response, e.g. office registration, also pointing at a lack of database flexibility and IT support. Furthermore, HOs had started to replace their international staff with local human resources as they assumed the situation was becoming more stable. However, rainy season complicated the situation in some parts and new staff lacked experience. Therefore, increasing this criterion flexibility has some limitations that need to be considered.

Despite the challenges, we observed that improving HR flexibility decreased high rotation of field workers. This rotations added to the complexity of management due to diversity in viewpoints As a result of HR flexibility, some interviewees expressed more consistent decision-making (Canadian Red Cross and UMN) in addition to improvements in establishing local partnerships.

1.11 Local partners

The Nepalese Government required all international HOs, to partner with local organizations. Those partners were often local NGOs who distributed relief items to villages.

“We don‘t do the distribution, our local partner does. We just procure items, and they do the rest.” (23. 06. 2015, WVI, Kathmandu)

They also assisted with finding local manufacturers, negotiations with customs control, and recruiting volunteers. Among the studied HOs, some had a pre-established partnership with local NGO(s) and therefore, they could start their operations faster. Local partners also led operational decision-making.

“We are not deciding, but the partner is. The partner will come with the new plan so after the assessment, they have some documentation about what is the need for this VDC. After that, we will decide together.” (24. 06. 2015, Cordaid, Kalikasthan)

However, a lack of flexibility to engage in new partnerships where necessary and insufficient HR flexibility to facilitate the situations delayed the processes and procedures:

“I have to go with them in distribution. I have to go myself and see how they do it It‘s our first partnership, and we don‘t know them well.” (28. 06. 2015, Humedica, Kathmandu)

According to our observations, we found that this criterion flexibility was among the best practices of HOs. Most of them managed to quickly establish a partnership or change it when necessary (for instance after changing their cluster). Interviewees mentioned that they have defined partnership protocols. In addition to the support that local partner flexibility can provide for other criteria, it supports the community empowerment (Baharmand et al. 2017).