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Budget feasible mechanisms for facility location games with strategic facilities

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Abstract

This paper studies the facility location game with payments, in which customers and facilities are located at publicly known locations on a line segment, and the facilities are strategic players. Each facility has an opening-cost as her private information, and she may strategically report it. Upon receiving the reports, the government uses a mechanism to select some facilities to open and pay them. The cost/utility of each customer depends on the distance to the nearest opened facility. Under a given budget B, which constrains the total payment, we derive upper and lower bounds on the approximation ratios of truthful budget feasible mechanisms for four utilitarian and egalitarian objectives, and investigate the case when augmented budget is allowed.

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Acknowledgements

This work is partially supported by Artificial Intelligence and Data Science Research Hub, BNUHKBU United International College (UIC), under project No. 2020KSYS007, and by a grant from UIC (No. UICR0400025-21). Minming Li is supported by a grant from Research Grants Council of Hong Kong (No. CityU 11205619). Chenhao Wang is supported by a grant from UIC (No. UICR0700036-22).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong

    Minming Li

  2. Beijing Normal University, Zhuhai, China

    Chenhao Wang

  3. BNU-HKBU United International College, Zhuhai, China

    Chenhao Wang

  4. AMSS, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

    Mengqi Zhang

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  1. Minming Li
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  2. Chenhao Wang
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  3. Mengqi Zhang
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Correspondence to Chenhao Wang.

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A preliminary version of this article appears in IJCAI 2020 [18].

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Li, M., Wang, C. & Zhang, M. Budget feasible mechanisms for facility location games with strategic facilities. Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst 36, 35 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-022-09563-9

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