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Watchdogs and ombudsmen: monitoring the abuse of supermarket power

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Abstract

Self-regulation has become a mantra for both governments and private industry in the neoliberal era. Yet, problems remain in terms of supermarket accountability and control. Governments everywhere appear to be under increasing pressure to move beyond the self-regulatory model by enacting legislation which better monitors and polices supermarket-supplier relations. In most cases, the appointment of an oversight authority—known variously as an ombudsman, watchdog, or adjudicator—with the power to set standards and apply sanctions, and to whom suppliers can appeal in cases of perceived abuse, has been advocated. This paper investigates the role of watchdogs and ombudsmen as potential governance mechanisms for overseeing supermarket-supplier relations and explores, in detail, escalating pressure for their appointment within the UK and Australia over the last 20 years. The pursuit of regulatory frameworks to monitor, and adjudicate on, problems arising out of changing power relationships along agri-food supply chains in these two countries has been met with strong resistance from supermarkets; however, after 20 years of debate, it appears that these governments may be on the path towards legislating for an independent body to handle disputes. This paper critically examines ‘self-regulation’ and concludes that watchdogs and ombudsmen are only a partial solution, at best, to the problems that are arising from the neoliberal settings which govern relations between food suppliers and food retailers.

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Notes

  1. This is the case as long as a retailer is a subscriber to the ETI. When Somerfield, the UK supermarket chain was acquired by a private equity consortium involving Apax Partners and Robert Tchenguiz, a property developer, in 2006, one of its cost-cutting measures involved withdrawing from the ETI (see Burch and Lawrence, this volume; The Guardian 2006).

  2. Slotting fees can vary greatly in scale but are generally thought to add significantly to a retailer’s overall profits. In France, it has been reported that in 1999, some 88 % of a retailer’s margin consisted of ‘hidden’ charges, mostly slotting fees (Allain and Chambolle 2005). In the US, a Federal Trade Commission report (2003) found that the average value of a slotting fee varied from US$2,313 to US$21,786 per item per retailer, and that the cost in slotting fees of introducing a new grocery line nationally was between US$1.5 and US2 million (see Federal Trade Commission 2003).

  3. ‘Ombud’ is derived from the Nordic term ‘umbodh’ with ‘um’ meaning ‘regarding’ and ‘bodh’ meaning ‘command’. The term was first used in Sweden in 1552, but the work of ombudsmen can be traced to the Qin Dynasty in China in 200 BC, through to the Muslims in 600 AD. Influenced by what he had seen in Turkey, King Charles XII of Sweden created the ‘Highest Order of Ombudsman’ in 1713 (Office of the Ombudsman 2009). In 1809, the Swedish parliament appointed an ombudsman to ensure that decisions of the executive branch of government did not compromise the rights of citizens. The ombudsman was, and is, an independent official who, in helping to mediate and resolve disputes in a fair and unbiased manner, represents citizen interests. In a legal sense, the ombudsman is concerned with investigating citizen complaints and, at least in theory, must exhibit neutrality, trustworthiness, and confidentiality. Although often appointed by the state, the ombudsman does not have the power to alter laws, to police decisions, or to change administrative arrangements.

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Acknowledgments

This study was part-funded by the Australian Research Council (Project Nos. DP 0773092 and DP 110102299). Professor Lawrence was also part-funded by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2010-330-00159). The authors are also grateful to the two anonymous referees who provided comments on the paper and to Paul Belesky who provided insights into the work of Karl Polanyi.

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Correspondence to Geoffrey Lawrence.

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Burch, D., Lawrence, G. & Hattersley, L. Watchdogs and ombudsmen: monitoring the abuse of supermarket power. Agric Hum Values 30, 259–270 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10460-012-9412-8

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