Abstract
Selten's concept of perfect equilibrium for normal form games is reviewed, and a new concept of proper equilibrium is defined. It is shown that the proper equilibria form a nonempty subset of the perfect equilibria, which in turn form a subset of the Nash equilibria. An example is given to show that these inclusions may be strict.
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References
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Nash, J.F.: Non-Cooperative Games. Annals of Mathematics54, 1951, 286–295.
Selten, R.: Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. International Journal of Game Theory4, 1975, 25–55.
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The author acknowledges helpful conversations with Ehud Kalai and David Schmeidler.
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Myerson, R.B. Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept. Int J Game Theory 7, 73–80 (1978). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753236
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753236