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The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences

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Abstract

The vulnerability of a social choice function to coalitional manipulation of preferences is defined as the proportion of voting situations in which the social choice function can be manipulated by a coalition of individuals. In this paper, we provide exact relations giving the vulnerability of four specific social choice functions (plurality rule, anti-plurality rule, plurality with runoff, anti-plurality with runoff) in three-alternative elections. Plurality with runoff appears to be less vulnerable than the other three rules.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. C.R.E.M.E., University of Caen, F-14032, Caen Cedex, France

    Dominique Lepelley & Boniface Mbih

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  1. Dominique Lepelley
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  2. Boniface Mbih
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Lepelley, D., Mbih, B. The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences. Soc Choice Welfare 11, 253–265 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00193810

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00193810

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