Abstract
We consider the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. We study how large a preference domain can be to allow for the existence of strategy-proof, symmetric and efficient allocation rules when the amount of the good is a variable. This question is qualified by an additional requirement that a domain should include a minimally rich domain. We first characterize the uniform rule (Bennasy in The economics of market disequilibrium, Academic, New York, 1982) as the unique strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient rule on a minimally rich domain when the amount of the good is fixed. Then, exploiting this characterization, we establish the following: there is a unique maximal domain that includes a minimally rich domain and allows for the existence of strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient rules when the amount of good is a variable. It is the single-plateaueddomain.
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Mizobuchi, H., Serizawa, S. Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Rules in Allotment Economies. Soc Choice Welfare 27, 195–210 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0112-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0112-4