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An alternative characterization of the uniform rule

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Abstract

We consider the problem of allocating some amount of a commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences. We show that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying equal treatment of equals, Pareto efficiency, and strategy-proofness. This characterization strengthens two interesting results due to Sprumont (1991). Our method of proof involves only elementary arguments.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Rochester, 14627, Rochester, NY, USA

    Stephen Ching

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  1. Stephen Ching
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Additional information

I wish to thank Professor William Thomson for his enormous efforts in supervision. I am grateful to Professor Marcus Berliant and Hideo Konishi for their useful remarks and especially to an anonymous referee for insightful comments. All remaining errors are my own responsibility.

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Ching, S. An alternative characterization of the uniform rule. Soc Choice Welfare 11, 131–136 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00179209

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00179209

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