Abstract
Informationally robust equilibria (IRE) are introduced in Robson (Games Econ Behav 7: 233–245, 1994) as a refinement of Nash equilibria for strategic games. Such equilibria are limits of a sequence of (subgame perfect) Nash equilibria in perturbed games where with small probability information about the strategic behavior is revealed to other players (information leakage). Focusing on bimatrix games, we consider a type of informationally robust equilibria and derive a number of properties they form a non-empty and closed subset of the Nash equilibria. Moreover, IRE is a strict concept in the sense that the IRE are independent of the exact sequence of probabilities with which information is leaked. The set of IRE, like the set of Nash equilibria, is the finite union of polytopes. In potential games, there is an IRE in pure strategies. In zero-sum games, the set of IRE has a product structure and its elements can be computed efficiently by using linear programming. We also discuss extensions to games with infinite strategy spaces and more than two players.
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The authors would like to thank Marieke Quant for her helpful comments.
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Open Access This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License ( https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0 ), which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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Reijnierse, H., Borm, P. & Voorneveld, M. On ‘Informationally Robust Equilibria’ for Bimatrix Games. Economic Theory 30, 539–560 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0076-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0076-0