Abstract
We study the asymptotic average minimum manipulating coalition size as a characteristic of quality of a voting rule and show its serious drawback. We suggest using the asymptotic average threshold coalition size instead. We prove that, in large electorates, the asymptotic average threshold coalition size is maximised among all scoring rules by the Borda rule when the number m of alternatives is 3 or 4, and by \(\lfloor m/2\rfloor\)-approval voting when m ≥ 5.
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Pritchard, G., Slinko, A. On the Average Minimum Size of a Manipulating Coalition. Soc Choice Welfare 27, 263–277 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0130-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0130-2